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vAbstract
Ecological economists aim to study the interrelations between ecological and economic
systems, with a view to promoting changes towards sustainability. They agree that the nature
of global environmental crises is systemic and rooted in economic dynamics. Yet, core
economic categories, such as prices, profits, money and their interrelations with ecological
destruction, are surprisingly undertheorized. The ‘economic’ becomes either tied to
neoclassical economics or remains neglected. Marxian Political Economy has the potential to
address this gap, but is mostly ignored in ecological economics, especially in what it is best
at: explaining dynamics of the capitalist system as a whole.
This PhD advocates a more systemic and theoretically grounded ecological economics. I find
that neoclassical economic reasoning is rooted much deeper in ecological economics than
often assumed. I present a critique of the neoclassical underpinnings of ecological economics,
and a Marxian alternative. I identify the Marxian understanding of ‘value’ and ‘capital’ as the
missing core of ecological economics: a realistic understanding of the capitalist system,
spelled out from basics in simple and abstract terms. I explain these foundations and
integrate them with a system dynamics understanding of global ecological destruction, social
crises and barriers to social change.
I conclude that ecological economics needs to be grounded in a realistic understanding of
capitalism – if it aspires to meet its own ambitions. Economic theory and methodology are
powerful political tools towards this end: they expose or conceal root causes of social
ecological problems and offer better or worse guidance on how to act. Pragmatism about the
role of theory and methodology is dangerous, more often than not, because it promotes the
reproduction of power relations that prevent, instead of encourage, sustainability transitions.
I argue for the need to break with existing prejudices against the Marxian approach and take
it seriously as realistic economic theory.
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11 Introduction
1.1 The argument of this thesis
This chapter introduces the argument of this PhD research, which is the following. Ecological
economics provides promising foundations for understanding and acting upon social
ecological crises, in terms of content, approach and ambition. It moves beyond standard
economic applications to the environment in important ways (section 1.2.1). Yet, these
starting points have not been fully carried through to the realm of the economic. The
behaviour of ‘the economy’ and core economic categories such as prices, profits or money
and their interrelations with social ecological phenomena and crises remain surprisingly
undertheorized. The ‘economic’ remains either tied to neoclassical economics or gets
neglected (section 1.2.2). The relationship to neoclassical economics is the core contentious
issue within the field (section 1.2.3). Marxian Political Economy provides a systemic, realistic,
dynamic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding the economy which is consistent
with ecological economics (section 1.3.1). However, the Marxian approach remains almost
absent, especially what it is best at: explaining dynamics of the capitalist system as a whole
(section 1.3.2). This insight is not new (e.g. Adaman and Özkaynak, 2002; Özkaynak et al.,
2012), but no one has substantially progressed on this agenda. The contributions that exist do
not go far enough in remedying misunderstandings and prejudices regarding the contents and
goals of Marxian Political Economy, and providing an accessible account of core Marxian
insights for ecological economists (section 1.3.3). This prevents the uptake of a coherent and
emancipatory ecological economics paradigm in its own right, which I see as crucial for
pushing a radical agenda of social ecological transformation (section 1.4).
“We had to destroy the world in theory before we could destroy it in
practice” (Laing 1988 cited by Capra, 1997, p. 19).
21.2 The state of ecological economics
1.2.1 Common ground
Ecological economics developed out of a deep concern that standard economic applications
to the environment are insufficient to effectively deal with modern environmental crises
(Røpke, 2005, 2004). Neoclassical economics in general and environmental economics1 in
particular have been attacked for denying biophysical reality and approaching what is an
essentially dynamic, interrelated and complex system in a reductionist way. The alternative
offered by ecological economists starts with a recognition that natural and social systems are
inherently interconnected, influence each other, and need to be studied together (Foxon et
al., 2013; Spash, 2011a). This establishes the subject matter of ecological economics as
studying
“the relationships between eco-systems and economic systems in the
broadest sense” (Costanza, 1989, p. 1).
“how ecosystems and economic activity interrelate” (Proops, 1989, p. 60).
“the interactions between economic systems and ecological systems
(Common and Stagl, 2005, p. 1).
“the intersection of ecology and economics” (Martinez-Alier and Muradian,
2015a, p. 15).
These quotes show a remarkable consistency and agreement over what ecological economists
would like ecological economics to be, ever since the establishment of the field 30 years ago,
i.e. the study of social ecological interrelations, with a view to change towards sustainability.
How, then, do ecological economists think about the intertwined nature of social and natural
systems? The starting point is the so-called pre-analytic vision of ecological economics, a term
1 Environmental economics is a sub-discipline of neoclassical economics derived from microeconomic
price theory (Krupp, 1963). It is a disciplinary field that applies concepts and methods from neoclassical
(welfare) economics in approaching environmental problems (Howarth, 2011). Environmental problems
are conceptualised as negative externalities that need to be internalised to remedy market failure,
restore market efficiency and maximise social welfare. The basic solution to environmental problems
from this perspective is to get the prices right (Vatn, 2005b). Despite innumerable critiques of
environmental economics and its neoclassical foundations, it remains by far the most used analysis for
environmental policy-making in practice.
3borrowed from Schumpeter (Spash, 2012). Figure 1 illustrates two common ways how this
vision is presented.
Figure 1. The pre-analytic vision of ecological economics
Source: left: Spash, 2014; right: Costanza et al., 2015, p. 5
These diagrams portray a vision of the economy as a subsystem of society, itself embedded in
the biological and physical environment. From this perspective, all economic processes are
social2 and ultimately natural processes in terms of biological, physical and chemical
2 The distinction between economic and social spheres requires qualification. The economic system
refers to the production and distribution of goods and services and associated institutions. It is portrayed
as one amongst several social systems, such as politics, education, culture, science or law. All economic
processes are therefore considered social processes, whereas the reverse is not the case (Luhmann,
1994, 1987).
4transformations and as such subject to the laws of thermodynamics (Georgescu-Roegen,
1971). Waste and energy streams are an inevitable part of any economic process and
‘externalities’ not exceptions but pervasive and persistent (Kapp, 1971).3 Complexity arises at
each level of organisation – from the physical, to the biological, social and economic – which
implies that social and economic dynamics cannot be exhaustively explained by biophysical
laws. Ultimately, the key message from these conceptualisations is that economic and social
systems are dependent for their survival on the biophysical world and subject to the limits
thereof (Meadows et al., 1972; Spash, 2012).
From this starting point, ecological economics moves beyond environmental economics in
important ways. Ecological economists offer a biophysical perspective of the economic
process, i.e. flows of energy and resources through the system, by drawing on systems theory
(Bertalanffy, 1968; Boulding, Kenneth, 1956; Meadows, 2009), thermodynamics (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971), systems ecology (Odum and Odum, 2006), and resilience theory4 (Holling,
1985). In addition, they prioritise human needs and wellbeing (Cruz et al., 2009; Rauschmayer
et al., 2011) as well as social and environmental justice (Martinez-Alier, 2003) as desirable
societal goals, rather than economic growth or other economic targets as ‘intermediaries’.
This orientation leads to the study of distribution conflicts (Temper et al., 2015), power and
vested interests (Fuchs et al., 2016), institutions (Kapp, 1978; Vatn, 2015a), and environmental
values and ethics (O’Neill, 1992). By taking an inter- and transdisciplinary, and deliberately
pluralistic, holistic and post-normal5 approach, ecological economics also offers a
methodological tool-kit fit for studying social ecological complexities in realistic and
3 Whereas all forms of social organisation are associated with matter-energy and waste streams, the
types and magnitudes of resource use have varied greatly throughout human history. The social
metabolism of hunter-gatherer societies was estimated at about 10 GJ/capita, for agrarian societies at
50 GJ/capita and for the industrial regime at 200 GJ/capita. From 1500 AD onwards, the increase has
become much steeper: it more than doubled between 1500-1800, from 1700 on it doubled per century,
from 1900 on it doubled in 50 years, and from 1950 on it tripled in 50 years (Fischer-Kowalski et al.,
2014).
4 Resilience theory tackles the capacity of systems to deal with shocks. Holling (1986) pioneered the
approach of drawing inferences from the analysis of dynamic ecological systems – including
irreversibilities, thresholds, non-linearities, time-lags, fundamental uncertainty, multi-equilibrium
states, complexity – onto the analysis of economic systems thus co-founding (co-)evolutionary
economics.
5 Post-normal science has been developed by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz in the 1990s as a new
type of science for problems in which “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions
urgent” (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993, p. 744) – such as climate change. They critique the scientisation
of politics and associated use of elitist tools such as technocratic cost-benefit-analysis. Instead, they call
for new problem-solving strategies based on a democratisation of the scientific process, for instance by
adopting transdisciplinary methodologies (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994a, 1994c, 1993).
5transformative ways (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Lélé and Norgaard, 2005; Max-Neef, 2005).
Moreover, the field hosts spaces for advancing radical social change, such as post- and
degrowth movements (D’Alisa et al., 2014).
Taken together, these foundational pillars result in the widespread view that ecological
economics is the heterodox school of thought of the environment that offers a more realistic,
systemic and progressive alternative to neoclassical welfare economics.
“As the only heterodox school of economics focusing on the human
economy both as a social system and as one imbedded in the biophysical
universe … ecological economics is poised to play a leading role in recasting
the scope and method of economic science” (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005, p.
208).
The same opinion is expressed by Richard Norgaard, one of the co-founders of our discipline,
in an interview with Colander et al. (2004):
Question: Is ecological economics terribly heterodox?
Answer: Yes, I hope so.
6COMMON GROUND IN ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
The pre-analytic vision
 Biophysical reality exists independently of humans
 Biophysical and social realities are distinct (i.e. a hierarchical ontology is accepted – physical,
biological, social, economic) but interrelated
 Human development is subject to biophysical limits
 Social ecological realities are complex, dynamic, interrelated and continuously changing
Vision & ambition
Ecological economists study social and natural interrelations, with a view to change towards
sustainability. The vision of living well within limits for all includes future generations and non-
human beings. Increasing ecological crises require emphasising distribution conflicts and issues of
justice.
Methodology
Complex, dynamic, interrelated social ecological realities need to be studied realistically, in their
own right and with a view to transformative change; this requires
 Systemic thinking (understanding interrelations, emergence, co-evolution)
 Interdisciplinarity (different forms of knowledge, mixed-method approaches)
 Transdisciplinarity (deliberative and participatory methods, focus on processes)
 Biophysical and social assessments (input-output, material flow analyses, sustainability indicators)
 Post-normal science (strong uncertainty, complexity, reflexivity)
 Value pluralism and incommensurability (multi-criteria decisions, power and vested interest)
Research themes (in alphabetical order)
 Co-evolutionary processes and development
 Critique of neoclassical environmental economics
 Degrowth and steady-state economics
 Ecological macroeconomics
 Ecosystem services and commons
 Energy accounting and thermodynamics
 Environmental conflicts and social justice
 Environmental governance and institutions
 Environmental values and ethics
 Human needs, wellbeing and consumption
 Social metabolism
 Sustainability indicators
Table 1. Common ground in ecological economics
Source: own, drawing on Martinez-Alier and Muradian, 2015 and Spash, 2017, 2012
71.2.2 A missing core?
The pre-analytic vision acknowledges that the dynamics of the social world cannot be
exhaustively explained by biophysical laws. How, then, is the economic realm – that lies at the
heart of the pre-analytic vision – conceptualised and studied in ecological economics? The
answer is: surprisingly little. The economy is widely treated as a black box. Figure 1 serves as
an illustrative example. In the graph on the right, the economy is indeed visualised as a box,
with energy-matter entering and exiting the economy-box. This way of thinking might be a
legacy from general systems theory, which provides the following rationale for conceptualising
black boxes: because the inner life of systems is complex and not transparent, regularities can
be observed by looking at inputs and/or outputs. Attempts to influence unknown system
behaviour are then made by varying inputs or outputs. This implies a shift away from the
system itself to its surroundings. In practice, this has led to much research aiming to measure
biophysical inputs, throughput and output and conducting analyses that plot core conflicts
between the growth6 of ‘the economy’ and ‘the environment’.
Whilst the biophysical approach to understanding economic processes is insightful in many
respects – for instance, to understand the reliance on certain types of resources and their
impacts on ecosystems, especially dynamics and scale effects – it is insufficient for an in-depth
understanding of root causes of social ecological crises. Biophysical accounts are crucial for
substantiating ecological overuse, but cannot explain ecological destruction at a fundamental
level. They show what is happening (humanity entering the Anthropocene), but fail to explain
why. If we adopt a systems thinking perspective and accept that a system causes its own
behaviour, emerging from the interrelations of its parts, then problems are not ‘out there’ but
‘in here’ (Meadows, 2009). It is crucial to understand why and how the ‘black box’, i.e. specific
forms of economic organisation, destroy biophysical and social worlds. Luhmann is one social
scientist who long ago argued that Bertalanffy’s system theory is a valuable first step but does
not go far enough to analyse the social and economic realm. This approach may be
appropriate for certain natural systems with lower levels of complexity but it is not for social
systems that consist of many variables and different hierarchies (Luhmann, 1987).
6 Indeed, this also seems to explain ecological economists’ heavy emphasis on growth as the main cause
of global crisis phenomena. As Meadows remarks: “Asked by the Club of Rome to show how major global
problems – poverty and hunger, environmental destruction, resource depletion, urban deterioration,
unemployment – are related and how they might be solved, Forrester made a computer model and came
out with a clear leverage point: Growth” (Meadows, 1999, p. 1).
8How, then, can the economy as a complex social system entangled with the biophysical world
be understood? One obvious move is to turn to the discipline of economics. However, here
we encounter the next problem. Although there is widespread agreement that neoclassical
economics is deeply flawed (Anderson and M’Gonigle, 2012; Spash, 2013, 2011b; Spash and
Ryan, 2012), in practice, it remains widely accepted as one fundamental pillar of ecological
economics (Common and Stagl, 2005; Costanza et al., 2015; Daly and Farley, 2011; Shmelev,
2012). Many ecological economists believe neoclassical economics offers key insights and
concepts into how the economic system works, but that it is ‘freely floating’, i.e. not grounded
in biophysical reality and that this is what ecological economists can contribute to improving
it. Or alternatively, even if scholars acknowledge severe limits of neoclassical economics, they
often choose to buy into mainstream concepts for pragmatic reasons. Speaking a language
policy-makers understand is often seen as increasing the chances of resolving social ecological
problems (Spash, 2013).
If we leave disagreement about the role of mainstream economics within our field aside for a
moment, what alternative schools of economic thought have been explored? Interestingly, at
the time when ecological economics came into being, immediate links were established to the
physiocrats (Cleveland, 1999, 1987) and Classical Political Economy (Becker et al., 2005;
Christensen, 1989, 1987) because these schools of thought considered nature as a
fundamental part of the economic process. However, explorations in this direction were
mainly concerned with Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Mill (Seidl and Tisdell, 1999; Zweig, 1979).
Marxist perspectives have been widely omitted (see section 1.3.2). This matters, as Marx
pursued a different approach than the other Classics and reached different conclusions, as I
will elaborate in chapters 3 and 4.
Attempts to build bridges with Post Keynesian economics were initiated very early too
(Gowdy, 1991). These relations have existed ever since but rather at the fringes (Holt et al.,
2009; Kronenberg, 2010). This situation has changed with the development of ‘ecological
macroeconomics’ which has led to a mushrooming of Post Keynesian contributions (Dafermos
et al., 2014; Fontana and Sawyer, 2013; Jackson, 2009; Rezai and Stagl, 2016; Victor and
Rosenbluth, 2007). Until now, contributions focus on modelling (especially stock-flow
consistent modelling) and scenario building, not on substantive economic theory. Links to
other schools of thought exist too, most prominently with institutional economics (Paavola
and Adger, 2005; Vatn, 2005a), feminist economics (Nelson, 2008), and co-evolutionary
economics (Foxon, 2011; Kallis and Norgaard, 2010). These research communities cover many
9crucial issues; however, they do not focus on the core causal dynamics of environmental
degradation of economic activities.
To conclude, the economic system and its dynamic interrelations with the environment
remain surprisingly undertheorized in ecological economics. This is not a new idea. It has been
recognised that ecological economics needs a framework that considers how ecological issues
relate to the operation of the economic system as a whole (Adaman and Özkaynak, 2002;
Burkett, 2009; Douai, 2016, 2009; Klitgaard and Krall, 2012; Özkaynak et al., 2012). However,
such statements are typically made at the end of articles, without providing much substantive
alternative economic theory. I conclude that the promising heterodox elements and starting
points, as outlined in section 1.2.1, have not been carried fully through to the domain of the
economic. After three decades our field fails to provide an alternative economic theory to the
mainstream. Ecological economics remains “an unfinished journey” (Nadeau, 2015, p. 101).
1.2.3 A united but fragmented community
The uneasy relations between ecological economics and neoclassical economics disunites the
field. The question of how and whether to include neoclassical economics in the pluralist
ecological economics approach runs like a thread through Clive Spash’s characterisation of
ecological economics as a ‘movement in three camps’ (Spash, 2013). New-resource
economists admit that the assumptions of neoclassical theory are excessively abstract and
unrealistic but argue that many tools and concepts are useful and that environmental
economics should be extended. New environmental pragmatists aim for close links to policy
and opportunistically use mainstream ideas and concepts to get environmental messages
across without engaging much with theory or methodology. Social ecological economists, on
the other hand, reject neoclassical analysis altogether; however, their research moves rather
quickly from a critique of mainstream theory and elements of economic practices to stronger
ties with social theory and building alternatives, without a fundamental theoretical analysis of
capitalism. Alternative economic foundations remain absent.7
7 This divide can also be found in textbooks. Whereas more mainstream textbooks provide introductions
to mainstream supply and demand analysis (Common and Stagl, 2005; Daly and Farley, 2011), the more
progressive textbooks and handbooks tend to abstain from economic theory altogether (Martinez-Alier
and Muradian, 2015a; Söderbaum, 2000; Spash, 2017).
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The issue remains unresolved and disputed. It has led to a situation in which different research
communities within ecological economics live rather separate lives, but even worse, the
formerly more radical discourse of ecological economics has in fact drifted towards
environmental (neoclassical) economics over time (Plumecocq, 2014).8 Gowdy and Erickson
articulated 13 years ago that ecological economics
“has not yet coalesced into a coherent school of thought, but it is a leading
contender among heterodox schools to become a comprehensive
alternative to neoclassical orthodoxy” (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005, p. 208).
This is still the case today. Ecological economics has remained a non-coherent school of
thought, with a dispute about the role and importance of neoclassical economics at its heart.
1.3 The untapped potentials of Marxian Political Economy
1.3.1 Theory and methodology fit for purpose
Marx was a systems thinker and a realist. His ambitious agenda was to understand the
capitalist system as a whole, with a view to changing it. What characterises capitalism? How
did it emerge? How does it evolve? What are its core drivers and dynamics?
“One of the strengths of Marx’s Capital, acknowledged by friend and foe
alike, is to have pointed to the systemic character of capitalism and to its
essential features” (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016, p. 26).
The classical Marxian approach operates at a level of analysis that is fit for purpose for
understanding global environmental change, i.e. the level of generality of capitalism. Marx was
not interested primarily or initially in explaining the price of a pair of shoes, nor the
consumption behaviour of individuals but general tendencies, dynamics and contradictions of
the system as it exists under capitalism. In addition, by adopting a realist methodology,
biophysical considerations remain firmly rooted as part of the explanation of the economic
process. As such, Marxian Political Economy uniquely conceptualises the interplay of
8 Plumecocq explains this fact mainly by the rise of a tacit recognition of the New Environmental
Pragmatic scientific approach, i.e. ecological economists adopt mainstream concepts – prominently
notions of ecosystem services and of monetary valuation – in the hope to influence political decisions.
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biophysical and monetary processes and dynamics throughout the entire system, as I will
elaborate in chapters 3 and 4.
The scope to tackle the system as a whole, the ambition to trigger systemic change, and the
realist approach that emphasises interrelations, dynamics and change makes the Marxist
approach very akin to ecological economics. Yet, the systemic perspective is a disadvantage at
the same time: it is not straightforward to understand. What ‘value’ and ‘capital’ mean, or
what Marx’s theory of money, profit or interest is, can only be fully grasped by understanding
the Marxian approach as mainly laid out in Capital Volumes I-III in its entirety. This is because
the Marxian approach rebuilds capitalism as a complex system in thought – this implies that
categories presuppose and refer to each other.9 In this way, Marx builds a theoretical
architecture that forms an explanation of the system as a whole. This methodological
approach gives rise to the explanatory power of the Marxian approach, but it is also one of
the main reasons why confusions and misinterpretations regarding Marxian theory remain
widespread.
1.3.2 Uneasy relations
Misinterpretations also persist in ecological economics. Influential ecological economists
declare explorations into Marxism a dead-end at best and counter-productive at worst.
Costanza et al. (2015), for instance, state that
“Marx and his followers in communist countries have made a negative
contribution to the allocative efficiency problem … their ideological
rejection of rent and interest as necessary prices and their insistence on a
labour theory of value that neglected nature’s contribution were
responsible for much of the environmental destruction in communist
countries” (Costanza et al., 2015, p. 45).10
9 Capital, for instance, is defined as value in motion. An understanding of capital therefore requires an
understanding of value. Understanding value, however, requires grasping the nature of the commodity,
which, in turn, already contains the seeds for understanding the expansionary nature of capital. I will
detail and clarify these steps in chapters 3 and 4; the point here is to illustrate how different categories
in Marxian thought are interrelated to form a systemic understanding of capitalism.
10 Interestingly, this quote is part of a three-page section on ‘Karl Marx and the Ownership of Resources’
which, in fact, is not about Marxian Political Economy in any substantive sense but resource ownership
issues in general. The authors briefly state that their views about concentrated ownership and control
of resources roots in Marxian thinking, yet they end the section with a remarkable opposition towards
the Marxian approach, for the reasons stated in this quote.
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As I will explain in chapters 3 and 4, Marxian value theory does not neglect the role of nature
but rather explains why nature is undervalued, underpriced and vastly appropriated – ideally
for free – under capitalism. However, Costanza’s view remains widespread amongst ecological
economists. In a similar spirit, Costanza’s mentor Herman Daly believes that:
“Marx, with his theory that labor was the source of all value, was even more
eager than standard economists to deny any important role to nature in
the functioning of the economy and creation of value” (Daly and Farley,
2011, p. 32) or that “Marx’s models of simple and expanded reproduction
are also isolated circular flow models” (Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 32).
Contrary to Daly and Farley’s opinion, Marx’s reproduction schemes were in fact established
to show – contrary to mainstream equilibrium views – why capitalism is not a simple circular
system but rather an expanding spiralling system (Harvey, 2010a). Another widespread
opposition stems from the fact that former Communist countries were equally advocating a
growth agenda, which is what authors use to discredit the Marxian approach.
“The former USSR and the West … shared a fundamental commitment to
economic growth as the first priority. The Marxist’s deterministic ideology
of dialectical materialism refused any appeals to morality or justice” (Daly
and Farley, 2011, p. xxiii).
Daly and Farley provide a short account of the general circuit of capital in their seminal
textbook, but their conclusion is that Marx advocated growth, which is why they reject the
Marxist account (Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 286). This is erroneous (and unscientific). Marx did
not advocate growth; he explained the inherently expansionary nature of capitalism. And
whilst it is true that many Marxists have promoted growth for development, these positions
do not justify discarding realistic economic theory. Also, Marx’s theory is not deterministic but
explains dominant tendencies, as I will explain in chapter 4.
Joan Martinez-Alier, another co-founder of our field, former President and key source of
inspiration of the degrowth movement, has prominently argued against Marx and Engels
because they ignored and dismissed Podolinsky’s attempt in the 1880s to reconcile the labour
theory of value with the first and second law of thermodynamics (Martinez-Alier and Naredo,
1982; Martinez-Alier, 1987). I interpret their critique as paving the way for a conventional
wisdom within ecological economics that Marx neglected substantive ecological issues.
Marina Fischer-Kowalski, another former President of the Society, relies on Ted Benton’s work
to conclude in one of her most cited articles:
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“Marx’s and Engels’ theory … bears several theoretical defects … the net
effect of which is to render the theory incapable of adequately
conceptualizing the ecological conditions and limits of human need-
meeting interactions with nature” (Fischer-Kowalski, 1998, p. 62).
“The materialist Marxist traditions revived in the 1960s [did not deal] with
possible physical properties of society and society-nature interaction”
(Fischer-Kowalski, 1998, p. 66).
These quotes highlight that ecological economics has developed as a discipline in which key
scholars – all of those quoted above have developed whole research streams within the field
– consider the Marxian approach as severely limited for the advance of knowledge in our field.
These quotes indicate why relations between ecological economics and Marxists have been
frosty. As a result, ecological economics textbooks are marked by an almost (e.g. Martinez-
Alier and Røpke, 2008) or complete absence (e.g. Common and Stagl, 2005; Shmelev, 2012)
of references to Marxist thinking. Marxian thinking remains associated with failed political
projects and whilst this negative reception is partly understandable, it is a fatal mistake to
abandon realistic and insightful economic theory for these reasons.
1.3.3 Lost in translation
Marxists have attempted to correct influential misinterpretations, most prominently Paul
Burkett and John Bellamy-Foster,11 but also others, such as Ali Douai more recently (Douai,
2016, 2009). These scholars have tried to demonstrate the merits of classical Marxian Political
Economy for ecological economics; however, with limited success. Burkett, Foster and Douai
provide rather short accounts of Marxian value theory in their articles, and also in books (e.g.
Burkett, 2009). These dense portraits of complex theory in tandem with the use of Marxist
terminology that is not prevalent in ecological economics make them very difficult – if not
11 Burkett’s and Foster’s contributions have challenged arguments with respect to Marx’s reproduction
schemes being, in essence, no different to the mainstream circular flow model and thereby abstracting
from the biophysical world (Burkett, 2004), Marx neglecting the first and second law of thermodynamics
(Foster and Burkett, 2008) or him not treating nature as a source of value (Burkett, 1996, 2003). In their
literature on ‘the Podolinsky myth’ (Burkett and Foster, 2006, 2008; Foster and Burkett, 2004) they
challenge Martinez-Aliers’ critique by making the case that Podolinsky had not come close to
establishing a sensible thermodynamic basis for the labour theory of value (essentially by collapsing use
value to energy) which was the reason why Marx and Engels did not endorse it (Burkett and Foster,
2006). Burkett’s contributions of Marxian insights for ecological economics culminated in a book on
Marxism and Ecological Economics, where he introduces value theory and issues around conflict, power
and systemic crises as areas where ecological economists can still learn a lot from Marxist thought
(Burkett, 2009).
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impossible – to understand for non-Marxists. Other Marxian authors apply Marxian theory to
specific problems in ecological economics – such as to critique of ecosystem service valuation
as commodity fetishism, for instance (e.g. Kosoy and Corbera, 2010) – without detailing their
theoretical underpinnings. As a result, key insights from Marxian theory and methodology are
not accessible enough for ecological economists. The centrepieces – an understanding of
value and capital – and how they drive and shape the societies we live in, remain under-
considered and under-appreciated in ecological economics.
There are many writings about ecological sustainability from a Marxian perspective. This is
sometimes termed ‘eco-socialism’ or ‘eco-Marxism’. The journal Capitalism, Nature,
Socialism, which was founded about the same time as Ecological Economics, in 1988, remains
a key reference point. Early seminal contributions, for instance, by James O’Connor (Connor,
1988; Martinez-Alier et al., 2018) and more contemporary leading examples, such as Andreas
Malm’s Fossil Capital (Malm, 2016) or Jason Moore’s Capitalism in the Web of Life (Moore,
2015) rise in importance, as global ecological crisis intensify. This PhD centres on ‘classical’
Marxian literature and the specific Marxian literature that exists in ecological economics,
rather than the extensive and significant eco-Marxist literature in general. This is mainly
because this literature discusses and applies, rather than explains, step by step, the
foundations of Marxian theory of the capitalist system as a whole; foundations which I aim to
make explicit for ecological economists. However, it would be an omission to refrain from the
eco-Marxist literature altogether. I will direct the reader to selective literature in Chapters 3
and 4, especially to highlight deep and varied dialogues about the links between ‘value’ and
‘nature’ that are central to this thesis.
1.4 Aims, ambition and architecture of the thesis
1.4.1 Aims
The main ambition of this PhD is to contribute to radical social change towards environmental
sustainability and social justice. To this end, I advocate a more systemic, realistic and
theoretically-grounded ecological economics. This section elaborates this core aim from three
vantage points.
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Better economic foundations for better decisions
Interrelated ecological, social, economic and financial crises are looming and large-scale
interventions required, fast and effectively (Buch-Hansen, 2018). But how to judge what
interventions contribute to desirable systemic outcomes? A realistic understanding of
capitalist dynamics is a step to increasing chances for effective policies to be implemented.
This PhD intends to provide better economic foundations for ecological economics. It explains
why neoclassical economic foundations – that remain widespread in our field – contradict the
scope, vision and ambition of ecological economics, and it presents Marxian Political Economy
as an alternative. I explain core Marxian insights of the workings of the capitalist system as a
whole, with a view to developing ecological economics to realise the ambition to study the
interrelations between ecological and economic systems. I introduce a comprehensive
Marxian understanding of ‘value’ and ‘capital’ to show how intertwined social ecological
dynamics and crises can be explained in conclusive and realistic ways. These foundations can
be used to prioritise future research efforts that tackle root causes of destructive social
ecological changes and support systemic social change.
The power of ideas. Making the case why theory and methodology matter
Ideas matter, no matter whether they are empirically right or wrong. They shape how we think
about and act in the world. Economic ideas are especially important because they grant access
to resources and power. Power relations, in turn, influence and dictate what ideas gain
currency. They shape knowledge production in crucial ways, by channelling what gets studied
and what not; what gets financially and institutionally supported and what not. As such,
economic ideas – economic theory and methodology – are powerful political instruments. In
ecological economics, the role of theory and methodology is often downplayed. ‘Abstract’
theory gets contrasted with ‘concrete’ action and real-world problems, and the latter is what
needs to be prioritised. I partly disagree. Theories are not solutions per se, and not everything
it takes to change the world. That much is clear. Marxian theory-methodology is not the Holy
Grail either. Yet, good theories reveal spaces for action, warn of obstacles and, crucially, help
us to see beyond empirical reality (Luhmann, 1987). In contrast, theories are highly
problematic when they hide what is important and prevent sensible actions. From this
perspective, an engagement with theory and methodology is no abstract exercise in academic
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ivory towers but can be a radical tool for a more radical praxis. Because environmental crises
are accelerating, we cannot afford to rely on floppy theories.
The power of a united community. Synthesis and integration in ecological economics
This PhD research aims to foster integration within ecological economics, by debunking
neoclassical economics as a serious barrier for the advance of knowledge and a dangerous
guide for action, and by presenting Marxian economic foundations as a credible alternative.
Neoclassical economics has divided the community in ecological economics; Marxian theory
has the potential to serve as one powerful ingredient to strengthen the field along shared
principles, as outlined in section 1.2.1, by thinking more carefully about what makes sense and
what does not. More debates about substantive economic issues are needed because they
bear the potential to place ecological economics on firmer ground, give it a clearer sense of
direction and stronger critical voice as a united community. This is important to open up
spaces for more radical research that is needed to push an agenda of social ecological
transformation.
1.4.2 Research questions
This PhD research addresses the following set of questions:
 Why does ecological economics need better economic foundations? (mainly
chapter 2, but also chapters 3 and 4)
 What is value? Why does value theory matter for ecological economists? What
insights does Marxian value theory provide for understanding the capitalist system?
(chapter 3)
 What is capital? How is the reproduction of capital interlinked with environmental
impacts and barriers to social change? (chapter 4)
 What concluding insights can be derived from the previous chapters? What
elements constitute a progressive ecological economics research agenda moving
forward? (chapter 5)
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1.4.3 PhD structure
This PhD research proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 ‘CONTRADICTIONS’ substantiates and
exemplifies the claim made in the introduction that ecological economics lacks a coherent
economic theory of the system as a whole. Steady-state economics serves as the case in point.
The vision of a steady-state economy elaborated by Herman Daly is one of the most influential
theories in ecological economics for considering the interrelated nature of ecological and
economic systems. The chapter shows that steady-state economics internalises neoclassical
economic theory and reasoning which leads to fundamental theoretical inconsistencies within
steady-state theory. As Herman Daly pioneered the foundations of ecological economics with
his thinking, these ambiguities are not only problematic for steady-state economics but
ecological economics as a field more generally. I suggest to let go of neoclassical foundations
altogether in favour of a political economy approach.
Chapters 3 and 4 aim to elaborate this alternative. Both chapters taken together aim to
present the core Marxian understanding of capitalism and how ecological overshoot and
societal lock-ins can be explained on this basis. Chapter 3 ‘VALUE’ makes the case that Marxian
value theory – contrary to wide-held beliefs in ecological economics – is neither monistic,
favouring labour, neglecting the environment nor outdated. Rather, it is part and parcel of
understanding the essence of the capitalist system. The chapter shows how an understanding
of simple commodity exchange reveals how capitalist markets function and shape societies. It
explains, step by step, how pressures to increase labour productivity and the systemic strive
for monetary gains emerge as dominant motives driving societal reproduction. These value-
theoretic foundations are not consistently spelled out in ecological economics. Instead, and
contrary to widespread scepticism towards neoclassical economics, ecological economists
tend to unconsciously adopt the mainstream economic conception of the economic system
as a whole.
Chapter 4 ‘CAPITAL’ takes a next step and shows how the value theoretical foundations
developed in the previous chapter form the starting point for understanding capital. In its
simplest expression, capital is a form of value; it is value in motion. This chapter introduces
the circuit of capital and associated profit and competition dynamics of capitalist
(re)production. A discussion of the circuit of capital may seem basic for Marxists, but it is not
for ecological economists. It is virtually absent from the literature, including textbooks and
handbooks. This matters, because the circuit of capital forms the foundation for identifying
endogenous tendencies that drive environmental impacts and pose barriers to social change.
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I identify eight dominant tendencies – overproduction, technological dynamism,
appropriation, commodification, overconsumption, acceleration, alienation, concentration
and financialisation – and explain how they explain growth dynamics and the formation of
multiple crises.
Chapter 5 ‘CONCLUSIONS’ synthesises insights from the previous chapters, including elements
of a research agenda moving forward.
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2 Contradictions
The neoclassical Trojan horse of steady-state economics
2.1 Introduction
Steady-state economics is one of the most influential theories in ecological economics for
considering the interrelated nature of ecological and economic systems. The vision elaborated
by Herman Daly describes an ecologically sustainable economy that uses materials and energy
within the regenerative and assimilative limits of the planet’s ecosystems. It is defined in
physical terms, by a constant stock of human population, domesticated animals (i.e. livestock)
and built capital – such as buildings, infrastructure, or durable consumer goods – that are
maintained by a low rate of matter-energy throughput (Daly, 1991a, p. 475, 1974a; O’Neill,
2015). Daly argues that a physically non-growing or steady-state economy is the only long-run
alternative for economies to die of old age in the distant future rather than of the cancer of
‘growthmania’ (Daly, 2010a, 1996).
The analytical starting point for the steady-state goal is a new pre-analytic vision (Schumpeter,
1954) that overcomes the shortcomings of traditional economic ontology. Daly attacks the
isolated circular flow model of exchange value of ‘orthodox economics’ for ignoring
biophysical reality and absolute resource limits. Instead, he proposes a view of the economy
as a subsystem of a finite ecosystem that is totally dependent on it, both as a source of low-
entropy matter-energy and as a sink for high-entropy matter-energy (Georgescu-Roegen,
1971). This worldview infers that modern societies have moved from an ‘empty world’, where
“The great errors and failings of attempts to apply science to matters
of urgent concern have come from posing problems too narrowly, too
linearly, too statically” (Lewontin and Levins, 2007, p. 149).
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the scale of the economy was relatively small compared to its surrounding ecosystems, into a
‘full world’, where it increasingly presses against planetary boundaries (Steffen et al., 2015).
The full-world perspective begs the question: how big can the economy get in relation to its
surrounding ecosystems? This is the matter of sustainable scale which is Daly’s most important
concept and subject matter for a new ‘Environmental Macroeconomics’ that is meant to focus
on “the volume of exchanges that cross the boundary between system and subsystem” (Daly,
1996, 1991b, p. 256). Scale is defined as the material-throughput that can be tolerated
without eroding the carrying capacity and resilience of natural systems.12 As we approach or
overshoot sustainable scale, or planetary boundaries in modern parlance, the aim can no
longer be quantitative growth but qualitative development, leading to “an economics of
better, not bigger” (Daly, 1996).
The implementation of the steady-state economy is envisaged as a hierarchy of three
consecutive goals: sustainable scale, just distribution, and efficient allocation (Daly, 2010a,
1992, 1991a). A ‘good’ scale is at least sustainable. Once the overall cake is no longer
growing, distribution becomes an issue in its own right that has to be tackled as a separate
economic goal. Distribution means deciding how to divide the resource flow amongst
people, and a ‘good’ distribution is one that is just or fair, based on ethical principles and
keeping levels of inequality below reasonable levels. Only after a resource limit and the level
of distribution have been set does efficient allocation become the mechanism to determine
the destination of scarce resources. A ‘good’ allocation is efficient if it:
“allocates resources among product end-uses in conformity with individual
preferences as weighted by the ability of the individual to pay. The policy
instrument that brings about an efficient allocation is relative prices
determined by supply and demand in competitive markets” (Daly, 1992, p.
186).
Daly leaves little doubt that allocative efficiency is the kind of efficiency he means (Daly, 1992,
1991a, p. 82; Daly and Cobb, 1989, p. 59; Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 457).
This framework is supposed to be substantially different from the standard environmental
economics solution of ‘getting the prices right’. Externality theory, Daly argues, subsumes the
12 The pre-analytic vision and Daly’s concept of sustainable scale were instrumental in establishing a
research programme within ecological economics that deals with the operationalisation of biophysical
scale, leading to concepts and methodologies such as MFA, HANPP, energy accounting, footprint and
rucksack calculations, etc. (Røpke, 2005).
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scale problem under allocation by assuming that once all prices are internalised, there will be
no scale problem as prices reflect true scarcity. However, if scale is set first, then there is
nothing wrong with using the market mechanism for what it is good at: determining prices
that reflect relative resource scarcity. Faith in the market mechanism to yield Pareto-efficient
outcomes is reflected not only in steady-state theory but has also become a foundation for
several influential ecological economic textbooks (Common and Stagl, 2005; Costanza et al.,
2015; Daly and Farley, 2011).
Any theory needs to be logically consistent, as one criterion among others, to serve as a good
compass and guideline for effective action, especially so if the aim is to convince politicians,
policy makers and academics to advocate and implement steady-state proposals. Daly himself
says in the Preface of Steady-State Economics that
“we should be concerned with whether … arguments are valid or invalid,
and whether underlying values are good or evil” (Daly, 1991a, p. xvi) and
“to refute an argument one must find either a factual error in the premises
or a logical error in the reasoning” (Daly, 1991a, p. xi/xii).
Despite Daly’s appeal for theories based on logical reasoning and ethical considerations, there
has been very little critique of steady-state economics. Mainstream economists tend to ignore
it, do not know about it or dismiss it as naïve, and much of the ecological economics
community embraces it as a useful and pragmatic vision of a sustainable society.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a critique of steady-state theory with a view to
stimulating dialogue and establishing a constructive research agenda. Thinking through the
steady-state edifice step by step reveals that it relies on the neoclassical understanding of the
economy. If neoclassical theory is dropped (and several reasons will be provided why this is
necessary), steady-state economics remains a rather shallow normative framework stipulating
that the economy ‘should’ stay within the limits of the ecosystem and that resulting
redistribution issues ‘should’ be tackled in a relatively just way. Steady-state economics does
not explain how growth dynamics emerge, why steady-state proposals face extreme
implementation barriers, how wealth is distributed, why society changes, etc. In other words,
it does not have a social or economic theory of its own that explains social ecological dynamics.
This chapter primarily draws critically on Daly’s works, for several reasons: he established
steady-state economics within the field and has written most extensively about it; his
contributions still influence major advances of steady-state economics, lately sometimes
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under the name of ecological macroeconomics (Rezai and Stagl, 2016); and his works are most
insightful in revealing the theoretical essences of the steady-state approach.13
The structure of the argument is as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the foundations of steady-
state theory. Section 2.2 deconstructs these foundations by highlighting that steady-state
economics relies on the neoclassical theory of demand, supply, and general equilibrium
theory, which leads to theoretical inconsistencies, contradictions and unresolved issues. This
section also includes some presentation of alternatives on the issues covered. Section 2.3
demonstrates that steady-state economics not only relies on neoclassical theory but also
neoclassical thinking, which is problematic for similar reasons. Section 2.4 discusses why this
analysis matters. Section 2.5 summarises and concludes that ecological economics requires
sound theories that explain the emergence and dynamics of social ecological phenomena.
2.2 The ambiguous nature of steady-state theory
The steady-state approach seems reasonable at first. The idea is to limit the use of natural
resources, distribute them fairly amongst people and do this in an efficient manner. Market
efficiency is proposed as the third goal of steady-state economics to solve ‘the allocation
problem’. However, what does this really mean? What is ‘the allocation problem’? What is
efficient? For whom? And how is it to be achieved? This section reveals that allocative
efficiency is not a neutral concept in neoclassical economics but integrated into its very core.
Accepting allocative efficiency in the way Daly suggests implies accepting the neoclassical
understanding of capitalist dynamics – the theory of demand, the theory of supply, and
general equilibrium theory. This move is highly problematic, as these theories are flawed in at
least two ways: they are internally incoherent, and thus fail on their own terms; and they are
unrealistic, and thus do not capture essential dynamics of real-world economies that are key
for explaining and addressing social ecological problems.
13 Especially Daly’s older works explicitly refer to economic theory (Daly, 1996, 1991a, 1974a). In more
recent texts the focus shifts towards specific policy proposals, without addressing their theoretical
underpinnings (e.g. Daly, 2010a). This is problematic, as implicit theories are more difficult to detect.
However, from my reading there is little indication that Daly has changed the tendency to embrace
neoclassical economic theory and methodology ever since he developed steady-state economics.
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2.2.1 Allocation and perfect markets: the adoption of neoclassical microeconomics
Allocative efficiency is endorsed in steady-state economics based on the claim that markets
solve the allocation problem and deliver Pareto optimal societal outcomes.
“Yes, the market should certainly be the main mechanism for solving the
problem of efficient allocation of resources … We must use the market to
solve the allocation question, but we cannot expect it to solve the scale and
distribution questions” (Daly, 1996, p. 13). “The invisible hand [is]
wonderful for allocation” (Daly, 1996, p. 59). “The best we can hope for
from a perfect market is a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources” (Daly,
1996, p. 32).
Lawn, a supporter of steady-state economics, confirms that “Daly's vision of steady-state-
capitalism embraces the efficiency-facilitating role of markets” (Lawn, 2010, p. 7). These
statements illustrate the acceptance of the narrative and prospect of neoclassical
microeconomic theory, which centres, at its heart, on yielding allocative efficient outcomes.
The ‘allocation problem’ concerns decisions about what to produce, how and how much
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2015). Whether, which, how and how many bicycles, shoes or teapots
are produced in an economy depends on various factors, such as available means of
production (machines, factories, technology, resource inputs), consumer preferences, their
income and willingness to spend, and broader political economy considerations such as
industrial relations, the legal architecture and cultural, historical and geographical contexts
(Vatn, 2015a, 2005b). The neoclassical approach of tackling allocation assumes initial
endowments, consumer tastes and technology as given (exogenous), and abstracts from
political and time-space concerns (Fine, 2016). What remains endogenous is the
determination of equilibrium prices and quantities. This means the ‘allocation problem’ boils
down to a pure exchange problem, the solution to which is provided by ‘the invisible hand’ of
the market.
Perfect markets are considered efficient by consolidating production functions and utility
functions in the equilibrium, i.e. the point where welfare is maximised as the marginal benefits
of consumption equal the marginal costs of production (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2015). The
strict conditions for markets to yield efficient outcomes are well-known – they include perfect
competition, perfect information and rationality of individual actors, the existence of markets
for all goods and services produced across all time, the inexistence of externalities and public
goods, and fully assigned private property rights for all resources and commodities (Perman
et al., 2003). These conditions are notoriously unmet in real markets, and yet “it is no
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exaggeration to say that the entire modern microeconomic theory of government policy
intervention in the economy … is predicated on this idea” (Lockwood 1987 cited by Gowdy and
Erickson, 2005, p. 209).
Overall, efficiency is a vexed term in economics and subject to many interpretations, for
instance regarding the exact relationship between allocative efficiency and Pareto efficiency.
Daly uses both terms interchangeably, and so do many economists. What remains clear,
however, is that this type of efficiency often relates to the claim of perfectly competitive
markets yielding optimal societal outcomes. Daly maintains that “it would be a foolish waste
of effort and an intolerable imposition of microcontrol to refuse to use the market” (Daly,
1991a, p. 89). However, it is one thing to accept a certain role of markets as coordinating
production, distribution and exchange decisions, but another to accept neoclassical economic
theory as a sufficiently good explanation of how market economies and markets function. It is
not.
2.2.2 Unrealistic, flawed and inconsistent theoretical underpinnings
The problem with endorsing allocative efficiency lies in the implicit acceptance of the
neoclassical conception of the economic system and its pillars – the theory of demand, the
theory of supply, and general equilibrium theory. These theories establish the building blocks
for achieving a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources – a downward sloping market demand
curve, an upward sloping market supply curve, and the idealised equilibrium position where
both intersect. The purpose of this section is to show that all three theories are internally
flawed and detrimental to ecological economic ambitions.
The neoclassical theory of demand, to begin with, conceptualises consumers narrowly as self-
interested hedonists aiming to maximise their utility and concludes that this is good as it
benefits society at large. The theory rests on a set of well-known preference axioms:
preferences are presumed to be complete (consumers can compare and rank all possible
commodity baskets and thus always choose what is good for them); transitive (if A is preferred
to B, and B to C, then A to C); rational (consumers always choose what maximises their utility);
and non-satiable (more consumption is always better) (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2015).
Moreover, preferences are taken as given and considered to be stable, i.e. neoclassical
economists ignore where consumer tastes come from and assume that they do not change.
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Daly questions consumption theory for its lack of realism, narrow scope, and neglect of ethical
concerns. For instance, he criticises the preference satisfaction approach for being purely
subjective, and thus not allowing comparisons between people: as he highlights “there is no
distinction between what people of the present age of advertising think will make them whole
and happy and what would in fact make them so” (Daly, 1991a, p. 3). However, market
efficiency rests on assumptions of non-satiability and a subjective theory of value14 that
contradict the viewpoint he presents here (satiability and objective values). As high levels of
GDP and income no longer make most people in high-consumption nations any better off,
neither in terms of happiness (Easterlin et al., 2010), nor quality of life (Max-Neef, 1995),
whilst increasingly destroying life-support systems, sufficiency thinking matters and
questioning preferences becomes an ethical responsibility (Kallis et al., 2012). This reasoning
forms part and parcel of the steady-state vision to sketch a sufficiency economy that should
level-off once destructive overconsumption sets in (Daly, 2008). However, theoretical
inconsistencies remain unconsidered, not even when confronted with this criticism by Okun,
who declared that
“this concept of efficiency implies that more is better … It is appropriate to
ask sceptically whether people are made better off (and thus whether
society really becomes more efficient) through the production of more
whiskey, more cigarettes, and more big cars” (Okun, 1975, p. 2).
Daly, however, disagrees with this argument.
“The first of several problems with this view is that the maxim “more is
better” does not follow from the definition of efficiency. We could give an
equivalent definition “efficiency means getting the same output with less
input”, and then argue that efficiency implied that “less is better” (Daly,
1991a, p. 121).
He claims Okun confuses the definition of efficiency with consumer sovereignty and concludes
that an alternative definition of efficiency is needed that does not “lead to the anomalies and
confusions of the ‘more is better’ school” (Daly, 1991a, p. 122). However, Daly confuses a
technical understanding of efficiency with allocative efficiency in his response to Okun.
Allocative efficiency is about whether it is possible to make someone better off without
making someone else worse off. Technical efficiency is about using minimum inputs for a given
output. Technical efficiency plays into allocative efficiency as part of production decisions
14 The neoclassical subjective theory of value implies that the worth of things only depends on what
people are willing to pay for them at the margin of consumption (Fine, 2016).
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(increasing energy or labour productivity) but it does not replace it. Daly endorses both
understandings of efficiency, as is standard in microeconomics.
“It is well known in economic theory that the price system, in pure
competition, will attain an efficient allocation of resources in the sense of
a Pareto optimum” (Daly, 1991a, p. 202).
This quote and others provided in the introduction clearly demonstrate that Daly endorses the
allocative understanding of efficiency in the steady-state framework.
Daly’s suggestion to overcome the problems of the ‘more is better’ school, as he says above,
is an alternative ‘comprehensive efficiency identity’ that measures the ratio between man-
made capital services gained to natural capital services sacrificed. It is essentially a service-
throughput, or benefit-cost ratio, expressing how much ecosystem services are used to
produce goods and services for the satisfaction of people’s needs and wants15 (Daly and Farley,
2011, p. 475). The introduction of an alternative efficiency identity is a move towards
measuring technical efficiency differently. This is admirable, and not inconsistent with
ecological economics and the rest of the steady-state framework, but it does not overcome
Daly’s reliance on allocative efficiency and the problem of an unrealistic and reductionist
theory of consumption and the economy more generally.
Turn now to the neoclassical theory of the firm, which is equally unrealistic. Supply theory says
that firms maximise profits at optimal levels of output. The heart of the argument is an
assumption of rising per-unit production costs with rising output, both in the short and the
long term.16 The short-run explanation centres on rising labour costs; the long-run argument
on diseconomies of scale, mainly due to capacity constraints. Both assumptions lead to an
upward-slowing supply curve of a firm: a higher price has to be offered to motivate firms to
produce more (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2015). Both arguments have been refuted by Sraffa
already in the 1920s (Sraffa, 1926). Sraffa showed that diseconomies of scale do not exist as
firms produce up to a level of minimum efficient scale before they open the next factory. This
means that, in reality, the law of diminishing marginal returns does not apply to an industrial
economy in general. There is no production optimum as most firms operate under conditions
15 There are various ways how this type of efficiency can be improved, e.g. by distributing natural
resources to those people first that profit most from them, increasing product lifetime, maximising
sustainable yield, or giving up those ecosystems first that yield the least services for people (Daly and
Farley, 2011).
16 Short run means that some production inputs are variable and others fixed, whereas in the long run
all factors are variable.
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of constant or increasing returns to scale.17 As a consequence, profit can be made from every
extra unit sold. Firms will try and sell as much as they can. Limits on how much they can sell
depend on their ability at persuasion – convincing consumers to spend and banks to invest
(Keen, 2001). The result of constant or falling production costs for most manufactured goods
is flat or downward-sloping supply curves.
“This causes manufacturers no difficulties, but it makes life impossible for
economists, since most of economic theory depends on supply curves
sloping upwards” (Keen, 2001, p. 55).
This is no mere technical detail. It matters as Daly derives misleading conclusions about the
functioning of the economy. He suggests utilising the microeconomic concept of ‘optimal
scale’ for thinking about the macroeconomy (Daly, 1996, 1991a, p. 83).
“All of microeconomics is nothing other than defining the optimal scale of
some activity, be it production of shoes, consumption of ice cream, hours
worked per week … But, surprisingly, when economists switch from micro-
to macro-economics we hear no more about optimal scale … each micro
activity has an optimal scale, but the aggregate of all micro activities, the
macro-economy, is supposed to grow forever and never exceed an optimal
scale! How can this be?” (Daly and Cobb, 1989, p. 145).
The answer is that the neoclassical theory of the firm is unsound. However, steady-state
economics suggests employing the empirically unsupported ‘when to stop rule’ to think about
the macro-level, for instance, by suggesting caps on natural resource use. Daly’s metaphor18
of a macro ‘optimum’ of matter-energy use is portrayed as the point where marginal benefits
of additional built capital for human needs satisfaction equal the marginal costs of depleting
natural capital (Daly, 1996). In other words: the macroeconomic perspective of steady-state
economics becomes a biophysical marginal cost-benefit-analysis for the economy as a whole,
based on neoclassical microeconomic reasoning. Regardless of whether it was meant as a
metaphor or not, this is severely misleading, not least because it neglects systemic growth
dynamics. In reality, economies need to grow or enter into crises. It is crucial to understand
17 Modern microeconomics textbooks acknowledge the possibility or even likelihood of constant or
increasing returns in certain sectors too (esp. manufacturing), but not as part of their core analysis and
argument, and without drawing explicit conclusions for the demand-and-supply analysis overall (e.g.
Mankiw, 2004, p. 283ff; Nicholson and Snyder, 2014, p. 204ff; Perloff, 2015, p. 166ff; Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 2015).
18 I learnt from Inge Røpke and Dan O’Neill that Daly’s discussion of ‘optimal scale’ should be understood
in a metaphorical way. Daly would argue that the biophysical sustainable scale of the economy can only
be discussed in natural science terms (such as planetary boundaries) rather than as an outcome of
valuation exercises.
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these dynamics and the inherent role of (over)using matter-energy. Introducing a hypothetical
‘when to stop’ rule on the macro level – as if growth could be assumed away – distracts from
facing economic realities.
Constructive alternatives to the theory of the firm can be found in classical political economy.
These theories are more committed to an objective theory of value (in which costs of
production are independent of demand); allow for economies of scale – both within firms
(think of Adam Smith’s pin factory) and between firms (as in Marx’s analysis of the social
division of labour); offer insights into how production processes are actually organised (as
opposed to a pure exchange perspective on production); and explain how and why growth
dynamics emerge (Fine, 2016).
General equilibrium theory is a third case in point for internal inconsistency and unrealism. It
is the neoclassical theory of the system as a whole, attempting to prove that the aggregation
of individual utility and production functions results in an overall equilibrium of the
macroeconomy.
“Yet those who follow the news about microeconomic theory have known
for some time that general equilibrium is not exactly alive and well any
more” (Ackerman, 2002, p. 120).
General equilibrium theory was mathematically proven to be unstable 40 years ago. This
means there is no unique existence of a stable, Pareto-efficient equilibrium (Kirman, 1989;
Rizvi, 1994; Saari, 1995). The neoclassical micro-foundations project for macroeconomics
failed as it crudely sidesteps aggregation problems (Brown and Spencer, 2014). Individualistic
marginal theory is unable to grasp macroeconomic aggregates, as well as non-individual
domains, such as power, class, conflict or institutions (Weeks, 2014). That emergent macro
phenomena cannot be explained by aggregating individual states is obvious from a system
theoretical perspective and well-rooted in ecological economics (think of rebound effects or
positional goods). Daly also repeatedly emphasises that ‘the whole is more than its parts’
(Daly, 1991a, p. 3). However, again, without general equilibrium theory there is no Pareto-
efficient outcome for concluding that competitive markets are efficient and lead to maximal
welfare.
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2.2.3 The narrow confines of neoclassical economics
This section makes the case that the scope of neoclassical economics is too narrow for, and
conflicting with, steady-state ambitions. As historian of economic thought, Mirowski, put it
recently “Allocation as a special phenomenon … captures the essence of economics” (Lash and
Dragos, 2016, p. 126/127). This is prominently reflected in the definition of neoclassical
economics as the allocation of scarce resources between competing ends (Robbins, 1932, p.
15). The standard economics definition that Daly adopts on page three of his influential
textbook (Daly and Farley, 2011) seems to suit well at first, as the subject matter is about
scarce resources. This is a fallacy, however, as the focus is on allocating given resources in a
setting of given production conditions and given ends (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 2015). Recall:
on the production function side of allocation, technology is given, factor inputs such as natural
resources are given, and input prices as well due to the assumption of perfect competition;
on the utility function side, preferences are given. The latter reflects a deliberate choice to
abstract from any ethical content in the enterprise of ‘positive economics’.19 Ultimately, this
led to an extreme reductionism in the substantive content of neoclassical economics:
optimising the behaviour of individuals under very restrictive conditions (Brown and Spencer,
2012).
The focus and ambition of steady-state economics is admirably different: Daly is not content
with an economics that abstracts from the finiteness of ‘means’ – the question of absolute
resource limits – and raises the need for tackling desirable societal ‘ends’ – such as fairer
distribution and long-term sustainability. However, the way he suggests to implement this
vision is problematic. He only proposes to extend the scope of neoclassical economics. The
way in which this is done is to wrap ‘the allocation problem’ of neoclassical economics into a
biophysical and ethical corset by adding sustainable scale and just distribution as additional
goals (and to introduce a new measure of ultimate efficiency that captures the broader scope).
However, adding an ethical and ecological taste to wormy theory does not transform it into
‘new’ economics – it remains ‘old’ economics with add-ons.
19 Robbins’ aim was to establish economics as a science that clearly departed from ethical judgements,
reflecting the positivist philosophical understanding of the time that economists should refrain from
meaningless metaphysical statements. A demarcation between objective facts and normative
statements, i.e. means and ends, was introduced, leaving it to the social sciences (psychology, sociology
or political sciences) to deal with the latter (Bromley, 1990; Brown and Spencer, 2012; Milonakis and
Fine, 2009).
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An associated issue arising from the narrow scope of neoclassical economics relates to
efficiency as a goal. Why exactly does efficiency need to be a goal in its own right? It is clearly
an objective in neoclassical economics. In fact, Bromley concludes that efficiency as a goal lies
at the heart of the ideology of economics (Bromley, 1990). However, Daly repeatedly criticises
‘growth economics’ and runaway GDP for becoming ends in themselves. If steady-state
economics is to move beyond a perspective of the economy as an end in itself (which Daly
advocates) towards one in which the economy is a means to serve society at large, then
efficiency too is a means to achieve scale and distribution, which are clearly more important.
The lesson learnt from the problematic but widespread three-pillar approach of sustainable
development is that economic considerations often overrule broader societal long-run targets
Establishing a goal hierarchy where scale comes first, distribution second and efficiency third,
is insufficient to address this issue. I argue that scale and distribution are goals, whereas
efficiency can be a better or worse means to achieve them, but should not be a goal in itself.
The alternative for effectively addressing scale issues and related ethical concerns, the two
central issues in steady-state economics, is to see that the ‘emperor has no clothes’ (Keen,
2001). Recognising the reductionist, ahistorical, asocial, apolitical character of the neoclassical
approach removed from time and space leads to the conclusion that it cannot explain its own
subject matter – the economy – from its core principles and concepts (Fine, 2016). It cannot
explain how and why goods are produced, nor the social relations under which allocative
efficiency is generated. This means it is – in its entirety – of no help for a progressive ecological
economic enterprise. Promising alternatives can, for instance, be found in Marxist theory and
classical institutionalism (Marx, 1990; Veblen, 1904, 1898). Marx’s analysis of capitalism is still
unparalleled as an excellent account of how capital and capitalist economies function and
evolve (Harvey, 2010b). The classical institutionalists, on the other hand, offer key insights into
how the economic and political landscape within capitalist societies unfolds and how social
change emerges (Vatn, 2015a). Both schools of thought consider the system as a whole, take
a long-term perspective and do not contradict a biophysical perspective of the economy.
2.2.4 The neglect of interdependencies, dynamics and change
Another problematic consequence of the steady-state approach is the perpetuation of
analytical separations. Scale, distribution and allocation are presented as analytically separate
31
entities that can be implemented by separate institutions.20 In practice, it is impossible to
uphold this distinction. Allocation and distribution are connected as one cannot know the
value of production independent of the distribution of income (Bromley, 1990). Scale and
distribution are connected as imposing any kind of limits-to-growth means bringing
distribution back in its own right. Allocation and scale are connected as the amount of
available resources, or a resource cap, would influence what is being produced. Daly
acknowledges interdependencies and possible conflicts between the three goals (Daly, 1996),
but not to a great extent. The neglect of strong interconnectedness and trade-offs has been
discussed (Lawn, 2004; Malghan, 2010; Prakash and Gupta, 1994; Stewen, 1998a, 1998b).
What I would like to add from a theoretical perspective is that the analytical separation of
concepts becomes problematic when they change the focus of attention in a direction that
misguides the analysis. If trade-offs between the goals are massive, which is the case in
reality,21 then a theoretical framework is needed that focuses on a comprehensive
understanding of interdependencies (Klitgaard and Krall, 2012; Krall and Klitgaard, 2011).
Above all, we need to systematically understand how the dynamics of capital accumulation
relate to scale and distribution. For instance, we need to ask why, how and under what
circumstances labour and resource efficiency improvements drive the expansion of the
economy as a whole. Otherwise, we might be deprived of the chances to effectively think
through implementation challenges.
There are alternatives beyond analytical separation. Krall and Klitgaard (2012, 2011)
prominently mention the Social Structure of Accumulation (SSA) school as one alternative
approach to reconnect allocation, distribution, and accumulation dynamics. I would like to
provide the social provisioning approach in heterodox economics22 as another example. Social
20 In earlier works, Daly suggested three separate institutions that deal with limiting population,
resource use, and inequalities. This approach has been broadened by Daly (e.g. Daly, 2010a) and others
(Dietz and O’Neill, 2013) over the years, leading to a longer list of policy recommendations and
associated institutions (ranging from cap-auction-trade systems, to reforming national accounts, limiting
the range of inequalities, stabilising population, and others). However, the central issues and problems
persist: the questions how these policies and institutions are interlinked (which is absolutely crucial from
a systems-perspective), and why they are not being implemented on a large scale, remain widely
unaddressed.
21 This fact gave rise to a recent critique of steady-state economics, which centres on the question
whether a biophysically non-growing economy is compatible with capitalist accumulation dynamics
(Burkett, 2009; Hahnel, 2012; Lawn, 2010; Smith, 2010).
22 Heterodox economics is defined as spanning “a variety of approaches including ‘old’ institutional
economics, post-Keynesian economics, feminist economics, Austrian economics, and Marxian
economics. These diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives have for many years offered an
approach to economics that situates the economy in a broader social, historical, and political context.
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provisioning means explaining the social process of how goods and services are provisioned in
a capitalist system embedded in a social context (culture, technology, history etc.) (Lee, 2009).
The approach recognises that allocation, distribution and scale cannot be treated separately
from each other (drawing on Smith, Marx, Veblen, Keynes and others) and thus offers an
integrated framework to address the problem comprehensively; above all, social provisioning
focuses on process and includes elements of dynamics and change which is particularly
relevant as explaining the resource flow is no longer sufficient in a resource constrained world
– it is about changing it; moreover, it recognises that provisioning rests on the material basis
of the natural environment; it highlights production as being more important than
consumption because production decisions are made upon the expectation of profits whereas
consumption is dependent on these decisions; and it is not limited to market activities as it
accepts that economic processes rest on both market and non-market institutions (Bayliss et
al., 2015; Boffo et al., 2017; Jo, 2011; Lee, 2009). The social provisioning approach thus seems
to offer a true alternative to the core neoclassical framing of ‘the allocation problem’ that is
solved by the market.
2.3 The logic of steady-state economics
If we agree with Audre Lorde that, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”
(Lorde, 2007, p. 110), novel ways of reasoning are needed to effectively address social
ecological problems. Steady-state economics has potential in this respect. It starts with a
promising pre-analytic vision of how ecological and social economic systems are interrelated
and a strong normative position about the necessity to include distribution and sustainability
issues into economic analyses. However, it does not carry this logic fully through to all
domains. In fact, it remains heavily infused with ‘old’ neoclassical economic thinking, for
instance, regarding static equilibrium or externality logic. I highlight several cases in which
steady-state economics relies on neoclassical reasoning and show why this is problematic: it
hinders the detection of how and where social ecological problems arise and thinking about
how to tackle them; it also contradicts constitutive pillars of ecological economics: a systemic,
holistic, evolutionary and realistic understanding of economy-environment relations.
They have by their nature and often by their design sought to develop links with other human and social
sciences and to push economics in a more interdisciplinary direction” (Spencer, 2013).
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2.3.1 Unrealistic vs. realistic thinking
Steady-state theory is ambiguous about the realism of assumptions. Certain key neoclassical
assumptions are adopted as first approximations, most others are rejected as being overly
abstract. Above all, Daly attacks the failure of the mainstream to address reality. He accuses
neoclassical economics of committing the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, i.e. confusing
reality with abstractions of reality (Daly, 1991a; Daly and Cobb, 1989). What matters in reality
– and from a steady-state perspective – is addressing absolute resource scarcities and relative
social wants. However, two of the most important assumptions in neoclassical theory are
relative scarcity and absolute wants. On the other hand, diminishing marginal utility,
increasing marginal costs, perfect competition and individualistic maximizing behaviour are
explicitly accepted as solid evidence and good starting points for theory (Daly, 1991a, pp. 82,
83, 87). Implicitly, further neoclassical assumptions are incorporated by bringing allocative
efficiency on board.
The adoption of unrealistic neoclassical assumptions is problematic. A straightforward reason
is inconsistency. Accepting that markets lead to allocative efficient outcomes but refuting
some of the underlying assumptions for this claim to hold, e.g. insatiable consumer wants,
leaves the analysis in a confused position. Yet another, more profound reason why realism
matters is that the heavy use of idealisations hides topics that are relevant for steady-state
ambitions. Issues of power and vested interests, for instance, do not arise in the positivist
neoclassical tradition in which facts are assumed to be separable from values. In reality, the
distribution of power between market participants is never equal and it is important to
capture these differences to address distribution conflicts or consider the enforcement of
resource limits (Fuchs et al., 2016). Who wins and who loses? Whose interests are represented
and whose are not? These questions do not arise in the neoclassical framing and are issues
steady-state theory barely addresses. Or take the assumption of perfect competition: in a
fictitious world of perfect competition in which a myriad of enterprises produce up to levels
at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue, profit-making is ruled out (Keen, 2001). This
explains why neoclassical economics cannot provide a sensible theory of profit, which is clearly
important to understand dynamics in real-world economies and resistance to resource caps
or distribution policies (Fine and Dimakou, 2016). The need for a realistic account of the social
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world is widely acknowledged and indeed a defining characteristic of ecological economics
(Gowdy and Erickson, 2005; Söderbaum, 2008, 1999; Spash, 2012).23
2.3.2 Externality vs. systemic thinking
Whilst being sceptical about the strategy of ‘internalising externalities’ (Daly, 1991a, p. 69,
1974a, p. 18; Daly and Cobb, 1989), steady-state economics does not fully break with the
externality logic of neoclassical environmental economics. Daly calls the internalisation of
externalities inadequate and contradictory as a general solution to environmental problems
and believes “it is past time to change the basic framework of our thinking” (Daly, 1996). But
instead of consequently abandoning neoclassical reasoning that rests on the central belief that
markets are efficient mechanisms to allocate scarce resources, once they are ‘fixed’, the
suggestion is to deal with scale and distribution politically outside the market sphere and then,
within constrained limits, leaving the market alone to “safely function”, as if it were possible
to understand the political and market arena in separation from each other (Daly, 1991a, p.
89). This reasoning is not different from standard market failure theory. It implicitly accepts
the conceptualisation of externalities as issues the amoral market is incapable of dealing with
and maintains that, due to market failure, political intervention is needed to avoid social
damage. The resulting better market will yield an efficient outcome. “Depletion quotas”, Daly
maintains, “can be regarded as the correction of a market failure” (Daly, 1974b, p. 164). This
is the same logic and language as in standard environmental economics. The difference is to
limit quantity first (e.g. by depletion quotas), and let prices adjust, rather than fixing prices
(e.g. by taxes) and let quantities adjust.
This approach contradicts systemic thinking – another pillar of ecological economics. From an
ecological economics perspective, the conception of environmental problems in terms of
externalities is misguided, because the natural environment is part and parcel of every
economic activity. The contributions of nature are not ‘external’ to the system, but integral
23 Gowdy and Erickson, in their seminal paper on ‘The approach of ecological economics’ argue that
ecological economics is different from neoclassical economics because of a more realistic understanding
of the world. This includes, for instance, rejecting the rational actor model in favour of a more
comprehensive analysis of humans as social actors, or rejecting marginal analysis in favour of capturing
total effects and discontinuous changes (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005). In this spirit, Peter Söderbaum is
a key example of introducing concepts such as ‘political economic person’ or ‘political economic
organisation’ to account for multi-faceted human behaviour (Söderbaum, 2008, 1999).
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endogenous features of it (Ayres and Kneese, 1969; Daly and Cobb, 1989; Kapp, 1971; Mäler,
1990). Understanding social ecological phenomena from a systemic perspective, as
ontologically sketched by Daly in the pre-analytic vision and widely advocated for in ecological
economics (Bertalanffy, 1968; Boulding, Kenneth, 1956; Meadows, 2009) and also by himself
(Daly, 1991a, p. 46), needs to conceptually grasp interdependencies, relations and feedbacks
rather than trying to separate them out. The analytical separation of economics from politics,
positive from normative, and allocation from distribution, as pursued in neoclassical
economics and upheld by the steady-state approach to a certain extent, runs counter to a
systemic approach. It falls short of providing a sensible representation of complex systems
and, in addition, frames political and moral issues as technical exercises, thus depoliticising
politics (Bromley, 1990; Pirgmaier and Urhammer, 2015; Vatn, 2015b). The issue is hence not
one of tackling scale and distribution outside rather than inside the market realm but to
recognise that these issues are intrinsically intertwined in reality and therefore need
conceptual interconnections in theory.
2.3.3 Equilibrium vs. evolutionary thinking
Steady-state economics operates in a static framework, where equilibrium and ‘optimal’
states are envisaged as ideal outcomes. Equilibrium in economics refers to states in which
counteracting forces have no tendency to change (Bannock et al., 1984). As the name ‘steady-
state’ suggests, the economy is envisaged to level off in physical terms. ‘Physical equilibrium’
is the optimal level of matter-energy stocks that, once reached, will be maintained by minimal
throughput (Daly, 1974b). This steady-state is not considered static, but oscillating around a
‘dynamic equilibrium’ that can be compared to a mature forest that still develops in qualitative
terms without growing in quantitative terms. Elements of dynamism are also reflected in the
possibility of different steady-states levels:
“It may happen that as a result of technical and moral evolution it becomes
both possible and desirable to grow (or decline) to a different level of
stocks. We may certainly do it. But growth (or decline) will then be seen as
a temporary adjustment process of moving from one steady state to
another, not as an economic norm” (Daly, 1974b, p. 157).
Moving from one equilibrium state to another is thus perceived possible, but as soon as the
adjustment process is complete, the economy would tend to balance again.
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Equilibrium thinking stands in contrast to an evolutionary perspective of the economy,
another pillar of ecological economics. Equilibrium thinking emphasises stability removed
from space and time (and therefore history). In a world in flux static equilibrium has no
practical meaning (Ackerman, 2002). Key to understanding the economy as an evolving
process is portraying economies as ‘complex adaptive systems’ (Foxon, 2011). This explains
the ecological economic research agenda concentrating on unsustainable lock-ins, crises,
processes, path dependencies, time lags, resilience, co-evolution between social, technical
and ecological systems, leverage points of change, transition pathways, diversity, adaptation,
learning, and complexity, to mention some important aspects (Foxon, 2011; Gowdy, 1994;
Holling, 1985; Kallis and Norgaard, 2010; Norgaard, 1994). Veblen insisted as early as 1898
that progressive economics needs to break with static thinking, as it prevents a deep
understanding of economic systems (Veblen, 1898).24 Daly repeatedly refers to co-evolving
systems; however, it is difficult to see how equilibrium thinking can be aligned with a co-
evolutionary perspective. Despite attaching ‘dynamic’ to equilibrium, steady-state economics
remains situated in a static framework.
2.3.4 Biophysical vs. monetary thinking
Steady-state economics clearly presents a biophysical perspective of the economy (Farley,
2015). Most concepts applied or introduced are thought of in matter-energy terms: scale,
growth, equilibrium, population, allocation, or capital. Even distribution becomes a matter of
the relative division of resource flow amongst people (Daly, 1992). Conceptualising the value
of physical stocks and flows in biophysical terms is considered necessary to correct the
mainstream isolated circular flow model of exchange value (Daly, 1996). Daly portrays the
circular flow model as a perpetual motion machine independently of any material
requirements fetishizing money (Daly, 1996). He claims that Georgescu-Roegen’s introduction
of ‘the entropic flow model’ provides a bridge to reality (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). Instead of
misconceptualising the economy as a mechanistic, reversible, quantitative loop, the
alternative offered is a one-way throughput process from sources to sinks and wastes that
24 This view was shared by most early marginalists, such as Marshall and Jevons, who saw static analysis
as a transitional methodology until economics reached maturity. However, this approach was later
shown to be misguided: it was impossible to derive a dynamic understanding of the economy from static
foundations (Keen, 2001). However, as much of the neoclassical architecture is bound to the idea of
equilibrium, it remains in place, as it does in steady-state economics.
37
accounts for irreversibilities and qualitative changes. The material view of the economy in
which both quantity and quality of matter-energy throughput matter is meant to complement
and improve the conventional perspective of the economy, in which value is mainly expressed
in monetary terms.
Daly’s move is admirable, as it attempts to emphasise use value aspects that are neglected in
mainstream economics. However, the way this is done is inadequate. A biophysical
perspective of the economy attached to a flawed neoclassical theory does not yield a
satisfactory theory. What we need to understand theoretically is how use value and exchange
value considerations are related, rather than separating them out. Use value relates to the
material properties by the virtue of which a commodity becomes useful for people (Brown,
2008). The use I gain from drinking coffee, for instance, stems from the coffee beans, the
metal of the coffee machine and foamed milk that give rise to its specific taste and consistency.
Exchange value, in contrast, is the quantity of other commodities for which coffee exchanges.
As there are as many exchange values as there are different commodity combinations (coffee-
tea; coffee-sugar, coffee-hats etc.) and as this is impractical, money serves as the socially
accepted measure of exchangeability. This means use value relates to biophysical
considerations and exchange value to monetary considerations. It is crucial to understand that
a commodity is always the bearer of both, like a coin that has a ‘qualitative’ picture on one
side and a ‘quantitative’ number on the other. A material perspective is, without doubt, an
essential step to gain a deeper understanding; however, most economists work, think and talk
about the economy in exchange value terms expressed in money, as this is the predominant
value form in capitalist economies. It is essential to understand material and monetary
relations, which remains underexplored in steady-state economics.
2.3.5 Open vs. closed systems thinking
The pre-analytic vision Daly introduces represents an open systems ontology of the social
world.
“What is needed is not an ever more refined analysis of a faulty vision, but
a new vision … The necessary change in vision is to picture the
macroeconomy as an open subsystem of the finite natural ecosystem
(environment), and not as an isolated circular flow of abstract exchange
value, unconstrained by mass balance, entropy and finitude” (Daly, 1996,
p. 48).
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In this vision, ‘open systems’ are defined in thermodynamic terms, i.e. exchanging matter-
energy with their surroundings. This conceptualisation sounds trivial but has far-reaching
implications. It means that all economic processes are ultimately natural processes in terms
of biological, physical and chemical transformations and thus subject to the laws of
thermodynamics (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). However, as complexity rises from natural to
social systems (Luhmann, 1987), dynamics of the economy cannot be exclusively explained in
biophysical terms. There is more to inflation than atoms and molecules. Also, seeing the
economy as embedded in the environment implies a hierarchical understanding: the economy
needs the environment for its survival, but not vice-versa (Spash, 2012). As economies are
open they can become smaller or bigger in terms of throughput and natural capital stock,
giving rise to Daly’s ‘empty’ vs. ‘full’ world perspective. Moreover, the outcomes of social
environmental systems interdependence are unpredictable and indeterminate and subject to
uncertainty and constant change.
Every sensible person (or economist)25 agrees with this view. The crucial question is how
economic theory relates to this ontology. To pick up Whitehead’s fallacy of misplaced
concreteness: given the pre-analytic vision, what is a sensible abstraction of it? What does
economic theory need to look like to capture essential dynamics of this worldview? If Daly’s
ambition is to offer an alternative vision that is more ‘realistic’ to account for the nature of
open reality, then it seems sensible to embrace an open system methodology that accounts
for fundamental uncertainty, imperfect knowledge and mutability (Chick and Dow, 2005).
Most of the foundations of ecological economics are tied to open systems methodology: the
commitment to value pluralism and incommensurability (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998), the need
for a different (post normal) understanding of science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994a), the
importance of inter- and transdisciplinarity (Lélé and Norgaard, 2005) and holism (Meadows,
2002). However, the steady-state approach unconsciously incorporates the core of an
economic theory that is based on a closed systems methodology, in which certainty, atomism
and isolation of linear cause-effect mechanisms prevails. As a consequence, the steady-state
approach falls back into the isolated-loop architecture Daly detests so much. In the end, the
ontological foundations of steady-state economics clash with the closed systems methodology
of neoclassical economics.
25 This also becomes clear in the correspondence between Daly and Solow/Stiglitz in which they all agree
that economic processes are subject to thermodynamic laws, embedded in a larger environmental
system and dependent on it for sources and sinks (Daly, 1997a, 1997b; Solow, 1997; Stiglitz, 1997).
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2.4 Discussion
Steady-state economics is presented as a solution-oriented and desirable alternative of a
future sustainable world overcoming some fundamental pitfalls of ‘standard growth
economics’ (CASSE, 2016). It was meant to offer an approach targeted at institutions that have
the potential to set in motion, direct, and progressively foster transformational change
towards sustainability and equity (Daly, 2010a, 2008). In a pragmatic spirit, Daly argues:
“theorists must not allow themselves to be debilitated and rendered irrelevant by too deep a
philosophical reflection on the infinite interconnectedness of all things” (Daly, 1994, p. 91). In
other words, instrumentalists can do without theoretical rigour and waterproof philosophical
and methodological foundations (and even systems thinking). What matters is a convincing
narrative to gain political credibility and achieve desired outcomes, i.e. limiting resource use
under a relatively fair governance regime. Given this motivation, do the theoretical,
methodological and ontological inconsistencies presented in this article really matter?
It seems necessary to ask what criteria a ‘good’ theory should fulfil. Ecological economic
theory of the human-planetary system should aspire to meet three criteria, at least. One is to
offer deep explanations of why current economic development trajectories and policies
prioritising GDP growth are unsustainable and increasingly unjust. Only a realistic account of
how market dynamics unfold and how central capitalist dynamics relate to destructive
environmental change can give rise to meaningful insights beyond naivety and utopianism. In
order to do so, theory needs to arise out of concepts and assumptions that are rooted in reality
(Brown and Spencer, 2012; Kapp, 1961). Besides an explanation based on realistic concepts,
there is a need for logical consistency. We can only make sense of the world by logically tracing
how core concepts of a theory are related. In addition, theories should aim for impact – in
terms of reaching and influencing Realpolitik and societal awareness about the need for social
ecological change. The criteria of deep explanation based on realism, logical consistency and
real-world impact need to be balanced such that no one criterion becomes paramount.
Consistent theory detached from reality is not sound, neither is aiming for impact at the
expense of consistency or realism.
Steady-state economics addresses these ambitions to some extent but falls short on most of
them. It provides a vision of where to go and first steps into this direction in terms of
institutions and policy proposals (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013), but fails in terms of logical
40
consistency26 and deep explanation based on realism, as it does not offer a developed theory
of how capitalist dynamics relate to ecological disruptions. Without such a sound theoretical
basis, the steady-state project remains a rather shallow attempt of listing normative goals and
policies that bear little resonance to real-world implementation challenges. The lack of a
realistic conception of growth and power dynamics constitutes a central critique of steady-
state economics (Burkett, 2009; Hahnel, 2012; Mujezinovic, 2013; Smith, 2010; Spash, 2015a;
Trainer, 2011), which Daly has not taken very seriously (Daly, 2010b). If we believe that
systems and their structures follow dynamics emerging from the parts and relations they
consist of, then the problems are not ‘out there’ but ‘in here’ (Meadows, 2009). There is a
need for a realistic perspective on how markets operate and a debate about the benefits and
limits of non-market vs. market economic order (Polanyi, 1944).
Advances in this direction are attempted with the development of a new ecological
macroeconomics (Rezai and Stagl, 2016; Røpke, 2016) and the economics of degrowth (Kallis
et al., 2012). This is not the space to review this evolving body of literature; however, what
this chapter offers is an impulse to carefully think about the theoretical foundations of
‘alternatives’ proposed. Jackson, for instance, claims that “Daly’s pioneering work provides a
solid foundation from which to rectify this [ecological macroeconomics]” (Jackson, 2009, p.
123) and proceeds to explain macroeconomics basics in terms of the neoclassical production
function approach. This is highly problematic. This is just one example that illustrates the need
for caution and awareness of the limits of neoclassical theory in developing constructive
ecological-economic theory.
Daly’s position on neoclassical economics remains ambiguous. He is highly critical of
mainstream theory, including environmental economics (Røpke, 2005). However, if Daly is so
critical, what is the rationale for adopting mainstream concepts and reasoning? My
speculation is threefold. First is a belief that standard market theory, when corrected for its
‘freely floating’ character that abstracts from biophysical realities, provides a satisfactory
framework for analysing economic systems (Daly and Farley, 2011). This chapter shows that
this is not the case. Second might be long training in mainstream thinking and lack of exposure
26 I clarify that two inconsistencies need to be distinguished: internal inconsistency of neoclassical theory
(as shown by Keen, 2001, for instance) and inconsistency of neoclassical theory with steady-state
ambitions and ecological economics more broadly. This chapter mainly addresses the latter: however, it
also highlights the former in the discussion of the theory of the firm and general equilibrium theory in
section 2.2.
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to alternatives. Apart from the classical economists as a source of inspiration, John Stuart Mill’s
vision of a stationary state in particular (Mill, 2006), Daly speaks of ‘economics’ as if there was
no alternative to the mainstream.27 This chapter shows that there are heterodox alternatives.
A third reason might be linked to pragmatism (Spash, 2013) and Daly’s early ambitions to
change the discipline of environmental economics from within, rather than creating a new
field. As an expert of subtle and ironic formulations (Røpke, 2005), Daly developed concepts
such as ‘uneconomic growth’, ‘optimal scale’ or the index of sustainable economic welfare
(ISEW) to show that the pursuit of economic growth is no longer desirable, even when
considered from a mainstream perspective. However, Daly’s pragmatic use of mainstream
theory weakens the analytical and political contribution as well as the relevance of steady-
state economics. It has neither convinced mainstream economists nor led to the
implementation of steady-state policies. Rather, it has contributed to a split ecological
economics community (Spash, 2013), with an unfortunate tendency to become more
mainstream again (Anderson and M’Gonigle, 2012), whilst social ecological crises continue to
worsen.
What became clear for me, and what others highlight as well (Nadeau, 2015; Spash, 2013), is
that internalising neoclassical economics and its reasoning impedes the ability to address
social ecological crises as it remains caught in an ahistorical, static, universal, purely subjective
and individualist methodological architecture. These foundations cannot provide sound
theories of growth dynamics, profit, money or distribution, which are key to understand the
contemporary political economy landscape. It is important to know neoclassical reasoning as
most of contemporary economics relies upon it; however, basing central theories of ecological
economics on it seems utterly misleading. Instead, it is necessary to let go of neoclassical
foundations altogether, as they contradict a systemic, holistic, dynamic and realistic
understanding of the interrelation between the economy and the environment with a view to
27 A few references are made to Marxist economics, which are however quickly abandoned. Daly
believes that “Marx, with his theory that labor was the source of all value, was even more eager than
standard economists to deny any important role to nature in the functioning of the economy and creation
of value” (Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 32). This thought seems to have been passed onto Daly’s student
Bob Costanza, who argues that “Marx and his followers in communist countries have made a negative
contribution to the allocative efficiency problem” which has contributed to much environmental
destruction in former-communist countries (Costanza et al., 2015, p. 45). These accounts are based on
misinterpretations of Marx’s work, confuse Marxist theory with socialist dictatorships and do not
acknowledge that Marxist theory cannot provide insight into ‘the allocative efficiency problem’ because
it rejects the conception of allocation in favour of a more comprehensive understanding of production,
exchange and distribution.
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proposing effective policies and triggering change towards sustainability (Gowdy and Erickson,
2005; Klitgaard and Krall, 2012; Krall and Klitgaard, 2011; Spash, 2011a). The new generation
of ecological economists needs to be aware of the pitfalls of neoclassical theory and pragmatic
strategies to maintain mainstream language and concepts to fruitfully advance ecological
economics.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter reveals that steady-state economics is internally flawed as it heavily relies on
neoclassical theory and reasoning. By accepting allocative efficiency of markets, the core of
neoclassical economics is incorporated into the steady-state framework. The hidden
implications of this move are profound. It means accepting a utility-based preference
satisfaction account of wellbeing (O’Neill, 1998), stable and unquestioned preferences, the
neoclassical theory of the firm, general equilibrium theory, rational economic man,
instrumentalism regarding the unrealism of assumptions, and a neoclassical definition of what
economics is and should be. Adopting the scope, reasoning, and core assumptions of
neoclassical theory and adding a biophysical and ethical flavour to it does not lead to its
improvement, but rather to fundamental internal inconsistencies between the ‘old’
economics paradigm and ‘new’ progressive ecological economic thinking.
Critique is never a satisfying end result but rather the starting point for constructive
alternatives. This chapter offers a prelude for progressive advances in ecological economic
theory along heterodox lines. Marxist economics, ‘old’ institutionalism, post-Keynesian
economics, parts of classical political economy, evolutionary economics, feminist economics,
Polanyian approaches and environmental sociology are amongst the most promising sources
of inspiration to think about the intertwined nature of economic and ecological systems and
better understand environmentally destructive feedbacks of the system as a whole. They
provide a broad conception of the economy as a social and historical process, focus on social
structure, crises, dynamics and change, the role of money and finance, the impact of politics,
and offer methodologies that fit the pre-analytic vision of ecological economics. More bridges
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between heterodox traditions and progressive ecological economics are needed to collectively
establish a new economics that is supportive of socially just sustainability transitions.28
28 One attempt to establish a new economics based on a cooperation between many streams of
heterodox economics is ‘New paradigm economics’ (see e.g. Fullbrook, 2014, 2013).
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3 Value
Understanding social ecological structure
3.1 Introduction
Value theory is abstract, difficult, and Marxian value theory very controversial – why should
ecological economists care? There are at least three reasons to care. First, ecological
economics lacks a coherent economic theory of the system as a whole. This was a key
conclusion from the previous chapter. Value theory is considered to be the bedrock of an
economic paradigm. Understanding and exploring what value is, how it gets reproduced, and
how use value and exchange value considerations are entangled serves as a powerful starting
point to understanding the system as a whole. This serves the purpose of establishing sound
theoretical foundations for ecological economics as a coherent, realistic and more effective
interdisciplinary paradigm. Marxian value theory provides an understanding of how
biophysical flows are attached to (and detached from) monetary flows and how they travel
together through the system. As such, value theory can be portrayed as the foundation for
understanding and explaining social ecological dynamics.
Second, the practical implications and consequences of different value theoretical
underpinnings are profound. Mainstream marginal utility theory leads to strategies of ‘pricing
“What is essential is invisible to the eye” (Saint-Exupéry, 1943).
“What is value? This is perhaps the most urgent, yet neglected,
question of contemporary social theory” (Murray, 2017, p. 16).
“If you think you can solve the environmental question and global
warming … without confronting … the value structure … then you got
to be kidding yourself” (Harvey, 2010a).
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nature’, whereas the Marxian understanding of value to strategies of ‘overcoming the system’.
The differences could hardly be further apart. What strategies should ecological economics
adopt? We need to understand how social ecological crises arise to fight them more
effectively. Understanding the value theoretical underpinnings of different economic
paradigms helps to trace how economists think about the emergence of social ecological crises
and why they arrive at different and, at times, opposing recommendations to counter them.
Through this lens, value theory is key to arriving at better informed decisions how to act upon
social ecological problems.
Third, this chapter provides the raw material and essential building blocks for the next chapter.
Capital is defined as ‘value in motion’ and the capitalist system is geared towards the
‘expansion of value’ – without an understanding of value, money and the commodity, it seems
impossible to conclusively understand the drivers of capitalism as value producing and
expanding system. This matters especially for the Marxian approach because many scholars
and also ecological economists continue to denounce Marxist theory as ideology. In order to
separate the wheat from the chaff and judge what theories are better placed to explain,
understand and act upon social ecological problems, we need to understand them first (or at
least try to do so). Value theory is the foundation upon which essential Marxist concepts of
capital, exploitation or surplus value rest. Understanding these foundations is key for sceptics
to judge whether consecutive Marxian developments make sense. If scholars choose to
abandon Marxian theory or elements thereof, they should do so for sound reasons rather than
inherited preconceptions. This holds especially for Marxian value theory, which is widely
rejected but little understood.
This chapter aims to explain Marxian value theory and show its relevance for ecological
economics. The intention is to provide an understanding of the social ecological structure of
the capitalist system, which can be further developed into an understanding of social
ecological dynamics in the following chapter. The research questions guiding this chapter are
the following:
 What is value?
 Why does value theory matter for ecological economists?
 What insights does Marxian value theory provide for understanding the
capitalist system?
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces some value theoretical
foundations: the meaning of use value and exchange value and how their interrelation is
theorised in the classical and neoclassical tradition. These foundations provide the basis for
understanding how most ecological economists approach value and valuation and why this is
problematic. Section 3.3 shows that ecological economists adopt, reject or neglect a
mainstream economic understanding of value, either in the classical form of Smith or Ricardo
or in the neoclassical form of marginal utility theory. The remaining Marxian alternative
remains absent in ecological economics. Section 3.4 explores the Marxian approach to value.
Section 3.5 stresses its explanatory power. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Foundations
The starting point of ecological economics is an awareness that social ecological problems
arise out of dynamics of the economic system. But how can we grasp ‘the economy’? Value
theory suggests starting from the simplest economic transaction, the exchange of
commodities. Value theory in economics aims to explain what determines exchange value.
This is no simple issue but forms the “the centrepiece” and foundation of an economic
paradigm (Söllner, 1997, p. 177). What properties explain why different goods and services
are exchanged in certain magnitudes? Marginal utility? Costs of production? Labour time?
How can we understand how two things with very different qualities – shoes and teapots –
are made commensurable in ‘free and equal’ market exchange?29 And how is exchange value
intertwined with use value, e.g. amounts and qualities of iron, electricity, steel, paper etc. that
are transformed in the production process? Value theory sheds light on these questions. This
debate is old and reaches at least back to Aristotle who distinguished between oikonomía (the
art of household management) and chrematistics (the art of acquisition) (Cruz et al., 2009).
250 years ago, at the beginning of what we consider modern economics, Adam Smith adopted
Aristotle’s distinction and provided a famous example how the distinction between use and
exchange value poses a fundamental question in economics:30
29 Value theory aims to explain equal exchange relations, i.e. the mutual agreement of two parties to
engage in the exchange of commodities. Obvious unequal exchanges based on force, manipulation and
violence are excluded from this analysis for the time being. I will return to these considerations in the
next chapter as part of a discussion of profits upon alienation.
30 This phrase became widely known as the so-called ‘water and diamonds paradox’ or ‘value paradox’
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“The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings … The one
may be called ‘value in use’; the other ‘value in exchange’. The things which
have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange;
and on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have
frequently little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but
it will purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange
for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very
great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it”
(Smith, 1999, p. 131).
In economics, there are three different ways to approach this issue and theorise exchange
value: classical theories of value – prominently represented by Smith and Ricardo, marginal
utility theory of value that led to the development of neoclassical economics, and Marxian
value theory – which is of a different kind,31 as I will explain below. Interestingly, all three
approaches seem to share an understanding of what the ‘value problem’ is (Fig. 1). They
accept the distinction between use value and exchange value and money as a standard unit
of measure of exchangeability. What property explains the exchange value of commodities is
where views diverge.
in economics. Interestingly, is was never a paradox for Smith and his successors. “There is no evidence
that any economist expressed any difficulty in explaining the relative prices of commodities such as water
and diamonds” (White, 2002, p. 661). The classics were not much interested in explaining market-prices
but rather the determination of long-run ‘natural’ prices. They acknowledged utility and demand as
essential for the short-run, but also that long-run prices follow quite different characteristics. It is in this
context that the phrase has to be understood. Apparently, the idea of a paradox became established
and popularised by marginalists much later. The brilliant article by White (2002) traces how Smith’s
paragraph was consciously misinterpreted, put out of context and finally cemented in Samuelson’s
seminal textbook to promote marginal economics. The gist of the story is to show how a problem that
puzzled Smith and other classical political economists can finally be solved with marginal utility analysis.
As such, the ‘value paradox’ is a product of the 20th century. It has become an influential professional
myth.
31Marxist value theory is typically portrayed as a version of Ricardo’s labour theory of value. In important
respects, this is wrong. However, this point of view is also widespread in ecological economics (Farber
et al., 2002; Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Judson, 1989; Söllner, 1997), and Marxist economics itself
in its neo-Ricardian versions. For understanding the entanglements between exchange value and use
value, which is essential for understanding economy-environment interrelations, I will argue that the
neoclassical tradition follows the footsteps of Smith and Ricardo much closer than is often recognised,
whereas Marx departs from it in fundamental ways.
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use value
? money as measure of (exchange) value
exchange value
Figure 2. The value problem in economics
Let us begin by clarifying what these terms mean (section 3.2.1) and how their interrelations
are theorised in the classical approach of Smith and Ricardo and the neoclassical tradition
(section 3.2.2).
3.2.1 Use value and exchange value
Use value denotes the appropriation of nature for the satisfaction of human needs and wants.
The reasons why goods and services have ‘use’ for people is closely tied to the specific
materiality embodied in them. A wooden spoon can be used for eating soup but hardly for
writing a letter. As such, use values represent the material side of commodities (Harvey, 2006,
p. 5). What makes objects useful also depends on individual tastes and social norms, such as
cultural, historical, spiritual and symbolic contexts. As such, use value considerations
predominantly stress the qualitative aspect of commodities, recognising the
incommensurability of a myriad different properties that give rise to usefulness. However,
there is a quantitative dimension to use values too. As use values, goods are definite
quantities, such as tons of steel, litres of water or thousands of strawberries. This implies that
use values have an objective basis which makes it possible to aggregate and compare them
through time (Elson, 1979).
Commodities are not only useful to people but also characterised by their capacity to be
exchanged. Exchange value is the quantitative worth (Shaikh, 1977) or “ratio between any two
commodities or services” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 561). It is the power of a commodity to
exchange for other commodities. Exchange values, therefore, express a quantitative relation
between useful objects, between use values. I would like to stress these two dimensions:
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exchange value is a quantity and a relation. As a quantitative relation, a commodity does not
measure absolute but relative amounts, i.e. it does not have ‘an’ exchange value but many
different exchange values. In fact, there are as many exchange values as there are different
commodity combinations (coffee-tea; coffee-sugar, coffee-hats etc.). However, in practice,
money has developed as a socially accepted measure of exchangeability. Exchange value
therefore represents the monetary side of commodities. The character of prices, incomes, or
any monetary categories only makes sense in relation to others, i.e. they are all relative
categories. These monetary relations change all the time and are hence often portrayed as
arbitrary or accidental amounts that vary with time and place.
As mentioned above, exchange value is considered to be the most basic economic entity
representing the simplest economic transaction, the exchange of commodities.
“Nothing is more basic to the functioning of capitalist society than the
elemental transaction in which we acquire a certain quantity of use value
in return for a certain sum of money” (Harvey, 2006, p. 9).
This sounds rather simple and yet, it remains one of the biggest controversies in the history of
economic thought. What do a house and five beds have in common? This question is more
than 2000 years old. The value problem in economics has been to explain why commodities
exchange at the relative prices they do (Harvey, 2006; Schumpeter, 1954). To understand
social ecological problems, we can ask what role use values play in the determination of
exchange value. The interrelation between use value and exchange value is the vantage point
I will use to explore how economists of different tradition theorise exchange value.
3.2.2 Classical and neoclassical value theory: the foundations of the ‘real’ economy
How to explain value was a question that engaged almost all of Adam Smith’s contemporaries.
Value theory was still a core subject area for the political economists of that time.32 Smith
approached the problem by arguing that a pure labour theory of value only holds for pre-
capitalist (barter) economies. He presented a famous beaver and deer example in which the
exchange ratio of both ‘commodities’ is determined by the amount of time required to hunt
the animals. If it takes twice as long to hunt a deer, deer will be twice as ‘valuable’, i.e.
32 It is no longer. If you open a standard economics textbook, you will not find a chapter called ‘value
theory’ (if you do, please let me know).
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expensive. Capitalist economies, in contrast, are characterised by the interaction of various
social classes that contribute to the production of commodities in different ways. This is why
Smith argued against a labour theory of value for capitalist economies due to payments
required to the owners of capital and land. He formulated a cost of production theory of value
for capitalist societies that explains the long-run exchange value of a commodity as the
summation of wages, profits and rents required to produce it (Screpanti and Zamagi, 2005).
Ricardo detected inconsistencies in Smith’s reasoning. For instance, he argued that profits are
a residual income that remains after wages have been paid. Contra Smith, he made a case that
a labour theory of value also holds for capitalist economies. He thought it was possible to
explain exchange value by the relative amount of labour time (rather than costs33) required in
production. Ricardo was well aware that labour time is not the only factor determining
exchange value. His theory was empirical, rather than analytic, that is, he wanted to emphasise
that relative labour times are the dominant determinant, not the only one (Stigler, 1958). As
such, he formulated a ‘93% labour theory of value’. We can understand his theory as an
attempt to reject the view that exchange value is governed by supply and demand.
“It is admitted by everybody that demand and supply govern market price,
but what is it that determines supply at a particular price? Cost of
production” (Stigler, 1958, p. 367 citing Ricardo).
This means Ricardo, as well as Smith, explained the determination of exchange value at a more
fundamental level, one that underpins the fluctuations of supply and demand. This is sensible,
important for understanding underlying drivers of social ecological problems, and also not
controversial. However, his theory became widely misinterpreted and discredited over time,
including in ecological economics. The few traces of Ricardo that can be found in ecological
economics are limited to short statements indicating that not much can be learned from
Ricardo as he suggested labour is the only sources of value (e.g. Farber et al., 2002a; Gómez-
Baggethun et al., 2010).
“The basic reason Ricardo’s theory is often misinterpreted is that it was
often misinterpreted in the past. If a theory once acquires an established
meaning, each generation of economists bequeaths this meaning to the
next, and it is almost impossible for a famous theory to get a fresh hearing.
Perhaps one hearing is all that a theory is entitled to, but one may plead
that Ricardo deserves at least a rehearing – his theory is relatively more
33 Stigler (1958) highlights that one of Ricardo’s main ambitions was to refute the popular idea of his
time that a rise in wage rates increases the (exchange) value of commodities.
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widely misunderstood today than it was in his lifetime” (Stigler, 1958, p.
367).
However, even though Ricardo managed to overcome some of the problems with Smith’s
initial formulation of value, e.g. by suggesting that fixed capital inputs could be expressed as
past labour, he was also left with several issues he could not resolve. For instance, his theory
could not adequately account for the role of technological change, changes in the distribution
of income (capital-labour ratios) and differences in the time it takes for commodities to come
to the market. Ricardo was aware of these problems and suggested that modifications are
required (Screpanti and Zamagi, 2005; Stigler, 1958).
Ultimately, both Smith and Ricardo could not explain value satisfactorily. This led to the further
development of value theory in two different directions. Marx took up Ricardo’s challenge to
reformulate the labour theory of value in important respects. The early marginalists, in
contrast, criticised the Classics, mainly Ricardo, above all for neglecting the role of demand in
price formation. They embarked on a different journey.
Bentham’s concept of utility provided a different avenue to approach the problem. Utility
expresses the idea that people seek pleasure and avoid pain in the pursuit of their happiness.
The innovation of the early marginalists – Menger, Jevons and Walras – was to build on this
idea and develop ‘marginal utility’ as an expression for the particular quantities of ‘pleasure’
and ‘pain’ that are involved in commodity production and exchange. They assumed that every
additional unit of consumption would yield less additional pleasure, whereas every additional
unit of production is associated with more pain or sacrifice, such as additional hours worked,
which translate into higher costs (Persons, 1913). There comes a point, so the argument goes,
at which decreasing marginal utility meets increasing marginal costs (as disutility). This is the
equilibrium point at which value and price are determined (Stigler, 1950).
This is how the ultimate standard for value was reconciled in the concept of marginal utility,
which is an expression of the degree of well-being or satisfaction gained from consumption of
one extra unit of a good (Persons, 1913). Marginal utility theory thus emphasises the role of
consumption, and exchange becomes the central organising principle of capitalist society
(Shaikh, 2016).
“Jevons, Menger, and Walras … aimed at the same goal: … to prove that
the principle of marginal utility suffices to deduce the exchange ratios
between commodities” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 878).
“The theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and
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pain; and the object of Economics is to maximize happiness by purchasing
pleasure, as it were, at the lowest cost of pain … value depends entirely
upon utility” (Jevons 1957 cited by Milonakis and Fine, 2009, p. 99).
By emphasising exchange and consumption as determining exchange value, the role of
production was downplayed, and with it, the role of labour in the production process. But
how, then, did the marginalists apply the principle of utility to capture the supply side of price
formation as well? Menger introduced an ‘analytic device’ that he called a ‘genuine stroke of
genius’. It was the idea that means of production serve consumers satisfaction too, though
only indirectly (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 880).
“It enables us to treat such things as iron or cement or fertilizers – and also
all services of natural agents and labor that are not directly consumed – as
incomplete consumable goods, and thereby extend the range of the
principle of marginal utility over the whole area of production and
‘distribution’“ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 880).
In this way, the cost side became subject to “the general kingdom of utility” too (Böhm-
Bawerk, 1894, p. 6). Formerly objective costs of production became ‘subjectivised’ as
something that contributes to human wellbeing and that can be explained by individual
choices. With this idea, the foundations were laid for a theory of exchange value that was
capable of accounting for both costs of production (scarcity) and marginal utility.
To sum up, how can we understand how the early marginalists solved ‘the value paradox’ (i.e.
the paradox they themselves created)? Essentially, they circumvented the paradox by
redefining use value as utility and using marginal utility to explain and measure
exchangeability. Utility serves as a homogenous entity to which heterogeneous use values can
be reduced. It is important to emphasise that marginal, not total utility ‘explains’ prices in
marginal utility theory.34 This made comparisons possible and the main issue became how to
measure utility (Alchian, 1953). Money became interpreted as a measure of pleasure and pain
‘at the margin’. Qualities are swallowed in quantities; totalities by relations and the borders
between exchange value and use value blur, merge and eventually dissipate.
This move has not remained unchallenged. Fundamental criticism came from the Austrian
economists, who attacked the ‘disutility’ (cost) side of the argument, for instance, as
unrealistic. In industrial real-world economies workers are not free to choose the length of
34 I will come back to this issue in the next chapter by explaining that macroeconomic aggregates, such
as capital and growth, cannot be coherently theorised based on marginal utility foundations.
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work and adapt their ‘pains’ to equilibrate costs and prices (e.g. Böhm-Bawerk, 1894). The
Austrian critique not only had reasoned but also ideological motives.
“Austrian economists had fought hard to repel the labour theory of value,
and they were not about to reintroduce labor as a causal factor in the
explanation of subjective value” (Spencer, 2004, p. 392).
This is why the Austrians suggested replacing the direct disutility of labour with the utility of
leisure time (as opportunity costs of labour). Their view prevailed and the marginal utility of
leisure time became engraved as an accepted standard of representing labour costs in
mainstream economics. This is no minor technical issue. It meant that the central role of
labour (work and workers) in the economic process was removed from the core of economic
theory.35
Criticism targeted at marginal utility theory came not only from outside. Also the inventors of
utility theory themselves were aware of fundamental problems with the approach they
proposed. Bentham recognised the difficulties of inferring from measuring individual utilities
to measuring total utility of all commodities; Jevons initially denied the possibility of measuring
utility at all; Walras avoided interpersonal comparisons of utility; and Menger omitted to be
explicit about the relation between utility and demand, to give a few examples (Stigler, 1950).
Problems and inconsistencies remained and some alterations by later economists such as
Marshall were considered “only patchwork repairs” (Stigler, 1950, p. 327).
Yet, the marginalist idea to explain and measure price and exchange value in terms of
quantities of pleasure and pain became the accepted standard approach in economics.
“This became the standard theory of value (price) that has dominated
neoclassical economics to this day. It has become the orthodox approach –
virtually unchallenged and widely applied to a whole range of public policy
issues, including ecological problems” (Patterson, 1998, p. 107).
“The concept of marginal utility … became the keystone on which the whole
neoclassical edifice has been erected” (Milonakis and Fine, 2009).
This move had profound consequences for the entire discipline of economics. As mentioned
earlier, value theory provides the bedrock for an economic paradigm. A lot of fundamental
35Moreover, the overemphasis on monetary dimensions of work (or leisure) in mainstream theory, most
prominently as wages, comes at the expense of understanding and debating substantive work-related
issues, such as the quality of work. This removes spaces for debate about improving working conditions
as a direct way to contribute to people’s wellbeing (Spencer, 2004).
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issues with mainstream economics arise out of this conception, not least that neoclassical
economics was developed upon individualist and subjective micro foundations (Milonakis and
Fine, 2009).
What are the consequences of this value theory for thinking about and acting on
environmental problems? The purely subjective valuation approach meant that objective
foundations of value creation were neglected. Moreover, the assumption of a direct link
between price as a measure of exchange value and exchange value as a measure of utility
(Douai, 2009) and thus wellbeing, establishes money and market prices as, at least in abstract
principle, adequate measures of natural wealth (as use values) and well-being. This leads to
ideas that externalities need to be internalised, GDP accounts adjusted to account for
environmental damage, or, in reverse, that the non-pricing and not assigning property rights
gives rise to the overexploitation of land and other natural resources which needs to be
corrected. Monetary valuation becomes an issue of individual preferences (typically as
willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept) and if former unpriced parts of the environment
get finally ‘valued’ (such as in payments for ecosystem services) it looks like an environmental
success. This line of reasoning paves the way to finding salvation in green capitalism. It also
forms a substantial part of what is advocated for in ecological economics (see section 3.3.1).
3.2.3 Similarities between the classical and neoclassical approach
To conclude, classical and neoclassical value theories differ in important respects. However,
they also share several similarities that are important for the argument of this chapter.
First, exchange value is essentially explained in trans-historical and naturalistic terms. This
seems clear for the case of marginal utility. “Value in use is the basis of value in exchange”
(Screpanti and Zamagi, 2005, p. 84 citing Bentham). Use value is a trans-historical concept in
the sense that all human societies produce and consume things with useful properties, i.e. use
values. What about the Classics? Smith emphasised the difference between use and exchange
value and hence rejected the idea that exchange value can be explained in use value terms.
However, by suggesting production costs as the basis for his commanded labour theory of
value, he essentially suggested exchange values (wages, profits, rent) to explain exchange
value, which is circular reasoning. As such, Smith’s value theory is disqualified. Ricardo, on the
other hand, suggested embodied labour as the basis for exchange values. The concept of
embodied labour shares a crucial characteristic with the concept of use value, namely that it
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too is a trans-historical concept. All societies, both capitalist and non-capitalist, produce things
which embody specific labour activity (embodied labour), which give rise to specific useful
properties (use value). This commonality across marginalists and Ricardo is significant. To
explain the historically specific predominance of exchange value relations by recourse to a
non-historically specific (trans-historical) concept (use value or embodied labour) is both
logically invalid and serves to mystify the capitalist system by making it appear to be natural
and so trans-historical.
Second, in the marginalist and classical tradition of Smith and Ricardo, exchange value is
related to actions, needs and aspirations of individuals. In other words, exchange value is
established from individualist (micro) foundations. In marginal utility theory, what something
is worth depends on what individuals are willing to pay for it at the margin of consumption
(Fine, 2016, p. 5). Although Smith was generally eclectic in his approach, drawing on both
systemic and individualist arguments, his value theory is a “micro-theory of market exchange”
(Milonakis and Fine, 2009). Also, Ricardo viewed labour time as the time of the individual
embodied in the commodity (Clarke, 1991, p. 96). So even though the classics were class-
theorists, i.e. they theorised society in terms of social class, their utilitarian individualism led
to the conclusion of a spontaneous harmony of interests. Where there is no deep-seated
structural conflict, there is no need for regulation. This highlights the direct political
implications of their viewpoints: a support of the fundamental political principle of laissez-
faire.
“The theory of exchange imposed a commitment to laissez-faire in the
regulation of economic relations, on the basis of the liberal principle of
individual self-determination” (Clarke, 1991, p. 148).
Third, and following from the previous point, both the classical and neoclassical tradition
portray capitalism in a positive light. It is no coincidence that Smith called his seminal book
The Wealth of Nations. The conception derived of capitalism is one of production for the
satisfaction of people’s needs.
“Orthodox theory has always insisted that the ultimate goal of all capitalist
production is to provide for consumption … it is consumption which rules
the roost” (Shaikh, 1978, p. 222).
The individual liberal framework suggested spontaneous harmony of class interests and
progress in terms of material accumulation. Starting from a conception of capitalism as an
efficient system of human needs provision, there was no reason to fundamentally challenge
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the system, or regulate it, or question its fundamental institutions, such as private property
and competition, and they did not do so.
“For Ricardo the existence of capital, landed property and wage labour was
simply an inescapable fact of life” (Clarke, 1991, p. 47).
They took the system for granted and supported the view that liberal capitalism is the best of
all possible worlds. The naturalisation of capitalist relations referred to above lay at the root
of this political endorsement of capitalism.
Fourth, both approaches share similar philosophical roots. The theories of Smith and Ricardo
were developed within the intellectual and ideological framework of the Enlightenment, which
was the 18th century challenge to the absolutist order that replaced God with reason and the
priest by the scientist (Clarke, 1991). Also, David Hume was a friend of Adam Smith so it does
not come as a big surprise that Smith’s and Ricardo’s value theories are heavily influenced by
the British empiricist tradition (Clarke, 1991; Murray, 2017). This tradition also influenced
Bentham and hence what gave the philosophical imprint to marginal utility theory.
This matters for two reasons. On one hand, some Marxists argue that the methodological
approach rooted in British empiricism prevented the Classical and neoclassical economists
from deriving an accurate explanation of exchange value (Brown, 2008; Ilyenkov, 1977, 1960;
Murray, 2017). I am inclined to adopt this position and explain why in section 3.4.1 when I
discuss Marx’s alternative method. On the other hand, British empiricism provides a flat
ontology of the world. A key critique of Marx was that mainstream economists are pre-
occupied with appearances rather than attempting to uncover the real essences of the world.
This limits the explanatory power of their theories because they are not able to grasp and
explain underlying drivers and mechanisms of surface appearances.36 This matters for
ecological economics when it comes to understanding root causes of social ecological
problems.
36 Smith and Ricardo failed to ‘dig deep’, as Marx argued, but still provided a quite rich account of the
political economy of their time. The explanatory power of marginal utility theory, in contrast, is
additionally curtailed by the reductionism of neoclassical economics. Supply and demand are the
‘explanatory’ mechanisms that explain changes in prices but almost everything that seems essential in
this interaction is taken as given or assumed away in equilibrium analyses (see chapter 2). On this basis,
neoclassical economics does not explain much at all.
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I will return to these points in section 3.4 when I explain how the Marxian approach differs
from the accounts offered by Smith, Ricardo and the marginalists.
3.3 Value theory in ecological economics: the foundations of the ‘real real’
economy
How is value theory debated in ecological economics? The answer is: surprisingly little. A
keyword search37 in Ecological Economics yields 1200 and 744 hits for value and valuation,
respectively, (out of 5200 articles), but only 8 for value theory38, and 2 for a combined search
of use value and exchange value. Ecological economists are preoccupied with ‘practical’
valuation, not with theory. Few articles address value theory explicitly and if so, often at the
margin. In the following, I divide the ecological economics community into five different camps
to understand better how ecological economists conceptualise environment-economy
interactions and to what extent they draw on value theory. The conclusion I derive is that
ecological economists rely on a marginalist understanding of value (section 3.3.1), reject it
(section 3.3.2), draw on the classical tradition of Smith and Ricardo (section 3.3.3) or are
indifferent about value theory (section 3.3.4). An alternative Marxian understanding of value
remains virtually absent (section 3.3.5).
Why does this matter? I think it matters if wrong or implicit value theoretical underpinnings
mislead or hinder ecological economists to grasp the nature of the capitalist system. I would
argue this is the case when ecological economists conceptualise capitalism as ‘real real
economy’ – that is, essentially a biophysical economy – instead of a monetary market
economy. Ecological economists study the biophysical foundations of the economy and
ultimate social outcomes such as wellbeing and quality of life. They dig deeper into what
should matter and be valued (more) in society. This is helpful, but it is not enough. It
documents the overuse and exploitation of the natural environment but it fails to identify root
causes of ecological destruction. Expanding a flawed mainstream conception of the economic
37 These results are based on a Scopus document search using ‘Abstract title, Abstract, Keywords’ in the
journal Ecological Economics on 18 January 2018.
38 The same result holds for variations such as theory of value, theories of value, value theories. The
combination valuation and economic theory yields 27 times, a somewhat higher result but without
much more theoretical substance.
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system as ‘real’ economy into a ‘real real’ economy prevents a deeper understanding of
fundamental drivers of social ecological crises.
3.3.1 Ecosystem service advocates: adoption of mainstream value theory and
valuation
The valuation of ecosystem goods and services is one of the biggest and most active terrains
within ecological economics. Understanding value is the pre-requisite for valuation as the
“process of expressing a value for a particular action or object” (Farber et al., 2002, p. 376).
However, there are only a handful of articles in Ecological Economics that explicitly establish
links to value theoretical underpinnings. When they do, it becomes clear that marginal utility
theory of value is the value theory adopted.
A seminal special issue from 2002 on The Dynamics and Value of Ecosystem Services:
Integrating Economic and Ecological Perspectives serves as an important reference point. This
special issue on valuation contains 12 articles (including Introduction), some of which touch
on the conceptual foundations of environmental valuation. Interestingly, eight individuals in
this Special Issue are co-authors of two or more papers; two individuals co-author five articles
(Wilson and Farber); and Robert Costanza39 co-authors six. Some of these articles are amongst
the most cited articles in Ecological Economics.40 These contributions form a substantial part
of the conceptual bedrock for ecosystem goods and services research within ecological
economics. What do these authors write about value theory?
Farber et al. (2002) provide the foundational theoretical contribution of the Special Issue. The
authors state
“The classical economists, such as Smith and Ricardo, could not resolve it
[the diamond-water paradox] using their labor theories of value. It was
resolved only by recognizing the importance of utility and scarcity in
determining exchange values, and the role of margins in value
39 Costanza is co-founder and past-President of the International Society of Ecological Economics,
founding Chief Editor of the journal Ecological Economics and on the Editorial Board ever since the first
issue got published in 1989.
40 Groot et al. (2002) is with 1655 citations the 2nd most cited article in Ecological Economics; Farber et
al. (2002) has 508 citations and ranks on place 13; followed by Wilson and Howarth (2002) with 223
citations on rank 93. Limburg et al. (2002) 194 citations, Sutton and Costanza (2002) 191, Boumans et
al. (2002) 152, Howarth and Farber (2002) 144.
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determination” (Farber et al., 2002, p. 378).
Whereas the classical political economists looked for
“a standard physical commodity unit for measuring exchange value,
neoclassical theorists did not need such a commodity. As value was
assumed to be determined by utility on the margin, and consumers were
assumed to allocate money optimally across uses, the marginal utility of
money was the same for an individual in all its uses. Money thus became
the standard unit of measure” (Farber et al., 2002, p. 378).
The authors leave little doubt that they consider the marginal approach as an improvement
of the classical tradition.
“The significance of the marginal utility theory of value to the evolving
concept of ecosystem service valuation is that it can be used to measure
use values, not just exchange values, in monetary units … money can thus
be used as a standard of measure of use value” (Farber et al., 2002, p. 378-
emphasis added).
The logic of marginal utility theory applied to ecosystem services valuation implies that
“The exchange value of ecosystem services is the trading ratios for those
services … market prices reflect the valuation of goods and service, but only
on the margin” (Farber et al., 2002, p. 388).
This is exactly what happens in practice. Scholars in this field focus on establishing
categorisations and typologies of ecosystem goods and services (i.e. a refined understanding
of different use value categories) (Groot et al., 2002 is THE reference point) with a view to
measure them for the purpose of ‘capturing’ environmental values that are otherwise
neglected and unaccounted for. The typical procedure is to conduct environmental cost-
benefit analysis in order to derive monetary measures that can be compared revealed
preference methods (e.g. hedonic pricing, travel cost method) and stated preference methods
(e.g. contingent valuation and choice experiments) are used (Spash, 2015b, p. 542). Monetary
valuation is not the only tool advocated to raise awareness of environmental degradation41
but an important and ‘useful’ one (Costanza and Farber, 2002).
Most valuation studies do not make their value theoretical foundations explicit. Environmental
valuation is a practical and pragmatic approach. The implicit anchorage in marginal utility
41 Other tools include biophysical measures and models or deliberative valuation methods. In fact, in
terms of non-monetary valuation methods, there is very much overlap to the position of Social
Ecological Economists (section 3.3.2).
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theory remains implicit or on the fringes, but nevertheless visible. These valuation methods
and data “are anchored to individual human preferences and valuation” (Turner et al., 2003,
p. 494). A lot of valuation studies proceed by speaking of ‘value’, ‘economic value’, ‘monetary
value’ interchangeably (e.g. Gallai et al., 2009). What shines through is a conventional wisdom
that this is what ‘economic value’ is.
3.3.2 Social ecological economists: rejection of mainstream value theory and
alternative valuation
Social ecological economists criticise monetary environmental valuation and the
microeconomic theory upon which it is based on various grounds. At the forefront of this
critique lies an attack against value monism, i.e. collapsing the multitude of environmental
values into single monetary numbers. The real-world plurality and incommensurability of
different values (Aldred, 2006; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998) imply that prices do not convey all
information necessary to make informed choices about environmental problems (Røpke,
1999; Vatn and Bromley, 1994).
The mainstream compression of values and its theoretical justification is also attacked for
neglecting important aspects that matter for environmental valuation, such as social norms,
political process, rights and ethical considerations (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; O’Neill and
Spash, 2000); different social, political, cultural contexts of valuation (Vatn and Bromley,
1994); a realistic treatment of time, complexity, and strong uncertainty (Getzner et al., 2004).
In addition, aggregation problems are highlighted (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; Spash and Vatn,
2006); as well as the incapacity of marginal analysis to consider absolute resource limits
(Spash, 2008a), and a disregard of realistic human behaviour and motivations (Vatn, 2005;
Vatn and Bromley, 1994). Decisions made on the basis of technocratic cost-benefit-analyses
are judged as misleading and distracting from intrinsically political and ethical issues.
The alternative offered is to re-politicise. As ‘prices are not much worth’ (Røpke, 1999) and as
most social ecological problems are inherently complex and uncertain (Funtowicz and Ravetz,
1994a, 1993) and subject to conflicting interests and priorities, effective policies require
alternative or additional valuation approaches and value articulating institutions (Vatn, 2015a,
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2005a).42 Multi-metric, multi-method, multi-discipline approaches are advocated that account
for plural values, address conflicts, create more transparency and facilitate open, inclusive and
participatory decision-making processes. This includes the necessity of biophysical
assessments (both to accompany or replace monetary measures), and the application of the
precautionary principle to account for fundamental uncertainty (Aldred, 2013). Deliberative
valuation methods43 are propagated prominently as a group of methods for dealing with plural
values, such as citizens’ juries, multi-criteria mapping, trade-off analysis, participatory
modelling methodology, deliberative visioning, participatory multi-criteria analysis, or
alternative water forums (Antunes et al., 2009; Kallis et al., 2013; Kenyon, 2007).
It becomes clear that social ecological economists discuss ‘value’ mainly in qualitative terms
(Douai, 2009). The prime concern is to include environmental values more effectively in
decision-making processes and to prevent further environmental destruction justified by
technocratic monetary cost-benefit exercises. Lo (2013) highlights that ecological economics
adopts an ‘alternative theory of value’ that draws on multiple philosophical strands, Sagoff’s
citizens values thesis and John Rawls’s theory of justice being the most prominent. The value-
theoretical links that are made thus reach out to environmental philosophy and ethics and to
social theory, but do not include other economic schools of thought.
Alternative understandings of economic value remain largely absent, even in this more
progressive camp within ecological economics. Generalisations such as the following are
widespread.
“Preference utilitarianism constitutes an implicit value theory of economics
… economists measure the value of environmental goods and services in
monetary terms … environmental values are treated as reducible to
consumer preferences” (Lo, 2013, p. 84).
42 Value articulating institutions are sets of rules that shape social processes of valuation by addressing
questions such as: Who shall participate? In what role? What data are considered relevant? How are
data processed? The choice of specific value articulating institutions influences what values are
included, what are excluded, and what type of conclusion can be reached (Vatn, 2015a, 2005b). An
example of a plural value articulating institutions are courts, as they enable different logics to be
sustained, e.g. historical justice, or expressing values of recognition or responsibility (Kallis et al., 2013).
43 Deliberation means “a particular sort of discussion that involves the careful and serious weighing of
reasons for and against some proposition. It is the act of considering different points of view and coming
to a reasoned decision that distinguishes deliberation from a generic group activity. Emphasis is given to
the product that arises from discussion (e.g. a decision or set of recommendations), and the process
through which that product comes about” (Antunes et al., 2009, p. 933). The goal is to achieve
generalizable interests, i.e. a workable agreement. This is based on the assumption that people are
capable of and want to listen to each other and be open about sharing subjective values.
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For many ecological economists, this is what ‘economics’ and ‘economic value’ is and what
‘economists’ do. I interpret this as a lack of awareness that the above critique is directed
towards a particular type of economic value theory rather than economics in general. Social
theory and philosophy are without doubt important, but they do not replace economic theory.
A sound understanding of what economic value is, is what matters to understand what
matters in (and beyond) markets and why.
To conclude, this camp moves rather quickly from the rejection of marginal utility theory to
pleas for value pluralism, incommensurability of values and the need for deliberative
institutions. However, a critique of mainstream value theory and normative appeals to take
nature into account more fully does not fill the gap of understanding economic value as a
major foundation of economic theory. Without value theory, there is no basis for fully
comprehending prices, money, profits and other core monetary categories of the economy.
Without these foundations, it is difficult to imagine how to fully understand intertwined
ecological economic dynamics and how to create an ecological economics paradigm along
alternative lines. Classical institutionalism, which is sometimes propagated as ‘the economics
of social ecological economics’ is insightful in many respects, but “one of the most important
lacunae in institutional thought is exactly the absence of a theory of price, or value theory”
(Milonakis and Fine, 2009).
3.3.3 Energy physicists: energy theories of value and energy accounting
The argument of energy theories of value is the following: available energy of the sun (partly
stored as fossil fuels) is required for the production of all goods and services and cannot be
substituted as ultimate input. Labour is a form of energy as well, which means energy is the
ultimate determinant of the exchange value of commodities. In addition, ‘free’ or ‘available’
energy is a homogenous substance (such as utility) that can be used to measure and compare
different commodity values. This leads energy physicists to conclude that, “the flow of energy
should be the primary concern of economics” (Costanza, 1980, p. 1219 citing Soddy). This line
of thinking dates back to the French physiocrats, for whom land was the ultimate and direct
source of value and wealth creation (Burkett, 2003; Christensen, 1989). In its modern
reincarnation, energy theories of value replaced land by energy as a source of value, surplus
and main driver of accumulation. This argument has developed in two different ways, one
based on energy quantity, the other on energy costs. Both versions are variations of
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“economics as the classical school did it” (Judson, 1989, p. 262). The difference is that energy
physicists focus on embodied energy or energy costs of production instead of embodied
labour or costs, as Ricardo and Smith did.
In ecological economics, this line of research dates back to H.T. Odum’s development of
emergy as a measure for embodied energy used in production. Although some present Odum
as an advocate of an energy theory of value (e.g. Judson, 1989), Foster and Holleman (2014)
argue that emergy was meant as a measure of use values and real wealth that, as Odum
repeatedly argued, should not be conflated with economic value. Odum developed emergy as
a metric to trace wealth in energetic terms and to show that unequal exchange relations
between countries and regions are much larger when accounting for energy flows instead of
monetary flows. However, while not proposing emergy as explaining exchange value, Odum
did compare emergy to monetary variables (e.g. an emergy investment ratio) to illustrate how
capitalist trade relations foster inequalities heavily biased against the poor.
In the early 1990s, there was a debate on the question whether embodied energy could and
should be related to market value (Foster and Holleman, 2014). Costanza argued against
Odum and for an energy theory of value in the form of an energy cost of production theory.
Costanza asked, “can anyone seriously suggest that labor creates sunlight?” (Costanza, 1980,
p. 140). Based on the argument that all production costs can be carried back to the solar
energy necessary to produce them, Costanza and colleagues used a Sraffian inspired input-
output approach to demonstrate a strong empirical relation between embodied energy and
market values (Cleveland et al., 1984; Costanza, 1980; Liu et al., 2008). A key aim was to
address the neglect of the role of energy in neoclassical production theory.
When these approaches started to be developed, it did not take long for criticism to arrive.
Some critiques point to problems with the methods of empirical testing.
“Due to the lack of physical data, economic input-output statistics have to
be relied upon for the determination of energy costs. Because … the energy
costs are calculated in accordance with the prices, constant energy
intensities … necessarily have to result – a methodological artefact that
renders energy accounting almost useless” (Söllner, 1997, p. 185).
Methodological issues are one severe problem. The most important critique within ecological
economics, however, against energy theories of value came from Georgescu-Roegen (1971)
and Daly (1991) who argued that “matter matters too”. They rejected energy theories of value
on the grounds that it is impossible to reduce all resources to energetic terms. One direction
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in which this line of thought has developed further is to study and measure various kinds of
energy and resource flows in their own right, without tying these analyses to value theory.
This became the hallmark of industrial ecologists (section 3.3.4).
As one response, energy theories of value were basically removed from the academic
landscape in ecological economics. Even though the label is no longer used today, the traces
of this research tradition are, however, still alive and active, although in somewhat different
form. There are two different research communities who conduct aggregate empirical
analyses on the relationship between energy and economic growth. Both have developed
refined measures of either a homogenous form of energy quantity (exergy) or energy costs
(EROI) that highlight the essential role of energy in production.44
Bob Ayres has pioneered the development of exergy (as useful work), which is an energetic
measure adjusted for energy quality which means it considers both the quantity and quality
of embodied energy used in production. Exergy was introduced in production functions to
explain the Solow residual and convince mainstream economists of the importance of energy
in the economic process. Empirical studies conducted by Ayres and colleagues suggest that
exergy is the key explanatory variable driving technological progress as the main engine
behind economic growth for various industrialised countries during the 20th century (Ayres,
1997; Ayres et al., 2007, 2005, 2003; Ayres and Voudouris, 2014; Ayres and Warr, 2009, 2005;
Warr and Ayres, 2012). These findings have been somewhat confirmed by recent work from
Brockway (2015, 2014) and others (Hammond and Stapleton, 2001; Heun et al., 2017;
Serrenho et al., 2012; Warr et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2008).
Another research community, led by Cleveland and Hall,45 make the case that energy return
on investment – short: EROI – is a key variable explaining economic growth. EROI shows how
much energy is left for the economy to use after taking into account the energy needed to
extract and ‘produce’ it. A high EROI implies high ‘surplus energy’, whereas a declining EROI
means the amount or accessibility of a certain energy resource is declining faster than the
advancements in technology to harvest it more efficiently (Dale et al., 2012; Murphy et al.,
2011;). By including EROI in production functions (Kümmel, 2011, 1982; Kümmel et al., 1985;
44 I am very grateful to Lina Brand-Correa who provided much substantive content and references to
understanding the exergy and EROI research communities.
45 Charles Hall was a student of H.T. Odum (Røpke, 2004, p. 299) as was Robert Costanza (Foster and
Holleman, 2014).
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Pokrovsky, 2003; Stern, 2011, 1993; Stern and Kander, 2012) studies show how the availability
of cheap fossil energy has spurred economic growth of the past, and how declining EROI for
oil over the last 40 years make energy ever more scarce and hence expensive. This signals ‘the
end of cheap oil’ and ultimately ‘the end of growth’ for oil-dependent industrial economies
(Murphy and Hall, 2011).
The practical policy implications of these approaches are no different than the ones derived
from marginal utility theory (Burkett, 2009; Söllner, 1997). If we assume that prices reflect
embodied energy or energy costs, then a perfectly functioning market would arrive at prices
proportional to energy and thus account for the ‘true’ costs of production.
“There is no inherent conflict between an embodied energy (or energy cost)
theory of value and value theories based on utility … Embodied energy
values are accurate indicators of market values where markets exist … this
is one way of ‘internalising’ all factors external to the existing market
system and solving the natural resource valuation problem … markets can
be viewed as an efficient energy allocation device that humans have
developed to solve the common problem facing all species – survival”
(Costanza, 1980, p. 1224).
Costanza’s view combines energy reductionism with unrealistic economic theory. It does not
allow for a “great” foundation for “a new ecological economics that links the natural and social
sciences”, as he suggests (Costanza, 1980, p. 1224). Instead, views like his naturalise capitalism
and thereby misguide ‘solutions’. It is perfectly legitimate to stress the essential role of energy
in production, and important for raising awareness of the energy dependency of societies.
However, the strong emphasis on whether or not key dimensions of biophysical throughput
(EROI, energy intensity etc.) can and do affect the scale of the economic system prevents
asking what underpins these relations. Why is it that capitalist societies use so much energy?
Moving beyond naturalist explanations not only allows for a deeper understanding of socially-
specific root causes of ecological problems but also gives rise to almost opposite policy
recommendations. From Costanza’s perspective, the problem becomes one of imperfect,
incomplete or missing markets in which energy externalities have to be internalised. As
Murphy et al. confirm: EROI analysis is “much like economic cost-benefit analysis” (Murphy et
al., 2011, p. 1889). From the perspective of understanding capitalist social relations,
elaborated below, attempts to internalise externalities feed an inherently expansionary
capitalist system.
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3.3.4 Industrial ecologists: empirical approach and biophysical accounting
Industrial ecologists46 provide a biophysical description of the metabolism of industrial
societies.47 The aim is to understand the reproduction of industrial societies in energy and
material terms, along the whole supply chain from extraction, production, consumption, to
waste. Empirical analyses range from very detailed micro studies (e.g. the CO2 content of 1kg
of strawberries produced by company XYZ) to global macro assessments (e.g. tons of iron
extracted and processed along the global supply chain). They include production-based and
consumption-based perspectives to account for trade patterns and burden shifting between
sectors and countries. Much emphasis has been put on the establishment and refinement of
accurate methodologies to develop data, indicators and biophysical accounts.48 The field has
become “one of the most important paradigms for the empirical analysis of the society-nature
interaction” (Fischer-Kowalski, 1998, p. 61).
How are society-nature interlinkages studied? The short answer is: in empirical terms, in two
basic ways.49 Environment-economy interrelations are often studied by conducting statistical
analyses, with ‘nature’ on one axis and ‘the economy’ on the other. In the same way as many
economists conduct econometric analysis to understand economic relations such as changes
in employment and GDP growth, industrial ecologists apply the same procedures but plot
different variables. Typical correlations of interest concern the link between economic growth
(typically as GDP) and environmental degradation. Modelling is the second way environment-
economy interlinkages are studied.50 This is where the interlinkages in the industrial system
become ‘dynamic’. Integrated models combine physical with monetary data to trace past
resource use and extrapolate trends or simulate different resources use scenarios as the basis
46 Industrial ecologists have their own journal and society and could be regarded as a separate
community. However, there are many overlaps with ecological economics. Many industrial ecologists
consider themselves ecological economists.
47 The term industrial metabolism was coined by Bob Ayres and refers to energy and material flows
through the industrial system, whereas societal metabolism covers non-industrial modes of subsistence
as well (Fischer-Kowalski and Hüttler, 1999, p. 108).
48 Prime methodologies include life-cycle assessments, environmental input-output analysis, and
material flow analysis (Pauliuk et al., 2017), as well as footprint (Wackernagel et al., 1999) and rucksack
calculations (Schmidt-Bleek, 2001).
49 There is a third way in which economic and physical measures of the economy are related. As was
already mentioned in the section on energy accounting above, in the initial stage of developing
biophysical data and measures, ideally, there is no ‘interference’ with economic monetary measures.
However, due to lack of data scholars revert to existing price information, whenever necessary, as
proxies for calculating biophysical measures.
50 For a state-of-the art of ecological macroeconomic models see Hardt and O’Neill (2017).
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for policy recommendations. To conclude, the approach of industrial ecologists is empirical.
Similar to the ambitions of energy physicists, the goal of industrial ecologists is to account for
biophysical throughput in the economic process. Underlying these efforts is the strong desire
to address economic scale arguments including biophysical dependency. However, explicit
value theoretical underpinnings that inform analysis and shape policy recommendations
remain absent.
3.3.5 Eco-Marxists: the adoption and rejection of Marxian value theory
There are few contributions and scholars that discuss Marxian value theory in ecological
economics. Besides a few articles that apply Marx’s value theory to specific issues in ecological
economics,51 there are a handful of theoretical contributions. Even though this group is small,
views are divided. The demarcation line between those who defend Marxian value theory and
those who reject it (or argue it needs to be adapted), centres on the question of how nature
can be considered a source of value. In ecological economics, this debate is as old as the origins
of the field.
Georgescu-Roegen, the founder of ecological economics, argued that Marxian value theory is
‘anti-ecological’ because it excludes the role of nature in production (Burkett, 1996). In this
line of thought, Martinez-Alier and Naredo highlighted the pioneering role of Sergei
Podolynski, a Ukrainian socialist, who attempted to ground Marxian value theory in the laws
of thermodynamics, thereby acknowledging the fundamental role of nature in production.
However, as this attempt was ignored and dismissed by Marx and Engels, Marxian value theory
is inconsistent with energy analysis, so their argument (Martinez-Alier, 1987; Martinez-Alier
and Naredo, 1982). Burkett and Foster stepped in to defend the labour theory of value on the
ground that Podolinsky suggested a crude energy theory of value, which is not an
improvement on, but rather the opposite of, Marx’s theory (as explained in section 3.4)
(Burkett and Foster, 2008, 2006; Foster and Burkett, 2008, 2004). However, this rebuttal has
not settled the issue. Instead, the same debate continues today in a second generation, at the
51 Such applications include critiques of ecosystem service valuation as commodity fetishism (Kosoy and
Corbera, 2010; Melathopoulos and Stoner, 2015) or state-led ecological modernisation initiatives
(Hovardas, 2016) or a discussion of the role of money, prices and the market in experimenting with
social transformation strategies (Nelson, 2001).
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few fringes in which it exists, for instance in a recent debate between Kallis and Swyngedouw
(2017) on the question whether bees produce value.
The role of nature as source of value is not only debated between ecological economists and
eco-Marxists but also amongst Marxists. Some Marxist scholars suggest modifications to the
labour theory of value, such as Brennan (1997), who argues to remove the subject/object
distinction between ‘active labour power’ and ‘passive nature’ from the labour theory of value
with the result to yield nature as overall source of value (Brennan, 1997). Other Marxists reject
the labour theory of value, such as Hornborg (1998, 2014, 2015), for lack of empirical
relevance and explanatory power as regards understanding asymmetrical global resource and
energy flows. Hornborg advocates an ecological theory of unequal exchange purely based on
physical categories.
What is remarkable is that all these contributions fail to provide a clear account and
explanation of what Marxian value theory actually is. This is especially surprising in the
theoretical contributions that aim to defend it. Ali Douai (2009) wrote an article on Value
theory in Ecological Economics in which he tries to convince the progressive camp within
ecological economics to adopt the Marxian understanding of value.
“The concept of economic value is an empty space in SEE [social ecological
economics]. This is detrimental to the achievement of its main goals”
(Douai, 2009, p. 272). “SEE still fails to define a conceptual framework that
relates ecological issues to the operation of the socio-economic system as
a whole” (Douai, 2009, p. 276).
I agree. However, when it actually comes to explaining what value means, Douai provides
essentially one paragraph52 (Douai, 2009, p. 264). He starts with the commodity, explains use
52 The whole paragraph reads as follows: “The commodity is the particular form taken by a part of wealth
in capitalist society. This form has a twofold aspect: (1) use-value and (2) ExV. As use-values, commodities
satisfy human needs (in relation to their physical properties). For Marx, this quality depends on the social
context and is not an economic category. As use-values, commodities are incommensurable: a pullover
and a bowl of rice have nothing in common in terms of fulfilment of needs. As ExV, they have only
quantitative characters. The equality between them means that we treat them as different quantities of
something they have in common. The common substance is the labour that served to produce them. But
the twofold aspect of commodities is a reflection of the twofold character of the labour that produced
them. Concrete labours are not socially useful without market exchange. But exchanged labours are not
concrete labours, and are instead defined by Marx as ‘abstract’ labours. Concrete labours are
qualitatively different, but on markets all labours count only as ‘productive expenditures of human
brains, muscles, nerves, hands’ (Marx, 1867, p. 72). Abstract labour is that which is common to all
commodities, and is the substance of a purely social phenomenon: ‘economic value (exchange-value
being its form of appearance)’ (Marx, 1880, p. 1550). The concrete representation of economic value is
money, which can be conceived as the social institution without which the produced economic value
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value and exchange value in two sentences, moves to labour as the common substance of
value in one sentence, followed by a little bit on social labour, and a statement that money is
the concrete representation of economic value. He provides statements that value is ‘an
immaterial social relation’ and that the analysis of the commodity is the most important part
of Marx’s work; however, this is without explaining how these concepts relate to each other
and what abstract socially necessary labour time means.
Interestingly, Burkett proceeds in a similar manner. His article on The Value Problem in
Ecological Economics is a criticism of ecological economics for adopting energy theories of
value or mainstream approaches to environmental valuation (Burkett, 2009). The key message
is that ecological economics lacks a systematic explanation of why nature has no value.
However, in his 40-page long chapter, Burkett focuses on criticising ecological economics
rather than sufficiently explaining what value means in the Marxist tradition.53 Like Douai, he
provides a short section on the core of Marxian value theory in which he juggles with difficult
Marxist terminology. Presented this way, value theory is impossible to understand – and hence
judge – for non-Marxists.54
What are we left with? Some scholars endorse the Marxian theory of value, others reject it or
suggest modifications but none of the contributions in ecological economics unpacks value in
a way that clarifies what it means and why it matters. The result is that Marxian value theory
essentially remains undebated in ecological economics. Even in the progressive camps,
ecological economists consider it a dead end and outdated. The general advice is to avoid it.55
would not be socially validated and could not take the money-form” (Douai, 2009, p. 263/264).
53 On method, Burkett notes: “The method Marx used to obtain these insights and the analytical
mediations involved are too complex to fully recount here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
the key role of Marx’s dialectical approach to nature, value, and use value” (Burkett, 2003, p. 159).
Burkett provides this statement in the original version of his essay published in 2003 but removes it from
the later republished version in 2009. This is interesting because Marx’s method makes all the difference
in understanding his theory of value.
54 At least, it was impossible to understand for me. Burkett’s article was one of the very first pieces of
Marxist literature I read in 2015. Back then, I found the article disappointing. In my first set of notes I
remarked “Marxian terminology widespread, not easy to understand”. I was keen to understand Marxian
theory so I approached this literature with great interest and nor I do not shy away from difficult texts;
however, the language used and the compressed way in which difficult theory is presented made it
impossible for me to understand. Re-reading the piece in 2018 – after having spent two years studying
Marxist theory and methodology – I understand his article, but also, why other ecological economists
probably do not.
55 When I started to study Marxian Political Economy, several ecological economists warned me of value
theory and suggested to ‘stay away from it’. For a long time, this was my intention. I changed my mind
when I realised that I will not understand more complex Marxian categories and capitalist dynamics
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3.4 Marxian value theory: the foundations of the monetary market
economy
The Marxian understanding of value differs from the classical and neoclassical approaches in
substantial ways. This section intends to show how and why it matters for ecological
economics. I agree with Murray that
“Marx came up with a unique, poorly understood yet (nevertheless) widely
rejected theory of value” (Murray, 2017, p. 17).
This also holds for ecological economics. This is problematic because Marxian value theory
offers the starting point for a systemic, dynamic and coherent understanding of the capitalist
system. It offers explanatory power far beyond marginal utility theory and helps to understand
dynamics that ecological economics are interested in and concerned about. This section
introduces the Marxian approach to value. My aim is to trace, step by step, why and how Marx
arrived at the conclusion that exchange value can be explained by abstract socially necessary
labour time and what this means.
Note that I use a smoothed and honed concept of value in this thesis. There is an extensive,
thorny and controversy-strewn literature about the precise meaning of this term. ‘Value’ is
equal to ‘labour value’ in most Marxian texts ever written (which is also the view I adopt), and
at the same time ‘value’ means ‘price’ in most non-Marxian (and some Marxian) texts (which
I reject, as explained below); and the bridge is provided in a vast literature by texts that wrestle
with the idea that ‘labour is the substance of value’. Especially the linkages between labour
values as set out in Marx’s Capital and prices as they appear in the economy are a matter of
considerable controversy. That is, there is often some engagement with the issue of the
transformation of labour value into prices, and the problematics of that transformation. I do
not address this issue further in this thesis; the interested reader can find an extensive
discussion of the ‘labour value/price’ relationship in the literature on the so-called
transformation problem (e.g. Fine et al., 2004; Foley, 1982; Kliman and McGlone, 1988; Lipietz,
1982; Moseley, 2000) .
There are many logical and substantive questions that must be confronted in the attempt to
understand value and its meaning for explaining capitalist dynamics. My use of ‘value’ in this
without understanding value.
71
thesis draws primarily on seminal interpretations of Marx’s Capital (e.g. Fine and Saad-Filho,
2016; Harvey, 2010b; Saad-Filho, 2002), in combination with an exciting literature on the
dialectical method (Brown, 2008; e.g. Murray, 1993; Ollman, 1993; Ollman and Smith, 2008;
Reuten, 2000; Smith, 1998), because method is what makes the big difference in
understanding the Marxian conception of value. This is why I begin by arguing that the concept
of value cannot be understood without comprehending Marx’s unique methodology.
3.4.1 A systemic and dynamic approach to theorising value
Marx was a realist and a systems thinker. He rejected the British empiricist epistemology and
‘flat’ ontology that underpins the economic thinking of his classical precursors and neoclassical
successors in favour of a dialectical method and historical materialist philosophy, which is
inspired by Hegel, Spinoza and ultimately Aristotle (Ilyenkov, 1977). Marx developed a method
– systematic dialectics – to study his object of inquiry: capitalism.
When I started the PhD I wondered how theories are built. What does theorising mean? The
main answer I got from scholars was to read much and draw inferences. I was enthusiastic
when I learnt that Marx followed a specific method that allowed him to derive a realistic
understanding of the capitalist system. I was even more excited when I discovered that the
dialectical method closely resembles modern systems and co-evolutionary thinking. Pioneers
in social ecological thought have stressed the importance of dialectical reasoning for
integrating knowledge with a view to radical change. Bookchin emphasised dialectics as the
philosophy of social ecology (Bookchin, 1995); Capra draws on dialectical thought in his
attempt to theorise living systems (1997, 1975; 2014) and Functowicz and Ravetz stress
dialectics as the basis of post-normal science (1994b, 1993; 2011). It is a philosophical
foundation for understanding complexity and life. Yet, the dialectical method and systematic
dialectics in particular and its philosophical underpinnings in materialist dialectics remain
relatively little known.
These methodological underpinnings are no minor detail but make all the difference in
understanding value in particular and capitalism as a whole. It led Marx to embark on a
different journey to solve ‘the value problem’ and derive a realistic, rich and insightful analysis
of capitalism. However, the dialectical method is not easy to understand. It is a different way
of reasoning to which we are not accustomed. This difficulty has given rise to many confusions
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and misunderstandings (also within the Marxist tradition). On method and its relation to the
value analysis of the first few chapters of Capital, Marx said in the Preface to the French Edition
“The method of analysis which I have employed, and which had not
previously been applied to economic subjects, makes the reading of the first
chapters rather arduous … That is a disadvantage I am powerless to
overcome, unless it be by forewarning and forearming those readers who
zealously seek the truth. There is no royal road to science, and only those
who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of
gaining its luminous summits” (Marx, 1990, p. 104).
Marx’s ambition was to understand the workings of the system as a whole rather than, or as
the basis for, individual exchange or prices or profits. What distinguishes capitalism from
previous forms of societal organisation, such as feudalism or slave societies, is that labour,
means of production and money have become commodities. This is why Marx starts his
exposition with the commodity (a choice that took him 30 years). He treats the commodity
not as a thing but as the simplest concrete representation of the capitalist system as it
confronts us every day, and with a view to the commodity in motion, i.e. commodity exchange
as a continuous process rather than a static picture in one point of time (Ollman, 1993, p. 31).
He asks: what can we understand about the functioning of the system from looking at the
most elementary economic transaction: the direct exchange of commodities? What does it
tell us about the nature of capitalism? How are capitalist societies organised? What matters
in such societies? These are questions Marxian value theory addresses.
The emphasis throughout the analysis lies on what is specific about capitalism, rather than
how societies are organised in general. Marx is not at odds with other economists who argue
that ‘goods and services’ are valuable because of utility, scarcity and costs. However, he argues
this is not enough to understand what makes capitalist value creation and valuation different
from other societies and forms of production. He aimed to uncover the historically-specific
(re-)production of value and related, the historically specific forms of domination and
exploitation. As I will show, this gives different insights into systemic (macro) entanglements
that cannot be derived from individual (micro) accounts. It is a lens that provides particular
insights into how nature is overused and appropriated. What follows is an outline of the first
five steps of Marx’s analysis in understanding exchange value.
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3.4.2 Step 1. Use value and exchange value are fundamentally different things
The starting point is a recognition that the commodity has a two-fold character: it is both a
use value and an exchange value. As explained above, use value refers to the material side of
commodities, whereas exchange value refers to the quantitative worth of a commodity as
compared to other commodities in the market. The other value theories discussed so far – the
classical approach of Smith and Ricardo, marginal utility theory, energy theories of value and
those eco-Marxists who propose to include nature into the labour theory of value – essentially
suggest that it is possible to express and explain exchange value in naturalistic and trans-
historical terms, e.g. as utility, concrete labour time, or energy.
Marx fundamentally disagrees. He argues for a clear analytical separation and demarcation
between use value, as a trans-historical category, and exchange value, the predominance of
which is specific to capitalism. As exchange values, commodities have nothing to do with use.
“As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-
values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an
atom of use-value” (Marx, 1990, p. 128).
What does this mean? Imagine what happens in exchange. We begin, as Marx does, with
simple exchange, in which two different commodities confront each other, say apples and
oranges. In the act of exchange, the owner of apples views his commodity as exchange value
and oranges as use value, as the thing he desires. It is the opposite for the owner of oranges.
He demands apples and views them as use value but holds oranges which are exchange value
for him. This means the use value of one commodity encounters the exchange value of
another, and vice versa. In exchange, commodities are confronted with their counterpart
(Ilyenkov, 1960). If you own a commodity, or have the power to command it, you can use it or
exchange it for something else, but you cannot have both at the same time.
The reason for engaging in exchange is provided by different use values.
“If the use values were not qualitatively different, hence not the products
of qualitatively different forms of useful labour, they would be absolutely
incapable of confronting each other as commodities. Coats cannot be
exchanged for coats, one use-value cannot be exchanged for another of the
same kind” (Marx, 1990, p. 132).
Exchange value, in contrast, represents the ratio at which different use values exchange. This
implies use values cannot bear a systematic relationship with exchange value. Why? As use
values, commodities are specific, e.g. the specific shape and quantity of wood of a spoon
74
enables us to eat soup. As exchange value, the spoon has a general ability to be exchanged for
other commodities. Exchange value is what connects and relates different commodities. An
explanation of exchange value therefore needs to capture what holds for commodities in
general, and cannot rely on a category, use value, as which commodities fundamentally differ
from one another in exchange.
This section provides a rather intuitive explanation of the difference between use value and
exchange value. A slightly different explanation can be provided by emphasising the
contradictory nature of use value and exchange value. I started this section by explaining that
use value and exchange value are two aspects within a commodity. This means, in reality, use
value and exchange value are related – as an actual fact. They are two aspects that
characterise a commodity. At the same time, however, I have just argued that they are not
directly related in the sense that use values do not bear a direct and systematic relationship
to exchange values. They rather confront themselves as opposites. As “abstract opposites” use
value and exchange value are opposing poles or forces within a commodity (Banaji, 1979, p.
31). Ultimately, this means use value and exchange value are somehow related and not related
– at the same time. This is what is called a contradiction.
What is the solution to a contradiction, or paradox? Ricardo could not solve the problem
satisfactorily and we have seen how the marginalists approached the problem. They
circumvented the paradox by reverting to a homogenous expression for use values as utility
that they thought could express and measure exchange value. From a Marxist perspective,
this is a violation of reality and dismissed as ‘bad abstraction’ because contradictions are not
just ideas but realities (Ilyenkov, 1960). Cornforth invites us to think: “Imagine, if you can, a
society without contradictions” (1987, p. 94).
The alternative offered by Marxists is to accept commodities as contradictions and derive a
sound representation in thought to understand what this means and explains. Contradictions
can be understood as unity and coincidence of mutually exclusive theoretical definitions
(Ilyenkov, 1960), opposing conflicting tendencies (Cornforth, 1987) or “a union of two or more
processes that are simultaneously supporting and undermining each other” (Ollman, 1993, p.
50). In this sense, use value and exchange value are one-sided expressions of a real
contradictory dynamic within a commodity. Dialecticians, in contrast to philosophical
approaches based on formal logic, do not shy away from such opposing contradictory
processes but actively look for them because they help explain the dynamics of a system
(Lewontin and Levins, 2007). The dialectical task is to trace the chain in which contradictions
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move in objective reality and theorise underlying mediating links that explain how they are
resolved in practice (Ilyenkov, 1960).
As they move, opposing forces are not equal or in balance but characterised by superiority-
inferiority, i.e. one tendency, as the name suggests, is typically stronger. In our case this is
exchange value, as the capitalist mode of production is production for exchange. This is
because capitalist economies are characterised by an advanced social division of labour of
commodity producers. In such societies, people and firms specialise in the production of
commodities that are produced for sale (i.e. with the purpose to be exchanged), rather than
for their own use. Exchange value is thus the dominant defining moment of capitalist
production. The contradiction between use value and exchange value is central in Marxian
thought. It forms the foundation out of which many other contradictions arise (Harvey, 2006).
Figure 3. Step 1. The demarcation between use value and exchange value
3.4.3 Step 2. The mediation between use value and exchange value by a ‘third thing’
called value
What follows from accepting the fundamental difference between use value and exchange
value? There needs to be something else than use values that explains the exchangeability of
commodities. As exchange values, commodities establish definite quantitative relations, say
1 coat = 2 backpacks. What makes a coat worth twice as much as a backpack? Where does the
equality (the equals sign signals equality) come from, if the commodities exchanged are
different use values? There needs to be some “common element, of which they represent a
greater or a lesser quantity” (Marx, 1990, p. 127). Commodities are, as a matter of fact, made
commensurable in exchange. They meet as equivalents. “There can be no exchange ... without
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equality, and no equality without commensurability”. This quote is not from Marx, but from
Aristotle (Marx, 1990, p. 151). Marx admired Aristotle for showing that exchange relations are
based on equality and that this requires that two things can only be compared as
commensurable quantities. Aristotle identified the requirement of a common substance upon
which commensurability is based but then he stated that such a thing cannot, in truth, exist.
Marx’s response was “But why not?” (Marx, 1990, p. 151). If use values drop out as possible
candidates to explain this equivalence and systematic relation, it needs to be something else.
This ‘something’ Marx called value. In a first step, this is an obvious fact. Commodities have
value, and this is what makes them exchangeable with other commodities. This is a colloquial
use of the word ‘value’ with which most people would intuitively agree.
Figure 4. Step 2. The identification of a ‘third thing’ called value
3.4.4 Step 3. The identification of value as abstract socially necessary labour time
For now, we know there must be a ‘third thing’, but we do not know what it is. What are we
looking for, if we aim to uncover the nature of value? This is a methodological question. The
ontological and epistemological understanding of the world influences how scholars build
theories. According to Marx’s realist methodology, things have inherent causal powers that
give rise to appearances in the empirical world. H2O, for instance, is the inherent causal power,
real essence or inner structure that gives rise to appearances of water, ice or steam. In the
same way, Marx aimed to uncover the real essence of value that gives rise to different
monetary appearances. Following this reasoning there must be a real ‘inner content’ of
commodities, i.e. something inherent and common to all commodities that explains their
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power of exchangeability (Brown, 2008; Ilyenkov, 1960). The search is for properties that
explain this power of exchangeability. What properties could this be?
The search is for properties that fulfil the following criteria.56 Clearly, it has to be something
that is characteristic of the commodity, i.e. of the specific social form to be explained. Second,
it has to be something material,57 i.e. an expression of objective reality. It cannot be a pure
thought construct or idea because this would violate Marx’s materialist and realist philosophy
according to which appearances arise from material structures (Brown, 2008). A ‘god-like’
substance is categorically excluded. Third, it has to be a quantity that bears a systematic
relationship with exchange value. As exchange value describes a quantity only another
quantity has the capacity to explain exchangeability. Also, as Marx adopts an ontology in which
real essences give rise to appearances, there has to be a systematic relation between the
essence and its physical manifestation (Harre and Madden, 1975). As H2O as real essence
necessarily manifests as water (or steam or ice), the real essence of value necessarily
manifests and bears a systematic relation with money. Fourth, it needs to be something
distinct from use value, as already argued above.
Marx argued the property left to explain exchange value is abstract socially necessary labour
time (ASNLT). What does this mean? To begin with, ‘labour’ has to be understood broadly, as
life activity or social practice. People work to reproduce themselves and society. As every
ecological economist agrees, energy and matter can neither be created nor destroyed, only
transformed. The agents of this transformation are human beings. People transform nature
(and thereby themselves) to survive. Under capitalism, the dominant form this transformative
power takes is wage-labour. Only wage-labour counts as producing value. ‘Bees’, and other
animals, do not produce value (Kallis and Swyngedouw, 2017).
From a Marxist perspective, animals do not produce value because they are not part of human
society and the social division of labour. They cannot be employed, they do not get a wage
and they cannot, by the virtue of their being, exercise decision making powers as humans can.
56 I could not find explicit criteria in the literature that guide the step of theorising an underlying real
essence. One way to approach this issue is to infer from Marx’s philosophical foundations what can and
cannot serve as a criterion.
57 David Harvey famously defines value as immaterial but objective (Harvey, 2010). So is value material
or is it not? Value is not natural material, i.e. it does not have a systematic determinate relationship to
any natural property, such as energy or wood or broccoli. Value is however social material, i.e. it relates
to an objective social reality, where social labour has to be quantitatively and qualitatively determined
in any society.
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Obviously, this does not mean they do not contribute to societal reproduction, not to speak
of their intrinsic value. Animals co-inhabit the planet as we do, should have rights and be
treated decently. In practice, often they are not. This is because human beings decide, in many
ways, how animals are treated, used and otherwise instrumentalised. Why do ‘good’ people
do ‘evil’ to animals in industrialised food production? This is a sociological question (Bauman
and Donskis, 2016), but also an economic one because it relates to systemic pressures of
capitalist value production. Understanding these systemic dynamics is needed to understand
social ecological problems. Arguments against Marxian value theory on the grounds that it
does not adequately account for the role of animals (and other forms of living beings and non-
living nature), miss the point, in my view. We need to understand how and why human
organisation results in global environmental destruction.
Having clarified why Marxists privilege labour in their explanation of value we can move on to
explain what ‘socially necessary’ means. ‘Socially necessary’ denotes the average amount of
labour time required, under existing conditions of skills and technology, to produce
commodities.
“If it takes one day to make a pair of shoes on average, then the abstract
labour embodied in a pair of shoes is one day no matter whether it takes
the individual labourer two or 50 hours to make” (Harvey, 2006, p. 14/15).
‘Socially necessary’ points to the importance of the predominant level of technological
advance in shaping value and price magnitudes.
‘Socially necessary‘ is sometimes also referred to mean that without effective demand, value
cannot be produced. Murray (2017) for instance argues that only socially-validated wage-
labour is value producing. Brown (2008, 2002) counters that it is certainly necessary for there
to be effective demand in order for there to be exchange value; however, this is a qualitative
condition for exchange value only. It involves use value as a ‘determinable’ abstraction. If
something is not a use value it cannot be an exchange value. This does not mean, however,
that effective demand also quantitatively determines exchange value. This involves use value
as a ‘determinate’ abstraction because the quantity of effective demand differs according to
the different determinate properties of each kind of commodity. Brown states that the
classical political economists argued that short-term demand fluctuation (market prices)
gravitate around technically-determined long-run conditions of production on which effective
demand has no quantitative influence and that this was Marx’s framework too.
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The real innovation and difference to other value theories, however, is the concept of ‘abstract
labour’. Abstract labour means that from the perspective of the system, work needs to be
done. Who works and under what conditions does not matter much at all. Capitalist society
as generalised commodity exchange society is indifferent about it (Murray, 2017). From a
market perspective, one use value is just as good as any other. This means a total abstraction
from determinate use value considerations in exchange and disregard for concrete labour and
concrete nature.
“In exchange the distinct qualities which give various commodities their
“concreteness” are abstracted from. In exchange, what matters is not the
physical properties of iron but how much wheat, or cloth, or coffee, etc., we
can get for the iron; hence in exchange we treat every commodity not as a
concrete bundle of distinctive qualities, but as the equivalent of specific
quantities of all other commodities” (Shaikh, 1977, p. 111).
With the concept of ‘abstract labour’ Marx breaks with the Classical and neoclassical tradition.
Again, the classical and neoclassical school argue that exchange value can be explained solely
in trans-historical terms, involving use value or concrete labour. Marx says it cannot. Marx
argues we need to understand the manifold ways in which use values enter value creation
processes, but that it would be a deep misconceptualisation to conflate exchange value with
use value or to conflate abstract labour with concrete labour. Money creation and ‘real wealth’
(use value) creation are very different things that need to be kept separate, even though the
latter is necessary for the former.
This is a crucial point for ecological economists. Often, Marxian value theory is dismissed for
emphasising labour at the expense of energy and resource considerations. This is a
misunderstanding. Marxian value theory abstracts from concrete labour and concrete nature
alike – as a way to realistically explain what exchange value is. By doing so, it accounts for and
explains more about the (monetary) drivers of energy and resource overuse and exploitation
than marginal utility theory which assumes a much closer relationship to use values. In other
words, Marxian value theory helps explain environmental impacts better than theories which
mistakenly assume a close relationship to use values.
There are deep and varied dialogues about the relationship between ‘value’ and ‘nature’ in
the eco-Marxist literature. Many contributions defend Marx’s labour theory of value as a rich
and powerful foundation for understanding environmental degradation, depletion of
resources and ecological crisis (e.g. Horton, 1997; Liodakis, 1994; Vlachou, 2002); even though
adaptations and ‘rethinks’ are often considered necessary (e.g. Taşdemir Yaşın, 2017). These 
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debates experience a revival at the moment. I would like to draw the reader’s attention to a
recent special issue in Capitalism Nature Socialism that seeks to explore value-nature
relationships under contemporary capitalism (Kenney-Lazar and Kay, 2017). The ‘old’ question
whether labour is the only source and substance of value remains contested, with some
arguing for it (e.g. Huber, 2017), whilst others insist that the ‘classical’ labour theory of value
needs to be extended to incorporate the crucial contributions of nature to value creation too
(e.g. Emel, 2017; Walker, 2017). Value analysis is today often applied innovatively to formerly
neglected realms, such as value destruction and devaluation, for example (Knuth, 2017).
Back to my argument: Whereas abstract labour represents the qualitative substance of value,
‘labour time’ stresses its quantitative aspect. Labour time is the magnitude of value (Banaji,
1979), measured in weeks, days, hours, minutes. Recall, exchange value is, by definition, a
quantitative relation. If value is a theoretical expression that aims to explain exchange value,
it needs to reflect this quantitative aspect. This element of time is crucial in the definition of
value. How much time it takes to produce a commodity is, without doubt, an essential aspect
in understanding dynamics of real-world commodity production. This quantity is measured by
duration – in weeks, days, hours, minutes. In this way, the real social process of value can be
quantified, and the socially necessary labour time required to produce a banana can be
compared with the one required to produce a T-Shirt.
Figure 5. Step 3. The identification of value as abstract socially necessary labour time
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3.4.5 Step 4. Money as measure of value
Having established the real essence and magnitude of value, the next step is to understand
how value gets measured and expressed in exchange. As value is constituted not by concrete
labour but by abstract labour – which is an inherently abstract relation – it is not immediately
visible in the natural properties of the commodity. It needs embodiments, i.e. forms in which
it appears to individuals. Historically, when exchange was sporadic different things measured
value, such as salt, tobacco or seashells. As exchange developed and became generalised,
most forms disappeared in favour of one commodity that emerged as socially recognised
universal equivalent (Shaikh, 1977). A basic money commodity as gold became the commodity
that is ‘more equal’ than others as accepted standard in which relative values of commodities
are expressed. Exchange relation are no longer expressed as 1 coat = 3 backpacks but 1 coat
= 50 pounds.
Marx derives money as the necessary appearance of value (Smith, 1990).58 Money arises out
of simple commodity exchange as the practical solution to the contradiction between use
value and exchange value (Lapavitsas, 2017, p. 54). It serves as universal equivalent that
measures value in terms of prices.59 Price is closely connected to money as “the monetary
expression of a commodity’s quantitative worth” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 10).
“Marx’s labor theory of value … is chiefly an attempt to explain why all the
products of human productive activity in capitalist society have a price, not
why a particular product costs such and such, but why it costs anything at
all. That everything humans produce has a price is an extraordinary
phenomenon peculiar to the capitalist era, whose social implications are
even more profound because most people view it ahistorically, simply
taking it for granted” (Ollman, 1993, p. 61).
Price is closely connected to value, but they are not the same. Price is the monetary expression
of value, a form in which value appears in the empirical world. Value, in contrast, is the
‘hidden’ underlying essence. Put differently, price is the external relation between
commodities, value their internal connection (Ilyenkov, 1960). This connection is not random
58 The fact that money emerges as necessary form of commensurating commodities had already been
recognised by Aristotle. The simple form of value in which 5 beds = 1 house, he says, cannot be
distinguished from the more developed form of 5 beds = so much money (Marx, 1990).
59 Marx’s analysis of money starts by grasping money as form and measure of value. From this starting
point, different forms and functions of money can be understood, from simple to complex. Whilst
money as form and measure of value is not the most significant form in developed capitalism (state fiat
money and bank money have gained importance), it remains a precondition for understanding modern
money (Lapavitsas, 2017).
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or accidental, but in fact relatively stable. Brown (2008) describes it as a ‘patterned’ or ‘rough
and ready’ relationship. The continuity and difference between price and value (Elson, 1979)
can be illustrated by recalling how these magnitudes are measured. Value is measured by
labour time, prices by money. The colloquial expression ‘time is money’ captures their obvious
connection in capitalist praxis. At the same time, everybody agrees that time and money are
not the same.
Figure 6. Step 4. Money as measure of value
3.4.6 Step 5. From money back to the commodity – now as capital
What we have achieved so far is to derive value, money and price and their interrelations in
four steps. This four-step movement is not linear but rather a ‘cycle of abstraction’ (Banaji,
1979). The first cycle moves from the commodity through its contradictory nature between
exchange value and use value to an understanding of value and the necessity of money. As
the production of exchange value is the stronger moment driving the reproduction of capitalist
society, and as exchange value becomes expressed as money in practice, we get, by the end
of the first cycle, an explanation of why commodities are produced. In capitalism, the
production of commodities is primarily driven by the purpose to make money. In this function,
money transforms into capital.
“Through our analysis of the simple commodity we arrive at the concept of
value and thus at a basis for defining … the concept of capital. Now it is
capital that produces commodities which form the substance and lifeblood
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of the process of circulation” (Banaji, 1979, p. 38). “Capital is the essence
of the individual commodity … on the other hand, capital itself is only the
developed and self-developing form of value … so value is likewise the
essence of the simple commodity“ (Banaji, 1979, p. 39).
Starting from value, Marx thus derives the concept of capital. In its simplest expression, capital
is a form of value. It is ‘value in motion’. The first cycle in Marx’s thinking is thus closed by a
fifth step that refers back to the commodity – now as capital. The second cycle of abstraction
then starts with the commodity as a form of appearance of capital, i.e. as commodity capital
(Banaji, 1979). Ultimately, what this means is that “commodity circulation presupposes
production on a capitalist basis” (Murray and Schuler, 2017, p. 125) and that “commodity
circulation is only the relatively cheery appearance of the endless accumulation of capital”
(Murray and Schuler, 2017, p. 126). The transformation of money into capital is the starting
point of Capital Volume II (Marx, 1993: chapter 1) and also the bridge to the next chapter in
which I start to explain ‘capital’ and some social ecological implications.
Figure 7. Step 5. From money back to the commodity – now as capital
84
3.5 From value to capital: understanding the system as a whole
What can we learn about the capitalist system from this understanding of value? In the
introduction I claimed that value theory shapes how economists think about the purpose and
functioning of the economic system. I also stressed that Marx’s ambition was to understand
capitalism with a view to change it. Having explored the Marxian understanding of value, we
can ask what this understanding helps explain. What systemic insights can be derived from
identifying the commodity as expression of abstract socially necessary labour time expressed
as money? What does this tell us about the system as a whole? And how to possibly think
about changing it? This section emphasises three key issues. Section 3.5.1 highlights how the
Marxian understanding of value helps to specify the systemic challenge ecological economists
aim to grasp and confront. Section 3.5.2 discusses how value theory can hide or expose
fundamental driving forces of social ecological destruction. Section 3.5.3 portrays Marxian
value theory as the starting point for explaining other systemic features and core economic
categories of capitalism, exemplified by the possibility of crisis formation.
3.5.1 Value theory specifies the systemic challenge and perceived solution space
I started this chapter with a quote from David Harvey:
“If you think you can solve the environmental question and global warming
… without confronting … the value structure … then you got to be kidding
yourself” (Harvey, 2010a).
What does this mean? It means that from the perspective of certain Marxian writers, whose
view I share, value is the foundational social structure of capitalism. Value is a systemic
emergent property; it arises as the aggregate outcome of the impersonal un-coordinated
interaction of people in the social division of labour. There is no direct discussion and planning
of what to produce, how and how much. The market acts as impersonal social coordinating
mechanism. At the level of long-run competitive prices and the general price level – which is
the level Marxian value theory emphasises – not the free will of people matters, but the ‘un-
freedom’ of the value structure that ‘lords over’ people (Smith, 1990). People do not decide
on value and prices. Their wills are regulated by abstract labour.
“Capitalism is regulated not by conscious human decisions but rather by
“thing-like relations” – the relations of the market, of prices and profits”
(Shaikh, 1978, p. 236).
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“The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product…
appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not
as their relations to one another, but as their subordination to relations
which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions
between mutually indifferent individuals, the general exchange of activities
and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual”
(Marx 1973 cited by Smith, 1990, p. 75).
Marginal utility theory, in contrast, suggests that people are the masters who decide what
they need and want to satisfy their needs. The forces of supply and demand equilibrate
different preferences and capacities of market participants and result in market prices that
reflect individual utilities. Free choice is the basis of market valuation. From this perspective,
we ought to reflect more ‘ecological’ values in exchange, by changing preferences and
internalising externalities. This is the basic premise behind the valuation of nature, which is
either ‘missing’ from markets or in the calculus of individuals. Marxists acknowledge that
market prices are shaped by demand and supply but as mentioned above, Marxian value
theory does not aim to explain individual prices or profits but “the meaning and underlying
structure of relative prices” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 381).
What underpins and regulates market prices? The quantity of abstract labour time necessary
to produce a commodity (Shaikh, 1977). This means there is an intrinsic connection between
exchange value and the labour time required to produce commodities. In other words,
exchange values do not wildly differ from costs of production.
“For commodity exchange on a society-wide basis this cannot be the case.
If the exchange value is far above the production costs of a commodity, this
will eventually lead others to produce it and offer it at a lower exchange
value. As a result, in a society-wide system of exchange, exchange value
will generally fluctuate within relatively narrow limits. These limits are not
determined by “common resolve”, but by the objective material facts of
production” (Smith, 1990, p. 77).
Prices fluctuate around values and the systematic deviation between production prices and
total labour times is relatively small (Shaikh, 2016). Shaikh suggests that 87% of relative
industrial prices is accounted for by direct and indirect unit labour costs (Shaikh, 2016, p. 69).
This is why Marx argues that the specific way that production is organised forms “the hidden
basis of the entire social structure” of the capitalist system (Shaikh, 1977, p. 110).
Clearly, there are positive aspects of capitalist value production. The importance of ‘labour’
that is ‘socially necessary’ and undertaken in a specific amount of ‘time’ points to a key
mechanism that structurally drives capitalist production: the role of technologically-induced
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labour productivity increases. This does not come as a big surprise. Capitalist societies are
highly productive (Smith, 1990, p. 79). Rising productivity has gone hand in hand with
increasing living standards for millions of people and is hence portrayed almost
unambiguously as a positive development and ‘progress’ that contributes to the thriving of
capitalist societies. Also, the global division of labour and international integration has moved
societies beyond provincialism (Smith, 1990, p. 83).
However, from a social perspective, capitalist value production has always gone hand in hand
with systemic pressures and fierce struggles over labour time, in terms of wages, the length
and intensity of work and how these social relations of production are constantly under
renegotiation and subject to limits. Volume I of Capital is about little else. From the
perspective of global environmental crises, in addition, the detrimental social effects of
capitalist value production have outweighed the advantages. One core problem is the
disregard and undervaluation of the environmental contributions of production.
“Rather than a free and reciprocal consideration of all relevant costs, we
have here a systematic ignoring of that significant set of costs that is part
of commodity production without itself being measured in commodity
prices” (Smith, 1990, p. 77/78).
Another detrimental societal effect is that value does not peacefully co-exist with other forms
of production; it dominates them. Different forms of and motivations for production co-exist
in capitalist societies. However, value is a social power60 that shapes and influences the world
and people around it. In its need to expand, value colonises other forms of production. It is no
coincidence that Marx’s writings repeatedly refer to the vampire-like or predatory character
of capitalist production relations. This matter when considering what alternative types of
production, such as non-profit organisations or cooperatives are up against.
To sum up, Marxian value theory explains the regulation of market prices and how value
imposes itself onto people. As Polanyi remarked, the deepest flaw of the system is that it
subordinates human purposes to the logic of an impersonal market mechanism (Polanyi,
1944). Value, money, the market and price mechanism become social forces structuring and
moving society. They channel individual behaviours and form “the hidden basis of the entire
60 Marxists prefer the term social relation instead of social structure or power because the Marxian
architecture emphasises how different categories relate to each other. I find the term social relation
more precise and helpful because it transcends the structure-agency divide. Social relations involve
continuous interactions and reproduction. However, I also try to use a language that is more intuitive to
ecological economists and hence decided to use the term social structure.
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social structure” of the capitalist system (Shaikh, 1977, p. 110), with associated detrimental
social outcomes.
“The inner logic that governs the laws of motion of capitalism is cold,
ruthless and inexorable, responsive only to the law of value. Yet value is a
social relation, a product of a particular historical process. Human beings
were organizers, creators and participants in that history. We have, Marx
asserts, built a vast social enterprise which dominates us, delimits our
freedoms and ultimately visits upon us the worst forms of degradation”
(Harvey, 2006, p. 203).
This does not imply systemic determinism. It is not a situation of inescapable systemic lock-in
that cannot be escaped. Everything that is social can also be changed. However, power is more
difficult to detect when hidden. Being aware of underlying social relations that shape human
interactions in detrimental ways, can be an important lever to changing them. This explains
the Marxian emphasis to unravel masked relationships of domination and the necessity to
move away from the value form as a central act of revolutionary transformation. The challenge
then is no longer to ‘price nature’ and ‘internalise externalities’ but to reject the basis of
commodity production and exchange, and confront the social structure in its totality. Clearly,
this is more politically demanding.
3.5.2 Value theory can hide – or expose – fundamental driving forces of
environmental crises
Every system has a purpose, even if that purpose often remains difficult to see (Marx, 1990;
Meadows, 2009). By purpose I mean a sense of direction or function, something upon which
the reproduction of the system rests. What characterises the reproduction of the capitalist
system?
From a neoclassical, and partly61 also classical perspective, ‘the economy’ is steered towards
the production of commodities for the satisfaction of people’s needs and wants. From a
marginal utility point of view, use value aspects in the form of utility dominate and shape
production decisions. The drive to satisfy people’s needs and wants lies behind wealth
expansion and capitalism becomes characterised as an ‘efficient’ system that produces
61 Partly, because with Smith, wish for self-regard and how it can be reconciled with self-interest or not,
plays a big role too.
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wealth. It is no coincidence that Adam Smith’s most famous work is called The Wealth of
Nations. The optimism about the ability and capacity of capitalism to produce wealth for a
long time, before a stationary state would be reached (that was anticipated by most classical
political economists as grim future outlook, with the notable exception of J.S. Mill who was
“inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement to our
present condition” (Mill, 2006, p. 453) is shared by neoclassical successors and deeply
enshrined in mainstream economics – starting from marginal utility foundations.
Marxists agree with this perspective in two respects. Real wealth is indeed associated with the
production of use values and capitalist production centres on the production of commodities.
However, a society which produces most goods and services for sale on markets is a society
that produces predominantly for exchange. How could it be otherwise? Commodities are first
and foremost produced for exchange. The conclusion is that capitalism is a system primarily
fuelled by the quantitative expansion of exchange value. “The overriding aim of production is
not production-for-direct-social-use but production-for exchange” (Shaikh, 1977, p. 111).
Exchange value is what shapes and dominates production decisions, not use value, as
proposed by marginal utility theorists.
Systems are generally good at achieving their function or purpose. They need to be because
this is required for their continuous reproduction and perpetuation (Luhmann, 1987;
Meadows, 2009). If capitalist societies are primarily driven by the production of exchange
value, this implies that the purpose of capitalist production is not the direct production of
wealth. Real wealth in the form use values for people’s needs and wants satisfaction result
indirectly via the production of exchange value. The real purpose around which capitalist
production centres is the creation of new value (and as a further step, surplus value as
established in the next chapter).
“The immediate purpose of capitalist production is not ‘possession of other
goods’ but the appropriation of value, of money, of abstract wealth” (Marx
1969 cited by Kenway, 1980, p. 30).
“It must never be forgotten that in capitalist production what matters is
not the immediate use-value but the exchange value, and in particular, the
expansion of surplus value. This is the driving motive of capitalist
production” (Marx 1969 cited by Kenway, 1980, p. 30).
The dominant capitalist value regime implies a social framework in which money becomes an
end in itself, outside of social control (Smith, 1990). Marx shows how money is derived from
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aiming to understand exchange value and how it develops into an objective power that stands
above the human community. The true ‘scandal’, as Bellofiore calls it, is that
“the commodity is not only inseparable from money, and money from
capital. There is more: capital is founded precisely on that ‘displacement’
and ‘perversion’ – inversion and madness, simultaneously – in which the
living worker has really become an appendage of his or her own labor-
power, and now counts only as a deliverer of living labor” (Bellofiore, 2011,
p. 97).
Hardly any economist would disagree with the fact that motives of monetary advances (as
profits, interest, rent etc.) spur capitalist production. From a mainstream perspective, this is
what stimulates the necessary dynamism, investment and technological advance that is
associated with flourishing capitalist economies. This social organisation cannot remain
unquestioned in a world of increasing and accelerating social ecological problems. By taking a
highly critical stance, the Marxist perspective answers questions that remain otherwise
clouded by a propaganda of technological optimism and ideas of ‘progress’ of capitalist
democratic societies.
Ultimately, Marx invites us to rethink what wealth really means. He opens the door for
critically reflecting upon the social ecological consequences of the pursuit of money creation.
This is where Marxian theories of money fetishism and alienation enter the scene. Marx
highlights that it seems as if capitalist societies predominantly produce real wealth, but, in
fact, there is a confusion between what really matters in terms of wealth (use values in terms
of healthy food, access to decent housing and mobility, social security etc.) and how we think
we can achieve it, i.e. by chasing money.
3.5.3 Marxian value theory explains other systemic features of capitalism
Marxian value theory is not ‘just one theory’, but a systematic starting point for understanding
the capitalist system. It is not a coincidence that Marx started his exposition of the capitalist
system with the commodity and value, and not a coincidence that most introductory books to
Marxian Political Economy start with value (e.g. Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016; Harvey, 2010a).62
Starting from the commodity, the Marxian approach unfolds, step by step, how simple and
62 It is also no coincidence that Burkett’s book Marxism and Ecological Economics starts with a chapter
on The Value Problem in Ecological Economics (Burkett, 2009).
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abstract categories develop into more complex and concrete ones. I explained the first cycle
of abstraction in five steps in this chapter. Every cycle retains the understanding of the
previous one and develops it further. The Marxian approach thus shows how parts are linked
to the whole. The commodity – this trivial looking thing – contains the seeds for understanding
other systemic features, such as capital, surplus, profits, growth, competition, labour,
exploitation, class, crisis etc. It presupposes the totality of the capitalist mode of production
and remains central to an understanding of contemporary capitalist dynamics (Fine and Saad-
Filho, 2018).63
In the next chapter I will explore some more complex categories; in this chapter, I pick one
example to illustrate how an understanding of value helps explain other systemic features.
This example is how value theory can explain the possibility of crises formation. What follows
aims to point towards tendencies for crises to emerge from the elements established so far.
To begin with:
“Marx put the whole matter neatly when he suggested that commodities
are in love with money, but the course of true love never did run smooth”
(Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016, p. 81).
We established that capitalist production takes the form of commodity production for
exchange. This implies whatever gets produced needs to be sold for societal reproduction to
function. However, decisions about what to produce are taken by individual producers in
isolation from each other and without any direct coordination with consumers (Kenway, 1980;
Smith, 1990). Capitalists produce for the market, not directly for personal needs. As the
coordination between what gets produced and what gets effectively sold is not personal but
impersonal there is no guarantee that commodities will be sold and at what prices.
Mismatches between production and exchange occur and if these disruptions happen at a
large scale, crises occur. This implies that the particular way in which capitalist production is
organised and motivated contains the possibility of regular breakdown and crisis (Kenway,
1980).
“The general abstract possibility of crisis denotes no more than the most
63 Marx’s value theory is not only about physical commodity production either. I mention this point
because colleagues have frequently asked how relevant value theory is in times of financialised
capitalism in which production has shifted from traditional sectors to rent-extracting activities. I argue
that understanding value remains a precondition for understanding such contemporary developments.
At the same time, if we consider the system as a whole, core productive activities never cease to be
important. They remain the foundation for the dominant reproduction of capitalist societies.
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abstract form of crisis, without content, without a compelling motive. Sale
and purchase may fall apart. They thus represent potential crisis and their
coincidence always remains a critical factor for the commodity. The
transition from one to the other may, however, proceed smoothly. The
factors which turn this possibility of crisis into an actual crisis are not
contained in this form itself; it only implies that the framework for a crisis
exists” (Marx 1969 cited by Kenway, 1980, p. 28).
“Capitalism’s tendency toward instability derives above all from the fact
that capitalism is a monetary market-economy. The social division of labour
on the market is unplanned, and this ‘anarchy’ can lead to an incomplete
realisation of the [new value] produced” (Bellofiore, 2011, p. 83).
Marx argues it is not only possible but quite likely that disproportionalities between
production and exchange arise. Tendencies to overproduction arise because capitalists aim to
sell as much as they can. This suggests structural tendencies for crises in reproduction (Smith,
1990).
“For Marx, capitalist crises are ultimately due to the contradiction between
the capitalist tendency to develop without limits the productive forces ...
and the limited social capacity to consume the product … capitalism
therefore always tends to be unstable and prone to crisis” (Fine and Saad-
Filho, 2016, p. 83).
From this starting point, different types of crises emerge. What they all seem to share is the
endpoint: devalorisation. Bubbles burst and are ‘corrected’ back to a ‘real’ level. Devaluation
takes various forms, e.g. money devalued by inflation, labour power devalued by
unemployment or falling real wages, commodities sold at a loss, or machines lying idle.
Devaluations can hence affect use values or exchange values or both (Harvey, 2006). When
the necessary devaluation has taken place, overproduction is eliminated and reproduction
runs anew. But as long as the value structure remains the same, the fundamental structural
possibilities for consecutive crises remain (Harvey, 2006) and with it all socially disruptive
consequences.
“The fight as to who is to bear the brunt of the burden of the devaluation,
depreciation and destruction of capital will likely be bitter and intense”
(Harvey, 2006, p. 202).
With the increasing interconnectedness and global flows of capital and labour across borders,
problems arise that have the potential to develop into crisis of the system as a whole, i.e. crises
reach global dimensions. Yet the fundamental dynamics remain largely the same. This is how
it is possible to move from an understanding of the commodity to an understanding of global
crises.
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3.6 Conclusions
Value theory provides the bedrock of economic paradigms. It shapes how economists think
about the purpose and functioning of the economic system. In economics, I identify three
different approaches to understand value: the classical approach of Smith and Ricardo, the
neoclassical approach based on marginal utility theory of value, and Marxian value theory. The
classical and neoclassical tradition theorise exchange value as driven by use value (as
subjective utility or objective embodied labour time or costs of production). This gives rise to
a conception of capitalism as a ‘real economy’, i.e. an economic system which produces goods
and services for consumption and the satisfaction of people’s needs. This is essentially a
conception of a barter economy and explains the difficulties of neoclassical theory to
realistically theorise money, profit, or crises phenomena.
Ecological economics implicitly adopts a mainstream conception of the economy, by drawing
on classical or neoclassical value theoretical approaches, mostly implicitly. This gives rise to a
conception of the ‘real real’ economy, in which the emphasis lies on studying the biophysical
foundations of the economy, i.e. the flow of matter-energy through the economy, the
fundamental role of ecosystem services, and ultimate social outcomes such as wellbeing and
quality of life. Ecological economists dig deeper as to what should matter and be valued (more)
in economy and society. This expands the mainstream conception of the economic system,
however, its basic logic remains the same.
However, capitalism is a monetary market economy. This is the conclusion derived from
Marxian value theory. Marxian value theory breaks fundamentally with classical and
neoclassical value theories by insisting that use value and exchange value need to be kept
analytically separate. This results in nothing less than opposing conceptions of the economic
system as a whole. What is dominantly (re-)produced and emphasised in capitalism is
exchange value, not use value. From this starting point, a lot of important elements are in
place: the foundations are laid for theorising money, prices, profits, capital, technological
change and crises. This starting point also provides the basis for a fundamental critique of the
market – and of classical Political Economy and neoclassical economics for mischaracterising
the nature of the system. However, this understanding remains largely absent in ecological
economics.
This chapter made the case that Marxian value theory is neither monistic, favouring labour,
neglecting the environment, nor outdated. Rather, it is part and parcel of understanding the
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essence of the capitalist system. If we understand what use value, exchange value and value
mean and how they are interrelated, we start to understand what matters in capitalism and
how it shapes the world around us.
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4 Capital
Understanding social ecological dynamics
4.1 Introduction
At times it seems impossible to grasp a world in constant flux. Reality is complex, contradictory
and constantly changing, and whenever we think we get hold of it in thought, it crumbles
again, more often than not. The requirements for scientific thought are especially demanding
if our ambition is to understand and act upon wicked global problems, such as accelerating
environmental destruction. We know that social ecological conflicts and crises deepen, widen
and accelerate around the globe. We also know that the nature of the problem is systemic
and that multiple crises need to be studied together. However, it is not obvious how this can
be done; especially, if we are committed to adopting a realist perspective to avoid misleading
reductionism and distortions – as advocated in chapters 2 and 3. If we acknowledge that all
social ecological phenomena are interrelated and subject to continual change and that reality
can only be understood as such, how should we proceed? How is it possible to study social
ecological dynamics and interrelations of the system as a whole in a realistic way?
Systems thinking offers guidance on how this can be done. At a surface level, reality is chaotic
and complex; at a deeper level of reality, however, order often prevails. What strikes me as
an interesting parallel between different systems theoretical approaches, from the social and
natural sciences alike, is that systems are more organised than we often realise. Many complex
systems and behaviours arise from simple elements, relations and organising principles
(Luhmann, 1987; Meadows, 2009). All life forms, for instance, emerge from five nucleotides,
“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”
(Leopold, 1949, p. 242).
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which form RNA and DNA structures that give rise to the vast diversity and complexity of life,
from ants to elephants. All atoms, at a deeper level of reality, consist of protons, neutrons and
electrons that constitute the foundation of all matter on Earth.64 Beneath the chaotic and
seemingly random flux of events lie relatively stable patterns of (self-)organisation (Capra,
1997; Capra and Luisi, 2014). Systems theorists emphasise the need to understand these
patterns to understand system behaviour.65
Complex systems are also understood as forms that deal with and structure complexity
themselves; they bring order to complexity (Luhmann, 1987). The way this is done is by
forming hierarchies, i.e. different strata operate at distinct levels of organisation. Higher strata
are embedded in lower ones and ultimately regulated by them. DNA and RNA structures are,
at a more fundamental level, conditioned by chemistry (however the emergent dynamics of
DNA cannot be understood by analysing electron orbitals, but belong to a new disciplinary
field: molecular biology). Different strata of complexity are believed to exist in reality, not just
in thought. A realistic representation of complex systems hence requires uncovering and
explaining different layers of reality, their structures and functions, in order to understand
system behaviour and causality at different levels.66
These systems theoretical insights give us two specific angles how to study complex systems:
one is aiming to identify core elements and organising principles; the other trying to
understand different levels of complexity and their interlinkages. This is how we can get hold
of real-world complexities, and retain our commitment to realism at the same time. Marx
suggested that capitalism can be studied in this way. And indeed, this is how he did it.
150 years ago, he developed and adopted a method to understand capitalism as a complex
64 These particles cannot be understood as static building blocks, but rather as parts that constitute
networks of inseparable relationships. In other words, (the properties of) parts can only be understood
in relation to other parts of the same system (Capra, 1975; Capra and Luisi, 2014).
65 Meadows, Luhmann and other great systems theorists emphasise this point. Chasing the actualised
surface level of reality is often fruitless, especially when the task is to think about systemic change. The
daily chaos of the actualised is too complex and statistical links are not stable. On this basis, scientists
often look for things that do not exist. “These [event-event] explanations give you no ability to predict
what will happen tomorrow. They give you no ability to change the behaviour of the system” (Meadows,
2009, p. 89).
66 Understanding the stratified nature of complex systems is insightful for several reasons. On the one
hand, it helps to identify elements and levels that are more critical than others because they are closely
tied to the essence and fundamental character of a system and hence important for its perpetuation
and reproduction. Without cells, humans cannot live; without an arm, they can. On the other hand, it
also enables us to grasp dimensions of time. This is because simpler levels of self-organisation come into
being before more complex ones. Flatworms existed prior to elephants. Effectively, understanding how
complex forms emerge out of simpler structures coalesces with evolutionary reasoning, to some extent.
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evolving system that closely resembles the ‘modern’ systems theoretical insights just outlined.
The method is called systematic dialectics.
Systematic dialectics starts with an emphasis on the whole system, rather than isolated
parts.67 The suggestion is to dare to understand the system as a totality, as an integrated
whole, from different vantage points and by adopting what we would today call a mixed-
methods approach. This allows identifying core elements. What follows is the attempt to order
the evidence and find a logical sequence that explains how different elements interrelate. This
step is fundamentally about relationships, order, and organisation. It aims to grasp the
hierarchical structure of the system. Finally, the ‘method of presentation’ describes how
capitalism as a complex adaptive system unfolds, starting from the most abstract and simple
to ever more concrete and complex realities (Arthur, 2008; Brown, 2007, 2002; Reuten, 2000;
Smith, 1990).
This is how Marx explains capitalism as a complex system that continually transforms but still
retains a stable core. What is this core? What are the foundational elements and organising
principles of capitalism? How are they interrelated to form a complex system? How do these
interrelations give rise to environmental destruction and social crises? These are the questions
of this chapter. It aims to explain the core of the capitalist system and its entanglements with
social ecological crises. The emphasis lies on comprehending long-term behaviour, core
drivers and interrelations. The system’s foundational elements have been established in the
previous chapter: the nature of commodities, value relations therein and the special role of
the money commodity as historically emerging dominant form driving exchange relations. This
chapter takes a next step and asks how these elements are interlinked to form a complex
system and what dynamics follow. I find these links and dynamics in the nature of what is
termed ‘capital.’ In this way, it can be shown how the value theoretical foundations developed
in the previous chapter enable a realistic, dynamic and coherent understanding of the
capitalist system as a whole.
67 This approach stands in sharp contrast to the ‘normal’ scientific method adopted in mainstream
economics, which starts from slicing up reality into ‘manageable’ parts, thereby excluding most of what
is important: the factors that connect these parts, such as politics, values, natural resource inputs,
specific contexts etc. – see chapter 2 – in the hope that isolated building blocks can subsequently glued
together in a meaningful way. This approach fails to provide a deeper understanding of complex systems
in general (Capra, 1975) and economic dynamics in particular (Mirowski, 1989). What has been
acknowledged as dead end in other disciplines for fruitfully advancing knowledge long ago, seems to
dominate the economics discipline until today.
97
The research questions guiding this chapter are:
 What is capital? (section 4.2)
 How is the reproduction of capital interlinked with environmental impacts
and barriers to change? (sections 4.3 and 4.4)
I approach these questions by adopting two lenses, or vantage points, throughout this
chapter: a ‘systems lens’ that aims to show how Marx’s systemic understanding of capitalism
resembles ‘modern’ systems thinking, mainly by drawing on Meadows (2009, 2002, 1999), but
also Capra (2014, 1997, 1975) and Luhmann (1994, 1987); and related, a ‘problem lens’ that
aims to demonstrate the explanatory power of Marxian theory for understanding social
ecological dynamics and crises. This problem lens includes considerations of ecological
economics as a discipline aiming to contribute to systemic changes towards sustainability.
This chapter is a next step to demonstrate how the Marxian approach helps advance ecological
economics in compliance with the foundations that ecological economists set out for
themselves. In chapter 1, I argued that ecological economics is grounded in a commitment to
systems thinking and dynamics to grapple with real world social ecological complexities; but
that these ambitions have not been pushed far enough to encompass the economic realm as
well. What happens in practice is that ecological economists fall back into neoclassical
economics, as demonstrated in chapters 2 and 3 (section 3.3.1 in particular), which contradicts
a systems dynamic approach because neoclassical economics has been erected on static-
linear-equilibrium foundations. In chapter 3, I started to introduce systematic dialectics as a
particular systems thinking methodology that helps theorise value relations in realistic and
systemic terms (section 3.4.1). I then showed how Marx derives, on this basis, the concept of
capital as ‘value in motion’ (section 3.4.2). The intention now is to show how these value-
theoretical foundations can be pushed further to develop more complex economic categories
and capitalist tendencies.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 explains the Marxian understanding of capital. I
introduce the circuit of capital and associated profit and competition dynamics of capitalist
(re)production. A discussion of the circuit of capital may seem basic for Marxists, but it is not
for ecological economists. It is virtually absent from the literature. Section 4.3 moves towards
a systemic understanding of environmental change. I identify eight endogenous tendencies of
the capitalist system that drive environmental impacts and pose barriers to change:
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overproduction, technological dynamism, appropriation, commodification, overconsumption,
acceleration, alienation, and financialisation. Taken together, these tendencies form the social
fabric of capital, the entangled web of the system as a whole. In the capitalist system, it is the
interplay between these tendencies that give rise to social ecological dynamics and crises.
Section 4.4 sketches the macroeconomic outcomes of the capitalist core and its tendencies:
growth and crises formation. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Setting value in motion
The previous chapter ended with an explanation of how Marx derived the concept of capital,
starting from his analysis of simple commodity exchange. In its simplest expression, capital is
a form of value; it is value in motion. As value starts to move, it explains the essence of the
system: capital. This section takes a next step and explains the Marxian understanding of
capital more comprehensively, the general circuit of capital M-C-M’ in particular, and
associated profit and competition dynamics. Taken together, these elements and dynamics
form the core fabric around which the reproduction of capitalist economies spirals. In other
words, capital is the core engine driving the expansion of the system as a whole, with
associated environmental impacts, as I will highlight in section 4.3.
Discussion of the circuit of capital, profit and capitalist competition might seem basic. You
would assume that ecological economics as a field aspiring to contribute to systemic changes
towards sustainability would emphasise the capitalist core prominently. However, this is not
the case. The core leverage point for change tackled by ecological economists is growth;68 but
growth and capital are not the same thing, as I will discuss below. Growth is the outcome of
the movement of capital through the system – capital being the underlying dynamic. Put
differently, emphasising growth (in biophysical or GDP terms, for instance) shows what is
happening, the dynamics of capital explain why.
68 Donella Meadows indicates why growth has been emphasised prominently: J.W. Forrester’s famous
world systems model that aimed to show the interrelations between major global problems – poverty
and hunger, environmental destruction, resource depletion, urban deterioration, unemployment, came
out with a clear leverage point: Growth (Meadows, 1999). This finding became the cornerstone in the
Club of Rome report ‘The Limits to Growth’ and has heralded debates about the need for slower growth,
no growth, and later degrowth. This line of reasoning dominates ecological economics to the present
day.
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However, few contributions exist in ecological economics that address capital, profit and
competition explicitly, comprehensively and as the scientific foundation for developing radical
proposals for change. I consider this to be a serious omission. I do not intend to elaborate this
point in much detail here, as I did in the previous chapter in section 3.3, where I showed how
different camps within ecological economics implicitly adopt mainstream value theoretical
foundations. Rather, I provide a brief summary here of what I consider the failings of ecological
economics are, and then move onto explaining the Marxian understanding of the capitalist
core.
What I find is that ecological economists consider ‘capital’ in a similar way as they consider
‘value’, as discussed in the previous chapter: either by uncritically adopting mainstream
neoclassical theory and concepts such as ‘natural capital’;69 refraining from theories of capital,
profit, and competition altogether;70 or, those ecological economists that are highly critical of
neoclassical foundations and acknowledge the importance of sound theoretical foundations,
most notably ‘social ecological economists’, fail to provide an alternative account of capital.71
Excellent contributions exist that adopt and apply a critical social science perspective (e.g.
Røpke, 2015); however, the economic underpinnings of these analyses are not made explicit
enough in ecological economics. The Marxian understanding of capital remains virtually
absent.72
I think this omission contributes to a situation in which the core drivers of capitalism remain
widely omitted in ecological economics research. It almost seems as if profit, competition and
capital are too obvious to be tackled explicitly. However, I argue in an interdisciplinary
69 I detail this finding in the discussion of capital below, see section 4.2.2.
70 Many ecological economists study the biophysical and technological drivers of environmental impacts
and document the biophysical dependency of the economic process, but do not substantively address
the social organisation of production that underpins these drivers (Foxon, 2018).
71 I found one contribution from Peter Victor in which he addresses capital theory directly. He explains
and critiques neoclassical capital theory and seeks to draw on alternative understandings, notably Post
Keynesian economics and the thermodynamic school, but again, without including the Marxian tradition
(Victor, 1991).
72 A Title-Abstract-Keyword search in Ecological Economics for “circuit of capital” yields 0 results; for
“capital & Marx” 1 result (Burkett, 2004); for “capital & Political Economy” 10 results. A few eco-Marxist
contributions exist that apply the Marxian understanding of capital (e.g. Blauwhof, 2012). One
contribution from Paul Burkett (2004) stands out in addressing the issue prominently. Burkett aims to
defend Marx’s reproduction schemes against widespread misconceptions by leading ecological
economists (Georgescu-Roegen, Daly and Martinez-Alier in particular) who portray the Marxist
explanation of capitalist reproduction as mechanistic and based on a closed systems approach in which
the contribution of nature is taken for granted. However, Burkett’s classical Marxian understanding of
capital and capitalist reproduction, which I share, has not entered the core of ecological economics.
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research field fundamentals cannot be taken for granted but should be made explicit and
highlighted prominently, for instance in textbooks (best in chapter 1). However, this is not the
case. This explains my rationale for keeping a discussion of capital, profit and competition not
limited to a brief introduction at this point, but rather upfront, explicit and at considerable
length.
4.2.1 M-C-M’
In the previous chapter, I aimed to explain the nature of commodities in general (C) and the
special role of the money commodity (M). I thereby aimed to show how Marxian value theory
clarifies, step by step, why it is sensible to think that simple direct exchange of goods C-C,
transform into exchanges in which money becomes the universal equivalent. This sheds light
on how goods have developed – over time and with expanding trade relations – into
commodities, i.e. things produced for sale, and how money develops into commodity money
and capital. Historically and logically, this has led to a shift from ‘stuff as property’ to ‘money
as property’ (Luhmann, 1994). It also explains the rise in the importance of markets as social
institutions for contractual forms of exchange for the purpose of gain and profit-making
(Polanyi, 1944).
Having developed a better understanding of commodities (C) and the function of money (M)
as measure of value, we can ask how these foundational elements can be combined to
understand core dynamics of the capitalist system as a whole. There are not many options by
which this can be done. C-C exchanges refer to the direct exchange of commodities – potatoes
for tomatoes – but we know that barter is, self-evidently, not the dominant form of exchange
under capitalism. C-M-C denotes a form of simple commodity exchange too, in which money
functions as a means of circulation. In this form, commodities are sold in order to buy other
commodities. This is the case, for instance, when labour power is sold in return for a wage,
mainly used for consumption. M-M (more correctly M-M’) means the exchange of money
quantities, such as granting a loan in return for interest. Purely monetary transactions have
become more dominant in mature (financialised) capitalist economies, especially in periods of
loosely regulated financial markets. However, a society cannot live from monetary exchanges
only. Something needs to be produced for people to live. Overall, even though the forms C-C,
C-M-C and M-M’ co-exist in capitalist societies, they are not the dominant forms explaining
capitalist (re)production – and they are also not the dominant forms explaining ecological
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overshoot. This is because the systemic surplus, i.e. aggregate net surplus of the system as a
whole, arises from the circuit of industrial capital, as I will explain below.
150 years ago, Marx established that the capitalist mode of production is not a commodity
circulating system in the form of C-M-C, but rather characterised as M-C-M’, i.e. a circulation,
or more precisely an advance, of money quantities mediated by commodity production. As
such, M-C-M’ represents the simplest characterisation of the capitalist system as a whole.
What does this mean? Capitalist production is based on the transformation of money (M) into
commodities (C) to recover the initial investment (M) plus an extra amount of money, i.e.
surplus value (dM = M’-M). In Marxist terms: value is set in motion with the purpose of
extracting more value at the end of the movement (Marx, 1990, p. 132). In simple terms:
capitalists strive to gain profits. For profits from production to be realised, capitalists buy in
order to sell. They buy means of production (MP), such as machines, fuels, and raw materials,
and labour power (LP). These two commodities are combined to produce commodities with a
higher value than initially invested (C …production process… C’). Produced commodities –
hats, teapots, haircuts or toothbrushes – are subsequently offered for sale on markets to
realise the additional value created (M’). This is sensible. For the risk and effort of the
investment and their work, producers demand a return over investment, otherwise they
would not engage in business. Part of the surplus value needs to be re-invested to maintain
production over time. This is how capitalist societies predominantly reproduce.
The M-C-M’ movement consists of two separate but interlinked stages: the sphere of
production and the sphere of exchange (see figure 8). In the first stage – M-C – money is
invested for the intermediate purpose of producing commodities for sale. In the second
stage – C’-M’ – these commodities are transformed back into money, typically (but not always)
more money than initially invested. Taken together, the circuit of capital describes a unified
process of production and exchange. The distinction between these two spheres is instructive
for several reasons: it guides further analysis where in the circuit surplus value and profits can
arise (section 4.2.3); it helps to locate how energy and resource use relate to the circuit
(section 4.3); and where the origins of crises formation lie (section 4.4.2).
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MP
M – C … production process … C’ – M’
LP
Figure 8. The circuit of capital
Source: Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016, p. 49
How can we be sure that M-C-M’ is the dominant structure that characterises the system best?
We might be content with a common sense understanding that this is how capitalist
companies typically operate and hence what gives rise to corresponding macroeconomic
dynamics. However, dynamics at the macro level can be quite different from those at the
micro level (Shaikh, 2016), as is well known from a systems thinking perspective. A common
sense explanation is therefore insufficient. How else can we explain that M-C-M’ is the
dominant social form of the system as a whole? The way I intend to unravel this question is by
starting to contrast M-C-M’ with a C-M-C conception of the economy – because neoclassical
economists treat the economy as if it were a C-M-C system and because this conception has
left wide-spread traces in ecological economics. Subsequently, at the end of the section, I
explain M-C-M’ as dominant social form based on the value theoretical foundations developed
in the previous chapter.
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To begin with, C-M-C exchanges represent simple commodity exchanges: commodities are
exchanged for money, which is exchanged for other commodities. In this movement, money
serves as means of exchange. A C-M-C system would come closer to the vision of an economy
that produces for the satisfaction of people’s needs. C-M-C forms of circulation are
omnipresent under capitalism. For instance, labourers sell their labour power (C) in return for
a wage (M) for the purpose of buying oranges, paying rent or going on holidays (C). This is the
typical form of exchange most people encounter on a daily basis, not least because it is the
form most relevant to them. C-M-C is what counts for most of us as wage workers. However,
it is one of the instances where Marx highlights that truth is often not how it appears. What is
dominant is often hidden. Even though C-M-C is a common and more obvious form of
exchange, it is not the driving force that shapes social relations and capitalist reproduction.
Neoclassical economics treats the system as a whole as if it were a commodity exchanging C-
M-C system, i.e. a system that produces for consumption. Two different explanations come to
my mind why this understanding might have arisen. One relates to the marginal utility
foundations of the discipline. As explained in the previous chapter, marginal utility
incorporates the idea that exchange value and price can be explained in utility terms. This idea
gives rise to the view that ‘the economy’ exists to serve people’s needs. A second explanation
for the implicit C-M-C conception of the economy relates to methodological individualism. The
idea that aggregating atomistic parts enables an understanding of the whole is a relic of the
successes of classical physics during the Enlightenment, but today considered inappropriate
for understanding complex systems (Capra and Luisi, 2014; Mirowski, 1989). Systems thinking
arose out of an understanding that ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’. However,
neoclassical economics proceeds as if it were possible to understand the dynamics of DNA on
the basis of protons, electrons and neutrons. It is not. DNA emerges as a more complex form
at a distinct level of organisation, out of the interactions of atomic particles. Similarly, M-C-M’
emerges as a dominant social form as a result of generalised commodity exchange.
So let me ask again: how can we be sure that M-C-M’ is the dominant form and not C-M-C that
exists alongside it? Helpful guidance can be found in the systems thinking literature:
“When a systems thinker encounters a problem, the first thing he or she
does is look for data, time graphs, the history of the system. That’s because
long-term behaviour provides clues to the underlying system structure”
(Meadows, 2009, p. 89).
What do empirical data suggest about the long-term movement of the system as a whole?
One of the most apparent facts of the capitalist system is its growth. Capitalist economies are
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growth economies. Capitalism is not a circular but a spiralling system of exchange, i.e. it
typically grows while it reproduces. Economic growth and associated environmental impacts
have been the most prominent matter of concern for ecological economists (Jackson, 2009;
Meadows et al., 1972; Victor, 2010). The fact that capitalist economies tend to grow (or
otherwise slide into crisis, see section 4.4) is one argument for the dominance of M-C-M’ over
C-M-C.
There are no good reasons to believe that a system in the form of C-M-C could systematically
give rise to growth dynamics. A system based on the exchange of commodities knows certain
limits. There are only as many teapots as you may desire, or shoes – how many shoes can you
have? Saturation tendencies could materialise as basic material needs are met. People might
tend to opt for less work and more leisure, instead of continuing to exchange most of their
time as labour time in return for wages and consumption. In an idealised C-M-C world, it would
be much easier for degrowth advocates to propagate a notion of ‘enough’. People would only
need to be convinced that a more frugal life can increase their quality of life. However, the
reality we are facing is not merely one of mistaken ideas but of structural dependency, i.e. rat-
race-dynamics that are difficult to escape.
What factors could explain growth in a C-M-C dominated world? Population, technology and
affluence are typically brought forward by ecological economists. What is well-known as IPAT
identity (or STIRPAT or ImPACT variations)73 (York et al., 2003) could fit well in a C-M-C
framework. Population growth certainly helps to explain an increasing number of commodity
exchanges and associated environmental impacts (Alcott, 2012). Technological advance is
clearly part of the growth explanation too. It cheapens commodities and thus boosts
consumption and rebound effects (Alcott, 2005; Sorrell et al., 2009). People’s ‘insatiable’
needs and wants could serve as a third explanatory variable (if you really believe this is the
case). All of these factors are certainly parts of the puzzle. At the same time, all of these
factors, separately or taken together, do not sufficiently explain the structural tendency and
73 The IPAT identity expresses that environmental impacts (I) are the product of three driving forces:
population (P), affluence (A) as per capita consumption or production; and technology (T) as impact per
unit of consumption or production, hence I=PAT. ImPACT is a further development that disaggregates T
into consumption per unit of GDP (C) and impact per unit of consumption (T) so that I=PACT. STIRPAT is
yet another development that allows for non-monotonic or non-proportional effects from the three
driving forces. Unlike IPAT and ImPACT, the STIRPAT model – for stochastic impacts by regression on
population, affluence and technology – is not an accounting equation but a stochastic model that can
be used to empirically test hypotheses (York et al., 2003).
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dependency of capitalist societies on economic growth and the necessity of governments to
stabilise capitalist economies by creating the conditions for their expanded reproduction.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand why a system in the form of M-C-M’ knows
no limit. The accumulation of capital knows no limit because its main measure of value, i.e.
money, has a particular form that can be accumulated without limit. The dominance of M-C-
M’ can be understood by considering the nature of money. There is a fundamental difference
between exchanging two commodities primarily for their use value characteristics or
exchanging two quantities of money. If commodities are exchanged for consumption, say a
loaf of bread for a basket of apples, what matters most is that commodities embody different
qualities. Use value considerations are the reason why people engage in exchange. Such
exchanges can take the form of C-C (direct barter) or C-M-C (indirect barter).
It is different with money. The only reason for exchanging a sum of money is to receive more
money back at a later point in time. The incentive to lend is to yield interest. The incentive to
save is to consume more at a later point. The incentive to invest is to earn profit. The only
substantial difference between two sums of money is different quantities. This is why
monetary exchanges do not take the form M-C-M but M-C-M’ (or M-M’ in the case of interest
or other purely financial returns, see section 4.3.8). In those cases, the advance of an initial
sum of money takes centre stage, not the exchange of qualitatively different commodities as
use values.
The most convincing and conclusive argument for M-C-M’ being the dominant structure
driving capitalist reproduction, however, can be provided from the value analysis of the
previous chapter. Marxian value theory traces, step by step, how exchange value becomes the
dominant driving force in societies with a developed division of labour, generalised commodity
exchange and expanded trade relations. As soon as a more complex social division of labour
develops, in which people(s) collaborate to produce a social product, which is subsequently
divided, more or less equally, commodities are predominantly produced for exchange. As
exchange value becomes the dominant motive of production, money develops as the universal
equivalent, measure of value and commodity capital. This explains the transition from money
as means of circulation (C-M-C) to money as goal of economic transactions, and as such as
capital, with repercussions of the system as a whole (M-C-M’).
This is as far as the explanation has proceeded in the previous chapter. I would like to add
three further annotations. What follows from the understanding that money develops into
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capital? It implies that the originally internal relation between use value and exchange value
in the commodity develops into an external relation, in which money suddenly confronts the
commodity, as a thing with a separate existence. In other words: what started with the
exchange of two simple goods, apples and pears, turns into a situation in which commodities
emerge that can be converted into money, as independent forms of existence. This is how
money M can be understood as external manifestation of exchange value, and physical
commodities C, as manifestations of use value (Smith, 1990, p. 84ff).
At the same time, C as manifestation of use value and M as manifestation of exchange value
do not denote independent atomistic ‘things’. They are constitutive elements of a systemic
understanding of capitalism, as explained in the previous chapter. Understanding commodity
exchange explains structural forces between different actors engaged in commodity
exchanges, i.e. all of us. M-C-M’ can be understood as logical and historical social form of
human (collaborative) development; whereas C-M-C constitutes individual forms only. C-M-C
exchanges exist alongside the capital form; they are their individual mirror image and forms
that presuppose M-C-M’ as predominant form of production. The capitalist value structure
explains what holds capitalist societies together, why M-C-M’ has become the dominant form
of societal organisation of production and continues to be.74
For readers who are still sceptical of this conclusion, let me say the following: what helps to
judge whether theories are credible and useful is their explanatory power. Sections 4.2.3,
4.2.4, 4.3 and 4.4 present more arguments and evidence for the explanatory power of M-C-
M’ as a realistic framework of the capitalist system as a whole. Before proceeding any further,
it seems essential to clarify what ‘capital’ and ‘capitalism’ mean in the Marxist tradition and
who ‘capitalists’ are.
74 An evolutionary understanding of capital matters for thinking about alternatives. Non-profit business
models or local, self-sufficient forms of production, for instance, as widely proposed in ecological
economics, might be portrayed as deviating from the dominant organisational structure M-C-M’. They
might be viewed as forms ‘swimming against the current’ that come closer to C-M-C types of
organisations. But is it sensible to think that efforts to upscale such initiatives are sufficient for ‘real’
transformative changes? This understanding can be questioned, if we understand those forms as equally
embedded in commodity-structures that ultimately prioritise exchange value considerations. To me,
envisioning and designing sustainable economies needs to move beyond trying to reverse the dominant
trend but develop forms of organisation that transcend current dominant structures. Through this lens,
thinking about radical changes towards sustainability and sensible interventions to this end becomes
even more demanding.
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4.2.2 Capital
If we open a standard economics textbook, a typical definition of capital reads as follows:
“The tools, instruments, machines, buildings, and other constructions that
businesses use to produce goods and services are called capital” (Parkin,
2014, p. 4).
This understanding of capital as tangible wealth is often extended to include intangible wealth
too, such as human capital, resulting in a general view of capital as “wealth that lasts longer
than one year” (Alchian and Allen 1969 in: Shaikh, 2016, p. 208). Most ecological economists
tap into this understanding by suggesting broadening the standard definition by ‘digging
deeper’ into the biophysical realm and enriching it by systems dynamics concepts such as
stocks and flows:
“We define capital as a stock that yields a flow of goods and services into
the future. Stocks of manmade capital include our bodies and minds, the
artifacts we create, and our social structures. Natural capital is a stock that
yields a flow of natural services and tangible natural resources. This include
solar energy, land, minerals and fossil fuels, water, living organisms, and
the services provided by the interactions of all of these elements in
ecological systems (Daly and Farley, 2011, p. 17).
The result is a relatively widespread and prominent advocacy for the concept of natural capital
in ecological economics (Costanza et al., 1997; Ekins et al., 2003; Missemer, 2018;
Wackernagel et al., 1999). This is another example of adding extensions to the mainstream
economic framework and reasoning, in the hope of including environmental constraints and
concerns into it more prominently.
Marxists understand capital differently. Following a realist dialectical approach that aims to
capture essences and interrelations in motion, capital is defined in a flexible and elastic yet
non-ambiguous way. To begin with, the understanding of capital is not tied to certain things,
such as money or machines, but emphasises the social function or purpose these things fulfil.75
75 This is one example where we see how dialectical reasoning differs from the standard Western
scientific method and reasoning. Conventional reasoning relies on fixed definitions in which a thing is
what it is and not another. The Marxian approach attempts to capture complex and messy reality
comprehensively in thought, from different vantage points. This is why definitions are more flexible, yet
still clear. In fact, in order to understand what drives behaviours and causality, it seems more useful to
understand intentions, functions or purposes, i.e. the meaning attached to things and actions, rather
than things and actions themselves, because this provides levers for interventions to yield different
actions. However, one needs to understand dialectical reasoning; otherwise it easily becomes
interpreted as unclear, confused or illogical.
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Capital is not an additional factor of production,76 it is production. M-C-M’ conveys the essence
of what capital means: value in motion in a way that creates more value. As such, capital is a
form of value; it is self-valorizing value (Arthur, 2008, p. 219) or self-expansion of value (Brown,
2002, p. 164). This perspective captures the fluidity of value flowing through the system and
how value transforms throughout the movement, taking different forms and shapes.
Sometimes capital appears as money, sometimes as airports or airplanes. This does not mean
that airports are always capital. They are a manifestation of capital if they serve the purpose
of advancing an initial sum of invested money and cease to be capital if they no longer do so.
A shut-down airport is not capital anymore. Capital needs to move, and move for a special
purpose, otherwise it ceases to exist as capital.
In this spirit, capital can also be understood as money used in a certain way, i.e. in the M-C-M’
circulation in pursuit of creating more money by the end of the movement. However, not all
money is capital and not everything that is capital is money. Only when money is circulating
with in pursuit of creating more value is it capital. If people decide to hoard money and take
it out of circulation it ceases to be capital. If this happens on a large scale and the flow of
capital is blocked, the economy slides into crisis (Harvey, 2010a). This perspective points
towards the crisis-riddled character of the capitalist system (see section 4.4).
Another way to describe capital is as a social relation of domination,77 i.e. a relation of power.
Capital is not just one but a dominant social relation in our societies, hence the name
capitalism. This perspective highlights the class-aspect and distribution of power in the system
with a favourable position of the capitalist class over labourers. The capitalist mode of
production constantly reproduces the capitalist relation: capitalists on one side, and wage
labourers on the other. Who a capitalist is depends, again, on the function a person or entity
or country fulfils. Mr Jones can be a labourer in his function as an employee, and he can be, at
the same time, a landlord in his function of renting out a house for the purpose of acquiring
rental income.
76 From a Marxian perspective, there are only two fundamental factors of production: means of
production and labour power. This seems to be an advantage for consistent theory building as it
circumvents a lot of problems that mainstream economics faces by defining capital as a separate factor
of production, its measurement and rewards (see Cambridge capital controversies (Harcourt, 1969)).
77 I explain how this relation of domination unfolds in the discussion of surplus value as the result of
capitalistic exploitation in the following section 4.2.3.
109
Yet another vantage point to understand capital is as giving rise to a specific historical period
which emerged out of the specific social conditions that will disappear once these conditions
change (Ollman, 1993, p. 34). The organising principle of capital as the dominant social form
of the capitalist system is the self-valorisation of value, which was not the organising principle
of pre-capitalist societies (Murray and Schuler, 2017). This perspective highlights the
historically specific character of capital. As such, capital incorporates aspects of change – as
something that has not always been and will not always be. This perspective emphasises the
distinct conditions that characterise capitalism and differentiate it from previous or possible
future societal formations.
Capital has to be understood as the entirety of these perspectives: as things and relations in
continual movement for the purpose of value production in a specific period of mankind. With
this understanding and clarity in mind, we can move on. What we have established so far is an
understanding that C-M-C and M-C-M’ are interlinked processes and that the latter is the
social dominant form under capitalism. The next question is how it is possible for surplus value
and profits to emerge. Where does the extra value (the dash in M-C-M’) come from? This is
the core question of the next section.
4.2.3 Profit
Having the contours of capital, M-C-M’ and a discussion of value theory from the previous
chapter in place, we can start to unravel the central role of profits in capitalist economies.
Much of Marxian analysis centres on how to understand profit, its origins (Capital Vol I),
different forms and distribution (Capital Vol III). This section is not an attempt to try and
reconstruct Marxian profit theory in detail but to condense key insights that are relevant for
ecological economics. This section covers three critical issues: the central role of profit in
driving capitalist reality; the lack of corresponding anchorage in neoclassical economic theory
and ecological economics alike; and several insights that can be derived from Marxist profit
theory for understanding social ecological dynamics.
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The centrality of profit-making under capitalism
Capitalism is a profit-driven system.
“It has been recognised at least since Adam Smith that profits are the
driving force in a capitalist economy. There are no state planners to issue
directives concerning the productive use of the state’s resources. Habit,
though not without importance, cannot be held responsible for the
production and exchange of goods. And benevolence, however widespread,
does not supply sufficient inducement for individuals to use their own labor
and property in generating output, especially when there is no guarantee
of reciprocal benevolence. It is instead the desire for personal gain, the
promise of profit, that motivates the entrepreneur to initiate productive
activity” (Obrinsky, 1983, p. 1).
“Profit is the survival condition for firms. Individual firms are punished by
extinction if they make persistent losses, and can be threatened even if they
merely make lower profits than their competitors” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 119).
The business of business is business, to quote Milton Friedman, not corporate social
responsibility or environmental protection. To what extent and how business interests can be
brought into alliance with broader societal interests remains a contested question. The fact is
that capitalist business revolves around the profit motive.
The profit of a firm is typically defined as the excess financial gain on total capital advanced.
Profit is what remains after all costs have been paid for – for wages, input costs, depreciation,
interest payments, etc. Competitive micro struggles of capitalist firms for profit translate into
profit dynamics of the economy as a whole. Aggregate profit is the sum of positive and
negative profits in the macroeconomy (Shaikh, 2016). In the aggregate, profit is an economic-
shaping structure that channels aggregate outcomes (Shaikh, 2016, p. 89). This insight is not
limited to Marxian analyses but is generally undisputed.
The insufficient explanation and problematisation of profits in neoclassical economics and
ecological economics
If profit is a central driving force of capitalist enterprise and economies, how are profits
explained in economic thought? The answer is, surprisingly little and unexpectedly
inconsistently (Howard, 1983; Obrinsky, 1983).
“Some four decades ago, when Joan Robinson decided to take a look at the
orthodox neoclassical theory of profit, she couldn’t find any. When I first
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began to study the subject less than a decade ago, I found, much to my
surprise, that the situation had changed but little” (Obrinsky, 1983, p. xi).
Why is that? With the marginalist turn profit theory became set aside and consciously
removed from the core of economic theory.
“So far as profit is concerned, in the sense of profit of enterprise, the English
classical school fails to see that it is the correlative of possible loss, that it
is subject to risk, that it depends upon exceptional and not upon normal
circumstances, and that theoretically it ought to be left to one side” (Walras
quoted in Obrinsky, 1983, p. 43).
In this quote, Walras suggests that profits as a core driver of capitalism can be left aside in
economic theory. This is an extraordinary statement, and unacceptable from a realist
perspective. What is interesting is that this reasoning can be linked to the theoretical and
methodological architecture of neoclassical economics. I emphasised the unrealism of
assumptions as one problem in chapter 2. As regards theory, then in neoclassical economics,
a distinction is introduced between “economic profits”, which are zero, and “accounting
profits”, which are profits “in the real world”. They are assumed to be “mostly” the return to
capital (the mainstream understanding of capital as essentially machines) (Mankiw, 2013, pp.
51, 55). Capital is treated as a factor of production in its own right and the marginal
productivity, or contribution, of this factor is considered as profit. This means profits are
essentially portrayed as interest payments for the use of capital (Howard, 1983). However,
this is unsatisfactory because interest is not the same as profit, and it is self-contradictory
because calculating the marginal contribution of capital would require measuring capital
independently of profits; but this is impossible given the treatment of capital as a collection of
machines hence inherently heterogeneous with no common basis of measurement (Howard,
1983; Obrinsky, 1983).
Obrinsky (1983) concludes that mainstream economics is a “theoretical cul-de-sac” and that it
does not have a real profit theory “because it cannot” (Obrinsky, 1983, pp. xi, xii). The
theoretical straightjacket of equilibrium and marginalist thinking does not allow for it: the
emphasis on equilibrium underexposes the importance of real-world profits; and marginalist
thinking, by accentuating – as the name suggests – marginal rather than also non-marginal
changes is incapable of fully capturing real-world struggles over profits. Ultimately,
neoclassical economics has come to fail to question where and how profits arise in the first
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place.78 On this basis, mainstream theory is severely restricted to illuminate to what extent
profits can be considered problematic from an ecological point of view.
How are profit considerations tackled in ecological economics? The answer remains the same:
surprisingly little. A keyword search for ‘profit theory’ in the journal Ecological Economics
yields 0 results;79 for ‘profit’ 135 results, with very few contributions addressing the profit-
motive in more detail.80 Textbooks and handbooks either adopt a mainstream theory of
profits, as part of understanding ‘economics’ (Common and Stagl, 2005) or as part of
questioning ‘economics’ (Daly and Farley, 2011); address profit as (somewhat) important issue
but without drawing on economic theory (Lawn, 2007; Martinez-Alier and Muradian, 2015a;
Söderbaum, 2000) or neglect the issue altogether (Costanza et al., 2015; Holt et al., 2009). My
conclusion is that despite the real-world significance of profits, they remain severely under-
addressed in ecological economics. The paucity of a serious debate of profit considerations
could, again, be interpreted as one indication how deep the roots of neoclassical theory and
methodology reach in ecological economics. The situation starts to change with the relatively
recent development of ecological macroeconomics grounded in Post-Keynesian theories
(Richters and Siemoneit, 2017) and increasing contributions that explore the links between
‘money and sustainability’ more generally (Jayashankar et al., 2015; Lietaer et al., 2012). My
contribution here is to provide some insights from a Marxian perspective.
Marxian profit theory
What can we learn from Marxian profit theory? Marx developed his theory of surplus value as
a critique to the mainstream approach of his time. From a mainstream perspective (old and
new alike), profits remain, in essence, after costs of production have been paid. What
contributes more to production is paid a higher price under competitive conditions. From this
78 If you open Mankiw’s seminal textbook Macroeconomics, for instance, profit is not part of any
headline in the 14 page long list of contents of the 600 page textbook! (Mankiw, 2013).
79 This is based on a Scopus search on 16 July 2018 for “theory of profit” and “profit theor*” in Article
title, Abstract, Keywords.
80 One notable exception is provided by Lux (2003). He emphasises the profit motive as a central
problem of sustainability and suggests the design of social institutions around ‘the common good’ (such
as maximum incomes or non-profit organisations) without, however, addressing implementation
barriers, issues of power and vested interests or links to capitalist dynamics of the system as a whole.
Another contribution by Richters and Simoneit (Richters and Siemoneit, 2017) explores the question
whether the current monetary system gives rise to a ‘growth imperative’. The authors rely on a
traditional understanding of profits as accounting profit and economic profit.
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perspective, it seems that all production inputs and contributions are fully paid for. If all inputs
are fully being paid for, this also means that output is fully being paid for (Brown, 2002, p.
161). What makes it possible to realise profit is exchange, i.e. to sell dearer than what it costs
to produce. From this perspective, profits arise in circulation, not in production, as an addition
to value. Marx sees this as an illusory appearance (Marx, 1863).
Marx highlighted several problems of the mainstream approach to theorising profits, which
are relevant for our purposes. First, the mainstream treatment of profit neglects how profits
are also linked to production, not just to circulation. Second, and related, from this perspective
it seems that all production costs are passed on, the cost price seems to be the ‘true’ price.
Third, all production costs are treated the same, which is how businesses calculate, i.e. profits
are calculated as surplus above total costs, no matter whether labour or matter-energy is
concerned. However, this perspective precludes a more nuanced understanding of social
ecological dynamics, as I will explain below. The Marxian approach sheds light on these issues
as follows.
To begin with, Marxian profit theory is not limited to profits from production. Profits arise
wherever possible. However, profits from trade in the form of ‘buying cheap and selling dear’
are no ground-breaking observation. These typical merchant profits are called profits upon
alienation or transfer (Marx, 1863). They are often associated with theories of unequal
exchange, such as contemporary forms of rentier capitalism (Standing, 2016). One core reason
why Marx emphasised profits that arise in production is because of their systemic significance.
Whereas profits upon alienation, which are essentially forms of cheating, are a zero-sum
game, systemic profits, i.e. net aggregate profits can only be explained by non-cheating. Marx
showed how profits arise under conditions of seemingly ‘equal’ exchange relations in
production. What he finds is that exploitation does not show itself by looking at monetary
magnitudes alone.
By looking closer at production, Marx established an explanation of why production inputs
that are fully being paid for can give rise to profits. From a Marxist perspective, as I mentioned
earlier, the two fundamental production factors are labour and means of production (energy,
resources, machines etc.). Which of these two commodities has the capacity to give rise to
profits by contributing more to production than is paid for by the capitalist producer? It cannot
be means of production because, as soon as there is a possibility of a ‘surplus’ to be made
from the use of resources, energy or machines, their price will rise until the basis of any surplus
vanishes (Heilbroner, 1980). Therefore means of production can only give rise to profits upon
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alienation (i.e. essentially by cheating, e.g. by appropriating formerly unpriced resources)
which is a zero-sum game and does not explain the net profits characteristic of the capitalist
system.
It is different with labour. To begin with, what capitalists buy when they buy the ‘fictitious’
commodity of workers, is their labour power81 as a capacity to work, i.e. a contractual
agreement and obligation to do work. This capacity can be more or less ‘used’ by employers
by varying work time and intensity. The former strategy – the extension of work time – does
not just refer to the length of the working day but stretches out to the length of sabbaticals,
holidays, retirement age, etc. The latter strategy – increasing productivity – is more prevalent
today because prolonging working time has clearer limits, both physical (a day only has 24
hours) and social (e.g. as limits to social acceptance, especially if workers are well organised).
The typical way by which working time is intensified is by replacing labour with machines.
These two strategies are known as absolute and relative surplus value creation in Marxian
thought and centre on the role of the length and intensity of working time. Both are
characterised by fierce struggles over labour time throughout history.
The crucial point is that both strategies translate into spaces for the creation of a surplus
product. Surplus product is an amount of commodities produced82 that exceeds the amount
required for reproduction.83 The time it takes to produce this additional quantity is surplus
labour time.84 Under capitalism, it is the amount of labour time that remains unpaid by the
capitalist.85 Surplus labour time, in turn, represents the source of surplus value. Surplus value
81 There is a crucial difference between labour and labour power in Marxian theory. Labour power is the
ability or capacity to work whereas labour its application (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016, p. 21).
82 In production nothing is created in a thermodynamic sense, but something is created in the sense
that matter-energy is transformed into something new that has not existed before.
83 Interestingly, Shaikh notes that a lot of profit theories (based on Keynes, Kalecki, Sraffa or the
neoclassical school) rely on the existence of a surplus product for profit without being explicit about it
(Shaikh, 2016, p. 232ff). The monetary price the surplus product takes is aggregate production profit
(Shaikh, 2016, pp. 218, 224).
84 Surplus labour time exists in all societies as a fund for development, as the time that a society has left
to work, produce and innovate what goes beyond bare subsistence needs. In the Marxian approach, the
surplus concept forms the basis of Marx’s comprehensive social theory. Social relations are essentially
class relations, and at the centre of every class society are the relationships through which the dominant
classes extract and gain control of the surplus, no matter whether in despotism, slavery, feudalism or
capitalism. As such, surplus creation and appropriation is a matter of power relations. Marx thought the
character of capitalism is shaped from this form of exploitation (Howard, 1983).
85 The fact that some people take advantage of the work of others is not new. This has been the case in
all societies. What Marxist theory provides is an account of what specific form labour exploitation takes
under capitalism.
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is the additional value created in production. It is unpaid value (Marx, 1863, p. 72).86 This
additional value can be realised as profits in the circulation process when commodities are
sold.
Marx argued that only labour power has the capacity to produce more value, i.e. surplus value.
“There is no other commodity whose use value can increase its exchange
value” (Marx, 1863, p. 66).
This is because only labourers can add more value to production than needed for subsistence.
Recall from the previous chapter that the value of a commodity is its socially necessary labour
time. The value of the commodity that workers sell (labour power) is the labour time socially
necessary to produce the goods that workers need for the reproduction of themselves and
their families. If workers only produced what was necessary for their own subsistence and
what they earned as wages, there would be no surplus, no basis for profits and no good reason
for capitalists to employ anyone.
“For profit to be obtainable there must be a surplus of output per worker
over the consumption per worker’s family necessary to keep the labor force
in being” (Robinson quoted in Obrinsky, 1983, p. 141).
This is not a quote from Marx but from Joan Robinson, who comes to the same conclusion.
If it were possible, in a fictitious idealised world, to achieve full equality, i.e. a situation in which
all labour contributions were fully being paid for, as claimed in mainstream theory, there
would be no surplus value.87 The only source left for profit-making would be nature, in the
form of buying cheap and selling dear or appropriating nature for free. If really all costs were
fully being paid for – both labour and nature – as environmental economists advocate as part
of their general strategy of ‘internalising externalities’ to achieve full cost pricing, there would
be no basis for sustaining profits. This is not capitalism.
Spaces that give rise to surplus value creation get protected and protected differently than
spaces of appropriating nature. ‘Protecting elements’, as Heilbroner (1980) calls them, are the
bargaining power of workers and the pressures of unemployment. Both are mechanisms that
prevent wages from rising to the point where they would eat up all surplus. These forces only
86 Effectively, this means that Marx follows the mainstream explanation of profits as arising from ‘buying
cheap and selling dear’ but he also shows how this mechanism derives from production, not circulation.
87 In this sense, idealised neoclassical theory is correct to assume implicitly no profits of the system as a
whole. The problem is that this conception hides from real-world power struggles and dynamics.
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apply to the commodity ‘labour-power’ as living human beings, not to matter-energy.
Essentially, this means that labourers are always in a weaker position than employers, and the
seemingly free and equal exchange relations between employees and employers turn out to
be relations of domination. Even if a ‘fair’ price was paid to workers, the value of labour power
would be less than the value that capitalists received from the commodities that are produced.
This establishes Marx’s theory of surplus value not as a theory of unfairness in the sense of
unequal exchange, but rather as one of structural and systemic tendencies. It also shows how
surplus value is created as a normal part of the production process, rather than exceptionally
(Heilbroner, 1980).
Surplus value and profit are not the same in Marxian theory. I mention this point because it
remains an issue of confusion, based on discussions I had with ecological economists. To
understand this difference we can draw parallels to the discussion of value in the previous
chapter. In chapter 3 I explained that abstract socially necessary labour time is the real
underlying essence of value, whereas price is its form of manifestation. Prices are measures
of value. Following this logic, surplus labour time is the underlying real essence of surplus
value, and profits their monetary manifestation. Profits are one form of surplus value. The
higher surplus value, the higher, as a general tendency, can profits be. This means profits
relate to surplus value in the same way as prices to value. As the real underlying essence is the
explanation of the empirical appearance, they cannot be the same. This is why surplus value
and profits are related, yet not the same. As with value, surplus value is the real and objective
basis of profits from production.
What does the concept of surplus value add to an understanding of profits that is not covered
by other theories? Two things, at least. On the one hand, it is a concept that emphasises the
sources of profit. This is where ecological economics is strong from a biophysical side. Similar
to Marx, the aim of a lot of ecological economists is to ask and uncover how much resources
and energy are spent in production and throughout the whole life cycle, where these
resources come from and under what conditions they are sourced. Marx provides the
theoretical infrastructure for understanding the entanglements between monetary and real
categories (both nature and labour). Marxian theory-methodology also incorporates an
understanding that monetary profits from production are rooted in something physical.
On the other hand, surplus value is an umbrella term. It alerts to the fact that different types
of profits and hence different streams of revenue have the same origin in production. Without
production, nothing can be sold and exchanged. What happens in production is hence a
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precondition for different types of profits in circulation. Surplus value from production comes
into being as general profit, which is further divided into specific profits such as rents, interest,
industrial profit, merchant profit etc. How these profits are divided and distributed – who gets
how much and how – is subject to class struggle (see Capital Volume III).
The key messages of this section are the following. Even though profit is a dominant motive
and driving force of capitalist societies, its role is downplayed in mainstream economics and it
is not prominent in ecological economics either. Marxian profit theory explains how profits
arise both in production and in circulation. Profits from production are the result of societies
able to produce a surplus. Profits from circulation arise from ‘buying cheap and selling dear’
but these are a zero-sum game with no net profit in the aggregate. Both sources of profits
stem from the appropriation of labour power and nature, i.e. by not fully paying the
contribution of both. If all production inputs were fully being paid for, there would be no
profits. As labour and resources are entangled and because the nature of both ‘commodities’
is different, various strategies arise how profits are created and maintained in practice.88
4.2.4 Competition
Competition runs like a red thread through capitalism. It is the central regulating mechanism
of the system (Shaikh, 2016), giving rise to core dynamics, in particular related to temporary
gains from technological innovation. At its core, competition involves continual struggles in
which some gain and others lose. Reasons for these struggles can be linked back to the
discussion of value in the previous chapter. There, I described how long run competitive prices
are underpinned by the quantity of abstract labour time necessary to produce a commodity.
This means there is a systemic imperative for capitalists to compete over labour productivity
increases. The winners of such competitions gain advantages in terms of profits, market share
and/or other forms of maintaining or expanding power, which typically strengthens their
position in the next round of competition. Competition can thus be described as re-enforcing
feedback loop or ‘systemic’ trap that is difficult to escape (Meadows, 2009).
88 For instance, capital and labour can cooperate to exploit nature, e.g. via technology-induced
productivity increases, part of which labour might profit from in the form of wage increases. Capital can
also use nature against labour, e.g. by using technological advance as threat to unemployment. Capital
and labour in one country can also cooperate to exploit labour and nature in foreign countries.
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We can ask: How does the Marxian understanding of real competition, in contrast to perfect
competition of mainstream economics, improve our understanding of environmental impacts
and lock-ins? To begin with, competitive advantage is temporary. It vanishes as soon as others
catch up. Remaining competitive therefore drives technological rat-races, which drive energy
and resource use. The temporary character of competitive advantage also explains strategies
for protecting head starts (actual or potential), especially ones that require large initial
investments, which is often the case in highly polluting sectors.
In addition, competitive struggles imply pressures to lower production costs. Lowest-cost
producers become regulating capitals, i.e. their production price regulates the price of the
whole industry. Regulating capitals become price-leaders, and non-regulating capitals price-
followers (Shaikh, 2016, p. 271). I would argue that pressures to lower production costs are
largely incompatible with more sustainable forms of production, which are typically more
time-intensive and hence costly. Most organisations we would qualify as ‘more sustainable’ –
because they are more local and purpose-driven – are small and medium-sized businesses.89
They are typically price-followers vis-à-vis big business. If prices are regulated by price-leaders,
production costs of price-followers are typically higher, profit margins smaller and survival
conditions more difficult. The perversity of capitalism is that unsustainable production is
structurally incentivised, often even subsidised, to remain competitive, whereas sustainable
alternatives often only survive in niches, often in higher-price segments. This is not conducive
to large-scale societal change towards sustainability.
A typical outcome of competitive struggles is concentration and centralisation dynamics. The
reinforcing feedback loop of competition spirals up, if nothing is done to break it. That bigger
companies generally have cost advantages, in terms of lower unit costs and higher profit
margins, favours the formation of oligopolies or monopolies (Shaikh, 2016, p. 271). Giant
companies are omnipresent as dominant operational units of mature capitalist production in
major branches of environmental destruction such as energy, transport, or heavy industries.
“Capital is, we can conclude, in love with monopoly. It prefers the
certainties, the quiet life and possibility of leisurely and cautious changes
that go with a monopolistic style of working and living outside of the rough
and tumble of competition” (Harvey, 2015, p. 139).
89 I do not imply that SME’s are generally more sustainable. However, I do believe that more purpose-
driven businesses instead of financially-driven organisations are more likely to be sustainable.
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This means that conditions favouring fiercer market competition do not foster a more efficient
distribution of resources, as typically claimed by free-market advocates. Rather the opposite
is the case. What tends to happen in times of laissez-faire, in which protection and regulating
mechanisms of States are dismantled, is that private monopolies become stronger (the
google’s, Microsoft’s, Nestle’s of the world). I think this is commonsense and established
systems thinking wisdom:
“Market competition systematically eliminates market competition”
(Meadows, 2009, p. 128).
“If a reinforcing feedback loop rewards the winner of a competition with
the means to win further competitions, the result will be the elimination of
all but a few competitors… the rich get richer and the poor get poorer”
(Meadows, 2009, p. 3).
This means capitalism is a system that requires continual regulation and redistribution to
counter reinforcing feedback loops and guarantee social stability – or the transition to another
system altogether. Polanyi coined this aptly as ‘laissez-faire was planned, but planning was
not’ (Polanyi, 1944). Capitalism is a trickle-down system, which generates rising inequalities, if
largely left on its own, as mentioned by many authors, Arnsperger, for example:
“Capitalism and equality are like oil and water: you can mix them up
vigorously, but if you don’t coerce them into staying mixed they will
separate again” (Arnsperger, 2008, p. 6).
A last issue I would like to mention is the Marxian emphasis on different forms of competition.
Firms compete over profits and market shares – within industries, between industries, and
across nations. The latter is tied to issues of trade, globalisation and development. Workers
compete over jobs, wages, and status, especially in times of rising inequalities and uncertainty.
Capital and labour compete against each other in terms of shares of income (profits and
wages).
“Competition pits seller against seller, seller against buyer, buyer against
buyer, capital against capital, capital against labour, and labour against
labour” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 14).
If competition is the central regulating mechanism of capitalism, and if the nature of
competition is essentially understood as everyone struggling against everyone, or different
interest groups or countries having to compete against each other, as Shaikh’s quote seems
to suggest, it is not hard to understand why serious actions to counter global ecological crises,
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which have to be based on collaborative efforts of the global community, are so difficult to
achieve.
To understand dynamics of vested interests and strategies to gain or protect competitive
advantage, class analysis is essential. Whilst class analysis was the basis for understanding
economic dynamics at the time of the classical political economists, and remains an important
unit of analysis in the critical social sciences, it was removed from the core of mainstream
economics, which is based on methodological individualism. Again, what gets removed from
how we think about economic dynamics, is not obvious to study and hence act upon.
To conclude this section, competition per se (as technology per se) is not necessarily
detrimental. Whether competition is desirable or not depends on the underlying purpose that
drives it. If the purpose is to become the world champion of resource efficiency, competition
may be desirable.90 But we have established that the purpose of capitalism is the creation of
surplus value. The striving and need for profit creation in conjunction with competitive
pressures is a toxic combination.
4.3 Dominant tendencies
How does the circuit of capital and its ties to profit and competition help explain social
ecological dynamics? This is the core question of this section. The approach is to move the
analysis closer to complex realities by identifying tendencies that spring off from the basic M-
C-M’ structure. I identify eight endogenous tendencies91 of capitalism that reveal
environmental impacts and barriers to societal change: overproduction, technological
dynamism, appropriation, commodification, overconsumption, acceleration, alienation, and
financialisation. These dynamics can be located at particular points in the circuit of capital, as
shown in Figure 9 below. Overproduction, technological dynamism, and appropriation
processes belong primarily to the realm of production (M-C); overconsumption to circulation
(C’-M’), whereas commodification, acceleration, alienation and financialisation span the
90 However, even when escalation is driven by good intentions it can be problematic, because it is not
easy to stop (Meadows, 2009).
91 I use the terms tendencies, features, and dynamics interchangeably. They represent something
through which an outcome is likely to come into being.
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whole circuit. This plotting of tendencies immediately shows the crucial importance of
understanding production processes for understanding social ecological dynamics.
Figure 9. Systemic tendencies in the circuit of capital
Books could be and have been written about these tendencies. My contribution emphasises
their interrelations because these entanglements explain both the persistence of destructive
patterns and why it is so difficult to change them. To support an understanding of the
interrelated nature of these tendencies, I explicitly cross-reference interlinkages as link to…
in the following sections; and I identify factors that prevent deep changes towards
sustainability as  barriers to change. I believe an understanding of dominant tendencies is
essential to make opposing forces more visible, which helps us to think about alternatives.
The first three parts of this section deal with production. What to produce, how and where
are questions of overproduction (section 4.3.1), technological dynamism (section 4.3.2) and
appropriation (section 4.3.3). The following parts emphasise commodification (section 4.3.4)
and overconsumption (section 4.3.5). The last part tackles cross-cutting issues of acceleration
(section 4.3.6), alienation (section 4.3.7), and financialisation (section 4.3.8). Before we
proceed any further, a few additional remarks are required.
To begin with, these eight features of capitalist societies need to be understood as tendencies.
A general tendency does not mean that it takes place everywhere and all the time. It is not a
law-like deterministic mechanism. Instead, countertendencies are at work that offset, delay
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or suspend general tendencies all the time, depending on specific cultural and historical
contexts and other circumstances. There are no certainties, and other worlds are possible.
However, any countertendencies can be countered again. The point is that tendencies, as the
name suggests, describe what tends to happen, i.e. what is more likely to happen than not.
In other words, tendencies are sticky. They endure over longer periods. The specific forms
these tendencies take vary between different periods of capitalism and contexts. How
commodification tendencies unfold in the UK in 2018 are different from how they were in
Brazil in the 1970s. However, the level of abstraction I address here describes tendencies that
endure in the long run. They characterise the movements and changing faces of capitalism as
a system throughout history, irrespectively of whether we speak about the Fordist, post-
Fordist or financialist era. In the medium and long run it is likely that these tendencies prevail.
One reason why these tendencies are sticky is because they are embedded in a network of
supporting structures. This means it is the combination of these tendencies that characterise
capitalism. Taken together, they form the social fabric of capital, the entangled network of the
system as a whole. As Donella Meadows informs us,
“a system is a set of things – people, cells, molecules, or whatever –
interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of
behaviour over time” (Meadows, 2009, p. 2).
In the capitalist system, it is the interplay between these tendencies – underpinned by
simultaneous countertendencies and social struggles – that gives rise to social ecological
dynamics.
The Marxian understanding of tendencies differs from a critical realist understanding, which
seems important to mention, given that critical realism has been proposed as philosophical
foundation for ecological economics in recent years (Puller and Smith, 2017; Spash, 2012).
Fleetwood (Fleetwood, 2011, 2001), who defends a critical realist position, rejects an
understanding of tendencies as related to empirical events. He portrays a view of tendencies
as ‘patterns in the flux of events’ as disguised forms of a Humean regularity view of causation
based on closed systems thinking, which he rejects. Instead, he proposes a ‘deep’
understanding of ‘genuine’ tendencies as forces or causal powers that drive outcomes,
irrespectively of whether these outcomes come into being or not. Tendencies may or may not
cause empirically observed events.
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Fine (2007; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016) and Brown (2007), in contrast, counter from a Marxist
dialectical materialist perspective that tendencies are necessarily linked to historically specific
configurations. Put differently, tendencies are linked to events, although not deterministically.
They are not continually actualized, but they must be actualized over a period of time for the
system as a whole to persist (Brown, 2007; Reuten, 2017). This developmental view of
tendencies (i.e. tendencies as something that emerges in the course of the systems’
development) requires the concrete empirical study of tendencies and use of sound economic
theory. On this basis, Brown and Fine critique critical realism for proposing a trans-historical
methodology detached from economic theory and capitalist realities. Critical realism is not
real and not critical enough, Fine concludes (2004). It strikes me that Puller and Smith (Puller
and Smith, 2017), in their advocacy for critical realism for ecological economics, highlight
exactly these two traits: they celebrate critical realism for being critical and realist.
Also, the interpretation of tendencies advocated here differs from cyclical variations or
Kondratieff-type waves, as sometimes suggested (Fleetwood, 2011). Such a conception
enables tendencies to be viewed as consonant with equilibrium thinking, which is not what I
mean. I describe long-term dynamics underpinned by the capitalist core described in section
4.2. Capital is inherently expansionary and capitalism a spiralling self-expanding system, not
an equilibrium system. The idea of economic equilibrium as a balance of marginal utilities
stems from classical mechanics, rather than from the outcomes of real-world observations
(Mirowski, 1989).
An addition remark concerns different levels of abstraction: in the previous chapter on value
and the sections on capital, profit and competition in this chapter, I tried to provide a
systematic explanation of core Marxian categories to show how Marx carefully unfolded an
understanding of the capitalist system as a whole, starting from the most simple and abstract
towards ever more concrete and complex categories. In the following sections, I drop this
ambition. What follows is no longer a careful step-by-step exposition but a network-like
perspective of tendencies and their interrelations that includes different levels of
abstractions.92 The intention is to emphasise and explain systemic interrelations associated
92 I rely on Ollman’s characterisation of seven different levels of abstraction into which Marx subdivides
the world, starting from the most specific to the most general (Ollman, 1993, p. 55ff):
Level one emphasises what is unique about a person or situation. “It’s all that makes Joe Smith different
from everyone else ... It’s what gets summed up in a proper name and an actual address” (Ollman, 1993,
p. 55). At this level, the here and now is brought into focus.
Level two is slightly more general. It emphasises what is general to people, their activities and products
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with environmental destruction and themes that seem essential for ecological economists. I
try to find a balance between keeping a ‘bigger picture view’, whilst refraining from too bold
claims at the same time.
4.3.1 Overproduction
Capitalist commodity production tends to increase over time. Marx captured this apparent
fact in the first sentence of Capital:
“The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails
appears as an immense collection of commodities” (Marx, 1990, p. 126).
Commodities are omnipresent in the world we live in. From an ecologically minded
perspective, the question is how and why they come into being. The previous chapter
established that the production of commodities is primarily motivated and driven by exchange
value considerations, rather than use values. However, exchange value cannot be produced
and realised without use values. Profits from production require a material basis.93 Surplus
within modern capitalism, in the last 20-50 years. Here, we no longer speak of an individual, but of a
financial trader, for instance.
Level three is capitalism as such, i.e. production as a whole. Joe Smith (level 1) as a financial trader
(level 2) becomes a typical wage-worker in capitalism, who produces commodities and value. This level
widens the area and lengthens the time span even further.
Level four addresses class society, that is, the last 5000 to 10,000 years in which human societies have
been organised into classes. This level focuses on qualities of people, their activities and products that
are common across capitalism, feudalism, slave societies etc.
Level five is human society as such, which brings into focus all human beings and their whole history.
Level six expands into the biological world and the qualities that are shared amongst all animals.
Level seven is the most general level that emphasises the physical and material parts of nature.
93 The question to what extent profits require a material basis relates to one of the biggest controversies
in the environmental discourse, i.e. whether energy-matter use can be decoupled from ‘value creation’
(which is typically used synonymously with economic output, GDP growth, wellbeing, welfare or
consumption, e.g. in Hepburn and Bowen, 2012). The central tenet of green growthers and eco-
modernists is that growth and profits do not necessarily require a material basis, i.e. the opposite of
what I state here. Their argument is that a structural shift towards a service economy, driven by
technological advance could lead to reductions in energy and resource intensities and indeed absolute
decoupling of matter-energy use and economic growth. Green-growth positions, such as the one
offered by Hepburn and Bowen (2012), typically underestimate the whole life-cycle energy and resource
requirements of ‘intellectual’ goods (art, literature, music) and ‘knowledge products (computer
software, the internet); they do not ask why and how technologies and growth come into being and
whose interests they serve; and they revert to an idealised future state of the world, instead of
confronting harsh realities in which there is no empirical evidence for absolute decoupling (except for
relatively easy technological fixes such as air and water pollution).
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value can only be created and profits realised from production when something is produced
and sold: commodities.
The M-C-M’ movement is thus mediated by the production of commodities. Commodities are
not at the centre of interest of capitalist producers. Producers are not primarily benevolent
philanthropists who produce commodities for the satisfaction of people’s needs. As James
Roderick, then Chairman of U.S. steel, put it: “The duty of management is to make money, not
steel” (Murray, 2017, p. 169). This is not to deny good intentions of producers. Many
businesses care about producing commodities that increase people’s wellbeing but in the end,
systemic pressures to survive rule the game. What matters in the end is the excess value that
can be realised as profit and reinvested in new production cycles.
Several implications follow. First, the huge mass of cheap commodities is responsible for the
massive environmental degradation of today. Second, capitalist commodity production does
not stop once basic needs are met. Rather, luxury goods become more important with the
large-scale use of money (Luhmann, 1994) ( link to 4.3.5 overconsumption). Third, the market
is unable to distinguish between the production of commodities that satisfy basic needs or
luxury consumption. The question of what to produce (and related: what to consume and
waste) is crucial from a sustainability perspective (Smith, 2010). In an increasingly resource-
constrained world, it makes a difference whether natural resources are used for producing
SUVs, 10£ flights, penthouse flats or healthy food and decent housing. These differences
escape capitalist rationality because commodity production is a means towards an end, rather
than an end in itself. Fourth, what not to produce, i.e. questions of sufficiency, which are
equally important from a sustainability perspective, fall out of capitalist logic ( link to 4.3.5
overconsumption). The rationale for engaging in capitalist business is production for profit.
Limiting production typically implies limiting profits (Gould et al., 2008). Lacking advocacy for
sufficiency is therefore not surprising.
What happens after commodities get sold? They can be further used and they also remain
socially relevant, but they can no longer be valorised (Murray and Schuler, 2017). As
valorisation needs to continue for the reproduction of the system, commodities – and with it
energy and natural resources – have to be thrown constantly into the process, like “fuel into
a fire” (Banaji, 1979, p. 37 quoting Grundrisse). A continuous flow of energy and resources is
required to sustain and fuel commodity production on an extended scale. As commodities and
capital accumulate over time, social structures and institutions are created that, ultimately,
lock societies into highly resource- and energy-intensive lifestyles. One example is the large
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share of material inputs needed to maintain the existing stock of infrastructure, such as
transportation networks or residential buildings (Wiedenhofer et al., 2015).
Overproduction is not only problematic from a sustainability perspective. The term is used in
Marxist crisis theory to signal a mismatch between production and effective demand, i.e. more
commodities are produced that can be sold at a price that enables the realisation of surplus
value embodied in those commodities (Clarke 2012) ( link to 4.4.2 crises). This means
overproduction in the classical Marxian sense denotes problems with ‘normal’ economic
reproduction; in times of increasing and accelerating ecological crises, overproduction adds
another layer to the crisis-riddled nature of the capitalist system.
4.3.2 Technological dynamism
Does commodity production on an expanded scale require a growing flow of energy and
materials? The previous section prompts the question to what extent commodities can be
produced with less or no energy and resource throughput. Decoupling and dematerialisation
debates are long, old and ongoing. This section presents the technology-productivity nexus as
a central dynamic driving environmental overuse. Understanding the links between
competition, profit-making and technology helps explain why the Jevons Paradox is not, in
fact, a paradox, why work-time reductions are anything but easy to implement, and why
technological advance is not per se a road to solving ecological crises.
Capitalism is technologically dynamic. The discussion of value in the previous chapter provides
one explanation why. The importance of ‘labour’ that is ‘socially necessary’ and undertaken in
a specific amount of ‘time’ points to a key mechanism that structurally drives capitalist
production: the role of technologically-induced labour productivity increases. Raising labour
productivity is crucial for remaining competitive and a central strategy of surplus value
creation. Recall: surplus value can be created in two basic ways: by extending working time or
working more efficiently. The former strategy has clearer limits. The length of the working day,
month, year or lifetime cannot be extended indefinitely. Some time is required to sleep, eat
and recover. In addition, if workers are well organised and in a strong bargaining position,
employers’ possibilities to prolong working time are restricted. Furthermore, labour costs are
typically higher than other per unit production costs and relatively fixed, as wages are
generally set by labour markets. As a consequence, labour-saving technologies account for the
majority of productivity growth in advanced capitalist economies.
127
Increasing labour productivity lowers production costs (via reduced unit labour costs), which
increases profit margins, and creates spaces for lowering prices, which increases competitive
advantage ( link to 4.2.4 competition). Lower prices, in turn, enable higher consumption
levels, especially if labour productivity increases also translate into higher wages.94 Sufficient
effective demand is, in turn, required for absorbing the commodities produced and for profits
to be realised. Labour productivity increases thus seem to trigger a positive reinforcing
feedback loop that benefits producers95 and consumers alike. Much policy effort is based on
this logic: fostering innovation to boost profits and competitiveness and enable higher wages
and consumption levels at the same time, leading to a win-win situation for producers and
consumers. In the environmental policy arena, this story becomes a green flavour. What
matters is to push for the right type of innovations, i.e. green and sustainable ones (better
insulating homes and driving in electric cars).
From an ecological economics point of view, this perspective is too narrow. What are the
system-wide consequences of labour productivity increases? Who are the losers of
technology-induced productivity gains? If we understand the nature of competition and profit-
making as constant struggles in which some parties gain and others lose, as highlighted in
section 4.2.4, we need to understand why and how the ‘win-win’ of some translates into ‘win-
win-lose-lose’ elsewhere. The losers are typically the weakest and least protected human and
non-human beings and the number of those who lose from competitive struggles increases in
times of global environmental change.
Value theory explains continuous pressures to increase labour productivity. The problem is
that technology-induced productivity gains over others are temporary. Competitive
advantages disappear over time. As the name relative surplus value creation indicates, it
describes gains relative to – in comparison to – others. As soon as competitors catch up by
adopting productivity-enhancing technologies, competitive advantage and temporarily higher
profit margins vanish. This is why capitalism has to be technologically dynamic. Therefore, it is
not surprising to understand strategies that create and protect spaces for maintaining
94 Labour productivity increases do not automatically translate into higher wages; but higher profit
margins make it both easier for producers to share part of these gains and for workers to demand a
bigger share.
95 Producers not only benefit from labour productivity increases in their own firm, but also in other
branches. Improvements in one industry cheapen and improve the means of production in another
(Marx, 1991, p. 179). Rising labour productivity hence also facilitates the social division of labour, i.e.
how the specialisation of labour proceeds in a particular country and worldwide.
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competitive advantage, within countries but also across countries as part of international
trade relations ( barrier to change). Rent seeking via patents and intellectual property rights
are prominent cases (Standing, 2016).
What are the environmental consequences of temporary productivity superiority? The ability
to produce more output in shorter periods implies higher demand for machines, raw
materials, and energy. Bluntly speaking, if a machine produces four times more output, four
times more resource inputs are required ( link to 4.3.3 appropriation). Furthermore, as fixed
capital investment in machinery needs to be amortised and as the gains of these investments
are temporary, machinery is used as extensively as possible, which fuels energy and resource
use even more. This is an old message.
“As the productivity of labour develops, and thus with the development of
the capitalist mode of production… the mass of means of production …
constantly grows” (Marx, 1993, p. 218).
Marx described a rise in the capital-intensity of production over time as changing ‘composition
of capital’, i.e. the tendency for constant capital (machinery) to rise in relation to variable
capital (labour).
The need to work machines as intensively as possible feeds back as increased demand for
labour. Marx pointed out that machines do not necessarily create unemployment (Smith,
1990, p. 139). Increases in labour productivity throughout history have not led to millions of
unemployed people. Rather, rising labour productivity has the perverse effect to prolong and
intensify work, instead of easing and shortening the working day. To what extent higher labour
demand translates into higher wages depends on social institutions, politics and specific
circumstances. An automatic strong link between productivity growth and wage increases is
an illusion (Shaikh, 2016), the reality is the outcome of power struggles over the distribution
of productivity gains between profits, wages and other incomes.
Technology not only contributes to higher but also cheaper outputs. Capitalist value
production leads to the cheapening of commodities (Fine, 2012). The tendency is for cheaper
and more, rather than high quality, durable and less, as desirable from a sustainability
perspective. The tendency for cheaper commodities also has the effect that lower wages are
needed for workers to enjoy a decent standard of living. Cheaper production therefore also
benefits producers as it enables to keep wages relatively low.
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Technology also serves as a means to discipline labour. If shorter labour time is key to surplus
value creation, capital tries to control and discipline it. Technology is one means through which
this power is exercised, for instance by determining the rhythm of work. Humans can be
stubborn. They can demand higher wages and better working conditions. Energy, resources
and machines cannot protest. From the perspective of the entrepreneur, it is easier to deal
with non-living matter. Through this lens, we begin to understand why labour productivity and
energy or resource productivity have to be understood differently. Living human beings
behave in different ways than machines.
Technology is not neutral. This is one of the prime insights of a Marxian perspective. In the
same way as capital is not ‘just’ money, technology is not ‘just’ machines detached from time
and space, but things that embody specific social relations, i.e. the socially specific forms of
organisation that prevail in our society. Technological innovations embody capitalist relations
(Foster et al., 2010, p. 80). Under capitalism, technological advance is predominantly steered
towards profit-making and competitiveness ( link to 4.2.3 profit and 4.2.4 competition). As
mentioned above, this directionality offers potentials for higher wages, more comfortable
working and living conditions and higher consumption levels for some parts of the world
population ( link to 4.3.5 overconsumption). However, we should not get blinded by the fact
that innovations in the pursuit of profit-creation look very different than innovations directed
towards other social goals, such as sustainability considerations.
How many ecological economists who study decoupling, dematerialisation and rebound
effects share this understanding of what seem to be crystal clear real-world economic
dynamics? Clearly, it is possible to use much less energy-matter throughput in production
processes and of course, it makes sense to foster the development of energy- and resource-
saving production. However, this is not a question of technical or economic cost efficiency,
but a social question. Green growth policies are not being implemented to a considerable
degree in practice. In reality, resources are often used lavishly because what matters most is
to remain competitive and secure profit margins, which can be achieved by keeping resource
and energy prices low or appropriating nature for free (or subsidised), all of which do not
support the uptake of resource-saving technologies or considerations of scale of impacts. Zero
waste, zero carbon, cradle to cradle, and related circular economy initiatives or negative
emission technologies which are prevalent in the environmental policy discourse are catch
phrases that remain wishful thinking in a reality that is dominated by the need to produce
surplus value.
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We need to critically examine: What type of technologies and innovations benefit whom? Who
supports these interests in what ways? This leads us to the role of science and the State in
promoting technological advance. Technological development needs time, investment and
deliberation. As Gould et al. put it: technologies do not run away by themselves, but are
planned (Gould et al., 2008). States fulfil an important role in this planning by channelling and
supporting technological uptakes in terms of funding and capacity provision. States launch
innovation programmes and offer skills training via school and university education that is
required for production (such as industry-tailored Master programmes). Often, no
specification is made about what type of technologies are socially more preferable than
others; from a systemic perspective, the directionality of technological change does not
matter. What matters is that it happens. Most state-led innovation programmes and
mainstream economic theories consider technological progress per se as desirable.
What are the key messages from this section? Under capitalism, human labour is substituted
by energy and resources – not the other way around. Increases in resource productivity have
not led to resource reduction and more leisure. The Jevons Paradox is no paradox. It is part
and parcel of capitalist logic and expected outcome of prevalent economic activity. Strategies
that target work-time reduction policies, energy- and resource-efficiency or eco-social tax
reforms that combine both need to be understood in this context. They run counter to labour
productivity gains as positive reinforcing feedback loop of capitalism and are anything but easy
to implement96.
96 These arguments are not exclusive to Marxian Political Economy, but resemble the treadmill of
production theory in striking ways. Treadmill of production theory considers the entanglement between
technologies, labour, resource use and the role of the State (Gould et al., 2008). Initially developed to
explain how US production had changed in the 1980s, based on a grounded theory approach, the
Treadmill explains the increasing capital-intensification of production: the more capital was
accumulating in Western economies, the more it was applied to replace labour with new technologies
to increase profits. These new technologies required far more energy and/or chemicals to replace
earlier, more labour-intensive processes, thus producing vast ecosystem pollution (outputs) and
ecosystem depletion (inputs). These new technologies emerged from an apparatus of scientific research
and company-based, -influenced or -financed research. From the treadmill perspective, productivity
increases lead to an acceleration of the treadmill – more throughput, more output, higher profits, but
with fewer workers and worsened environmental conditions (Gould et al., 2008).
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4.3.3 Appropriation
The previous sections explain how a technologically dynamic capitalist system geared towards
expanded commodity production fuels energy and resource demand. These resources and
energy need to come from somewhere. Appropriation tackles where and under which
conditions resources are sourced, extracted and accessed. The term appropriation is mainly
used for sourcing means of production, whereas exploitation typically refers to sourcing
labour.
A central appropriation issue is to access energy and resources as cheaply as possible to keep
production costs low. I see two basic strategies how this can be done: on the basis of relatively
equal97 or unequal exchange relations. The more peaceful strategy is trade. Energy and
resources have been traded for centuries. Under what conditions trade relations unfold
depends on framework conditions set by States or trading blocks, such as the EU. Whatever
specific forms trade relations take, a precondition for trade is that resources become
commodified. For some resources this is more obvious (barrels of oil) than for others (CO2
certificates). Appropriation tendencies are hence closely tied with commodification ( link to
4.3.4 commodification). The political reality of a lot of resource rich-countries is, however, not
one of peaceful trade relations. The alternative strategy to access resources is by exercising
brute force. Long histories of colonisation, imperialism and geographical expansion continue
today as land grabbing, green grabbing, blue grabbing (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012;
Fairhead et al., 2012). Communities at the locations of extraction are at the sharp end of the
spear of environmentally damaging capitalism; and domination over the environment relates
to domination over the populations in these areas (Bookchin, 2015, 1982).
Marx described primitive accumulation as a necessary initial phase in the development of
capitalism. The enclosure of common lands and eviction of peasants in the English and Scottish
countryside, i.e. a systematic plunder of land and resources, was essential to get capitalism off
the ground (Ince, 2014). Rosa Luxemburg, Hannah Arendt, David Harvey, Naomi Klein or
Arundhati Roy, amongst many, have firmly established that primitive accumulation processes
continue to remain essential for capital’s autonomous expansion. Harvey coined the term
accumulation by dispossession to describe a multitude of contemporary predatory practices
and encroachment processes, the appropriation of nature being one central theme therein
97 As we have learnt in the section on surplus value creation, exchange relations are never equal if profits
arise.
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(Harvey, 2004). As such, appropriation has become well documented and studied by critical
geographers, political ecologists, eco-Marxists and ecological economists, often, by linking it
to theories of unequal exchange (Hornborg, 2014, 1998; Jorgenson, 2016; Muradian and
Martinez-Alier, 2001).
Jason Moore’s Capitalism in the Web of Life is a seminal recent contribution that features
appropriation issues prominently. Moore highlights how the appropriation of unpaid work by
‘women, nature, and colonies’ and the capitalisation of paid work (labour) together produce
value and accumulation dynamics.
“The great secret and the great accomplishment of the capitalist mode of
production has been to not pay its bills, which is what frontiers made
possible” (Moore, 2014, p. 17).
The frontiers Moore talks about are unpaid fringes that capital uses to keep costs of
production relatively low. Non-commodified realms of work and life have enabled capital’s
‘free ride’ for a long time. However, as these frontiers cease to be cheap, Moore argues, labour
costs rise and accumulation opportunities shrink (Moore, 2015). The cheap nature strategy
that made capitalist expansion possible in the past, is no longer likely to continue. Moore
critiques classical Marxists for downplaying the role of appropriation for accumulation,
focussing too much on the circuit of capital and value creation inside production. I agree with
Moore on the centrality of appropriation to understand capitalist dynamics and ecological
destruction, but also think if we understand the circuit of capital in its entirety – and this is
what I argue for here – the appropriation of nature clearly does not lie outside of production
but is an integral part of it.
The appropriation of nature and related social conflicts are a terrain that remains neglected
in mainstream economics. The neoclassical approach assumes resource inputs for production
as given. The question of where resources come from does not arise. The heavy reliance on
equilibrium as organising principle suggests that market liberalisation leads to a harmonious
state in which everyone will be better off; possibilities of unequal exchange and violent
struggles over resources are widely neglected. Economics as positive science rules out
normative questions of power, vested interests, or rights to access, which are key to
understanding appropriation – and capitalism. The ahistorical methodological toolkit does not
open its doors to critically reflecting on past and ongoing histories of imperialism and
colonialisation. Understanding appropriation and its links to the core productive economy
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have no place in the core of mainstream economics. If you do not see a problem, there is no
obvious entry point to act upon it ( barrier to change).
4.3.4 Commodification
Commodification denotes processes of expanding ‘the commodity’ into new domains that
were formerly not subject to the logic of market exchange. The commodity as dominant social
form encroaches into areas where it has not been prevalent before. “Something that was not
functioning as a commodity, now functions as one” (Murray and Schuler, 2017) or something
that is – by the virtue of its being – not a commodity, a thing produced for profit, is treated as
if it were a commodity. What started with the commodification of labour, land and money as
‘fictitious’ commodities and precondition for generalised commodity exchange (Polanyi,
1944), has taken new forms today, such as carbon markets, habitat banking or biodiversity
offsetting (Bull et al., 2013; Sullivan, 2013; Vatn, 2015b). The question is whether we have
good reasons to believe in deeper seated structural and systemic pressures for
commodification tendencies and how they relate to increasing matter-energy use,
environmental destruction and barriers to change.
Commodification processes are one way in which the expansion of capital can be sustained.
These processes can be understood as a spectrum of something moving towards becoming a
commodity – by degree. Bayliss et al. (2017) distinguish various degrees. Commodity
calculation is the mere idea to use monetary criteria in decision making, without money
actually changing hands. Environmental cost-benefit-analysis is a typical example. Next,
commodity form is a different degree, which are transactions that involve payments for goods
that are not produced for sale. Something is treated as a commodity, even though it is not
produced for profit, such as paying pensions or unemployment benefits. Actual commodity
production for profit is the next, however not the last step. The authors claim that
commodification reaches even further by providing the basis for financialised activities ( link
to 4.3.8 financialisation).
In ecological economics, the commodification of nature is a controversial field of study. The
creation of and advocacy for ecosystem goods and services and associated markets is founded
upon the hope that internalising some externalities can prevent further environmental
damage. Often, this is based on a recognition that resources are exploited anyway ( link to
4.3.3 appropriation) and that exploiters should at least pay for some of the damages caused;
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thereby sometimes also creating revenue streams that can be used for more sustainable
purposes. Often, the monetary valuation of ecosystem services is merely suggested as a
pragmatic means to raise awareness of environmental values that are otherwise neglected;
rather than advocating for privatisation – and as such ‘full’ commodification – of the
commons.
However, weaker forms of commodification shape social ecological dynamics too. Commodity
calculations, in which no actual money payments are involved, cannot be understood
independently from the other commodity-forms-by-degree and also not independently from
the circuit of capital as a whole. What starts as well-meant intention and mere idea has real-
world implications in terms of sustaining and feeding the status quo. As such, it perpetuates
the dominant form of societal organisation, which shapes and restructures material
configurations. Commodity calculation – such as the idea to put a monetary value on
ecosystem services – is a necessary precondition for ‘stronger’ types of commodification. As
such, it bears moral, social and political significance. What was considered unacceptable some
years ago becomes normalised and legitimised over time ( barrier to change). Seriously, who
would have thought that ‘habitat banking’ could be proposed as a serious policy alternative
20 years ago?
If we understand commodification as a set of tendencies amongst others that, taken together,
are steered towards the reproduction of a system that is structurally inclined towards
environmental degradation, as I argue in this chapter, the advocacy of ecosystem service
valuation or payment schemes seems a shot in the foot, rather than a long-term viable
alternative because it is an expansion of capital, when it is precisely capital that is the problem.
Payment schemes and associated markets create new problems too: assigning private
property rights, such as carbon credits, permit pollution protected by law, thereby legalising
further appropriation ( link to 4.3.3 appropriation).
As all general tendencies, commodification processes are no one-way road. They do not imply
market determinism and counter-tendencies are at work all the time. De-commodification
strategies aim to reverse the dominant trend by turning something that used to be a
commodity into a thing that is no longer (Gerber and Gerber, 2017). However, the point is to
understand why these countertendencies are difficult to implement and sustain in a system
geared towards the production of surplus value. Re(commodification) tendencies occur too as
countertendencies to de-commodification strategies. Capital’s tendency is to turn nature into
commodities; not the other way round (Brand, 2016).
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4.3.5 Overconsumption
The previous sections describe tendencies that support the expansion of production. Now we
turn to the question of who is willing and able to buy the increasing mass of goods and
services. The willingness to consume, to begin with, is artificially stretched under capitalism.
The capitalist system does not just satisfy needs and wants, but actively produces them for
valorisation to continue and reproduction to function. M-C-M’ explains why marketing
departments exist. Advertisers actively create novelty and convince people to consume
beyond need. From a systemic perspective, it does not matter whether consumption is
steered towards satisfying needs or wants. The amoral market cannot make this distinction.
However, the social outcome is a highly problematic social logic of consumerism (Jackson,
2009) that locks people into environmentally and sometimes also socially-destructive
consumption patterns.
The physical requirements for people to thrive would be minimal. The question of what makes
a good life is as old as humanity. It seems crystal clear that good lives do not have to cost the
earth (Simms and Smith, 2008). People who feel balanced, grounded and satisfied need less
material consumption. Clearly, a certain level of energy, emissions and material requirements
is needed for ‘decent living’ under existing configurations (Rao and Baer, 2012; Rao and Min,
2018). However, if needs are met, humans are “energy saving models” (Hüther, 2013). If needs
are not met, people search for alternative satisfiers, which are often related to more
consumption and matter-energy use, especially in a throw-away consumption culture ( link
to 4.3.6 acceleration). The problem is that capitalist structures do not incentivise the
autonomous growth of people but energy- and resource intensive consumption growth
( link to 4.3.7 alienation). On this basis, it is hard to imagine how capitalist societies can lead
to high levels of wellbeing for all.
Creating and maintaining willingness to buy is however not sufficient. Demand needs to be
backed by the ability to consume, i.e. sufficient purchasing power. Where does the money
come from to absorb surplus value and surplus product? Harvey explains that Marx was not
much concerned with problems of effective demand. He thought capitalists would find the
money to absorb whatever is produced (Harvey, 2010a). One reason why demand and
consumption issues are not emphasised in Capital is because production matters more for
understanding core systemic drivers and also because consumption lies in the realm of
specificities, whereas Capital emphasises the level of generalities of the system as a whole.
The extension of the classical Marxist approach to include consumption-related issues was
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undertaken by later Marxists. The Systems of Provision approach, for instance, is one approach
that helps to understand how consumption patterns and cultures are shaped and driven by
general capitalist dynamics (Bayliss et al., 2017; Fine, 2002).
Back to our question: Where does the money come from to absorb surplus value and surplus
production? This is a question of systemic importance because if overproduction is not met
by overconsumption, capitalist economies slide into crises ( link to 4.4.2 crises). Who are
potential consumers? The broad mass of the population? Most people are in a double-role of
workers and consumers. Marx famously quotes that capitalists not only benefit from labourers
in their role of workers but also in their role as consumers. However, sufficient effective
demand cannot be taken for granted. If real wages stagnate, other mechanisms are required
to stabilise the system. The expansion of credit is one possibility that provides money for
(over)consumption purposes. Abandoning the gold standard in the 1940s meant a new regime
of credit-driven fiat money that made it possible to fuel aggregate demand “far in excess of
any possible growth in their potential supply” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 205). Credit for consumption
either results in higher national debt, if the State steps in as consumption stabiliser, or private
debts. Both forms of credit expansion cannot be sustained for a prolonged period of time.
Another possibility is to conquer new terrains. Rosa Luxemburg argued for the necessity of
imperialism as a way out of the misery (thereby opening the doors to new miseries). Harvey
(2004) mentions geographical expansion as one way to deal with crises of overaccumulation
too. Malthus, on the other hand, proposed as a remedy a class in society that does nothing
but consume. He made a case for the landed aristocracy to stabilise the system. Following
Malthus, is further support for landlords or, more generally, the richest 10% or 1% of the world
the preferable solution to stabilising an increasingly unequal and unjust and inherently crisis-
prone system? Clearly not. Still, we need to ask: who are the conspicuous consumers of our
times? Where do they live? In globalised capitalism, the class of consumers can be
geographically detached from production. Production happens where it is cheap,
consumption where people have sufficient purchasing power. Producing cheap and selling
dear has become global. This global rift is supported by cheap, fast and flexible transport and
communication channels, such as air transport, with considerable environmental impacts
( link to 4.3.6 acceleration). What it gives rise to is what Brand and Wissen call the imperial
mode of living (2012), i.e. unacceptable resource- and energy-intensive lifestyles of high-
income consumers across the world (Alvaredo et al., 2017) based on the exploitation of people
and appropriation of nature ( link to 4.3.3 appropriation and 4.3.7 alienation).
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4.3.6 Acceleration
From the production of needs and wants we move onto the production of time and space.
This section discusses space-time dynamics. It explains why short-termism, speeding-up the
rhythm of work and life and spatial expansion are inbuilt tendencies of capitalist economies.
Acceleration dynamics stretch over the entire circuit of capital. They shape both production
and circulation processes. One main mechanism for shortening production time is labour
productivity increases, as discussed above. This section adds three more considerations: how
acceleration dynamics incentivise products and production methods that reduce turnover
times; the role of transport and communication infrastructures for compressing time; and the
importance of credit and finance provision for bridging time frictions.
Core Marxian concepts unravel aspects of temporality. Value is socially necessary labour time;
capital is value in motion; surplus value stems from surplus labour time; competitive
advantages are temporal. “Moments are the elements of profits”, as Marx said long ago (Marx,
1990, p. 352). This is why capitalist firms try to capture time in various ways, typically by aiming
to reduce turnover times and extend labour times ( link to 4.3.2 technological dynamism).
Time cannot be expanded, but it can be compressed. Space considerations are therefore
inseparably linked to questions of time. Absolute space (a piece of land) is fixed and bears no
systematic connection to time. Relative space, however, refers to the time it takes and costs
it bears to move things around. It is an expression of how, for instance, urban spaces are
shaped, landscapes get transformed, and distance to markets become shortened. The
reduction of relative space is a systemic feature of capitalism and globalisation no accident
(Harvey, 2010a).
How is space-time linked to environmental impacts? For a start, natural processes have
typically longer reproduction cycles than industrial ones. This is why strategies to compress
time are easy to detect in industries that deal with living substances such as plants and animals
– agriculture and forestry – are subject to interruptions. As cheese ripens, grapes ferment or
coffee beans dry, capital lays idle. Possibilities to compress time incentivises types of
production and products with quicker turnover times. One possibility to shorten turnover time
is to intensify production. Fields are harvested up to four times a year in the region I come
from instead of once or twice when my grandparents were my age. Industrialised meat
production nowadays systematically breeds species that give birth several times a year. The
age at which pigs, chickens, cows and other animals are slaughtered has decreased
substantially, compared to their normal reproduction cycles.
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Another possibility to shorten turnover time is to systematically produce commodities with
relatively short life-spans. This can be done physically by producing things that break relatively
early (e.g. planned obsolescence) or imaginary, by fostering cultures in which certain
commodities get considered outdated or unfashionable. Both strategies contribute to high
resource and energy intensive throw-away consumption culture ( link to 4.3.4
commodification and 4.3.5 overconsumption). However, there are certain limits to compressing
time. This is why strategies exist to circumvent time constraints, for instance by switching to
production methods and materials that are less prone to time restrictions. Replacing natural
materials (wood) with artificial ones (plastic) is one example.
Sustainable alternatives, on the other hand, often have higher turnover times. Marx discussed
why sustainable agriculture and forestry are rather incompatible with capitalism (Foster and
Burkett, 2016). The temporal mismatch between natural and industrial processes in a system
that favours the latter gives rise to the systematic overexploitation of natural resources.
“The common element in capitalism’s tendencies to overexploit land and
labour power is the failure to provide sufficient time (and biochemical
energy inputs) for the restoration of productive power” (Foster and Burkett,
2016, p. 148).
Constant capital and machinery run significantly ahead of organic raw materials in fully
developed capitalism (Marx, 1991, p. 213) ( link to 4.3.2 technological dynamism). From this
perspective, it is not difficult to understand why capitalist production is not sustainable and
why sustainable alternatives often remain niches ( barrier to change).
Let us turn to a next crucial issue: the role of transport, communication and associated
infrastructures. Their role can hardly be underestimated for the reproduction of the capitalist
system. Infrastructures are the physical lifeblood of capitalism. They are the physical web that
supports the more or less fluid flow of capital through the system. Without cheap, fast and
expanding transport and communication systems the increasing global division of labour and
production systems would not be possible. Low fossil fuel prices are crucial to this end (rather
than upward pressures in light of absolute fossil scarcities) as well as the construction of more
highways, railways, waterways or virtual communication channels. The State is crucial to
provide infrastructures directly, invest in R&D that support the uptake of faster and cheaper
communications systems ( link to 4.3.2 technological dynamism), and negotiate trade
agreements and other legislation that supports increasing interconnectedness. Large
infrastructures are also needed to access new resource exploitation sites ( link to 4.3.3
appropriation) and to reach consumers in distant markets ( link to 4.3.5 overconsumption).
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The last issue I would like to touch upon here is the crucial role of credit and finance for
bridging time gaps. The essential function of credit is to provide money that has to be paid
back at a later point in time. Credit is a repayment obligation (Shaikh, 2016). It guarantees
continuity in the circuit and enables speeding-up, productive expansion and surplus value
realisation. To kick-start production, credit can be used to bundle sufficient capital for
investments, including the gap that arises between spending on labour power and means of
production and the time it takes to realise surplus value after sale. This enables higher
production levels than would otherwise be possible. During production, capital often lays idle.
Financial instruments can be used to work capital ‘productively’ at all times. At the end
production, credit can be provided as consumer credit to realise surpluses faster and shorten
turnover time ( link to 4.3.5 overconsumption). The provision of credit does not only
smoothen the production process but is also a potential source of disruption. Wherever credit
is granted, debt arises and vast lending can outweigh the capacity for repayments ( link to
4.4.2 crises).
4.3.7 Alienation
The tendencies discussed so far mainly explain drivers of environmental degradation.
Alienation, in contrast, emphasises the negative implications that a market society has on
people. It sheds light on what the systemic pressures to innovate, commodify, appropriate,
accelerate, overproduce and consume do to humans. What types of people does capitalism
produce? What social institutions are incentivised? What impact do they have on people’s
lives and behaviours? These questions matter because they help to understand why we – as
societies – find it so hard to move towards more socially just and environmentally sustainable
societies. Marx’s theory of alienation points towards reasons why capitalist societies are not
fertile breeding grounds for ‘agents of change’.
How are humans conceptualised in Marxian thought? The dialectical worldview – in which ‘the
truth is the whole’ – gives rise to a conception of human beings in realist terms: as feeling,
thinking and creative social creatures embedded in specific cultural, natural and historical
contexts. Living well from a Marxist perspective means to feel whole, i.e. to balance different
aspects of our lives that characterise us as social beings. Being alienated, in contrast, describes
how essential human characteristics become sidelined (Ollman, 1971). I found four different
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aspects of alienation in the Marxist literature: alienation from our own work; our produce;
other human beings, and nature (Ollman, 1971; Saito, 2017).
Let’s begin with the alienation of work. What does ‘normal’ work look like under capitalism?
The main activity of how people participate in society is wage-labour. Wage-labour means we
get paid for providing our capacity to work. Work becomes alienating when it prevents free
human development. Pursuing a typical 21st century job that requires to spend most of the
day in front of a computer screen is an alienating activity because it separates people from
other activities that help sustain their physical and mental health. It is no coincidence that
most office workers strive for physical exercise or social activities after work. The problem is
that the full complexity of individuals is not only not needed on markets but also disturbing
(Luhmann, 1994). This is why Marx problematized wage-labour as a dehumanising activity:
“In his work … [the worker] does not develop freely his physical and mental
energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind” (Marx 1844 cited by
Ollman, 1976, p. 136).
Wage-labour is problematized because work becomes a means to stay alive rather than life
being an opportunity to work (Ollman, 1971). Wage-labour also alienates people from their
products: people do not work to directly satisfy their needs but to earn money to make a living.
This matters because work for money shapes human beings differently than work for direct
social purpose. If you are lucky, you have a job that combines both, but for many people this
is not the case. How much time and energy do we spend on dull and meaningless tasks that
do not serve the common good or our own self-fulfilment? Why is a lot of meaningful work
amongst the least paid and socially rewarded? Why is the societal contribution of small-scale
farmers, carpenters, or musicians – professions tied to basic needs satisfaction and making
people’s lives more colourful, enjoyable and meaningful – not valued higher, or at least on par
with, say, the contribution of lawyers or bankers? Higher qualification and longer education is
a flimsy excuse.98 The point is that dedication, purpose, and quality are often only
systematically incentivised if they contribute to systemic drivers towards quantitative
expansion, productivity growth, and competitive advantage.99
98 This is what I was taught as part of my first economics education. Higher wages were explained as
rewards for longer education times and sacrificed income periods.
99 In the ‘knowledge industry’, to give one example, we produce 8000 word articles to make a living.
Whether our research supports oil extraction technologies or climate change mitigation does not matter
much from an individual career perspective. Academics are partially hired based on their capacity to
acquire grants, which essentially means that scholars need to earn money, before they are allowed to
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In addition, the advances of the productive forces in capitalism give rise to ways of living with
strong accents on privacy and individualisation. Relationships between people are often
mediated by things or, nowadays, technology. As such, the dominant way of working and living
to which capitalist production gives rise becomes asocial, alienating and socially destabilising
because it cuts off potential communicative bonds between people (Luhmann, 1994). On this
basis, Arnsperger calls capitalist growth-oriented development “an anthropological and
spiritual disaster” (Arnsperger, 2008, p. 5). He argues that the core functioning of capitalism
is based on existential anxiety and fear, which alienates people not only from other humans
or nature but crucially from ourselves.
Overall, Marx’s understanding of alienation can be understood as general alienation from
life.100 “The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces” (Marx 1884 cited
by Clarke, 1991, p. 64). The core problem is that the market shapes people’s behaviours,
rather than the other way round. The economy is not subordinated to the social order, it does
not primarily serve people’s need, but rather dominates and influences people’s lives. Gains
in productivity, output and profitability come at the cost of the mental, physical and emotional
wellbeing of workers (Harvey, 2015). The combination of technological changes and offshoring
has led to societies in which chronic overwork co-exists with many people being unemployed.
This is functional to the reproduction of the system and to sustain powerful elites, but it is
dysfunctional to society as a whole.
The question is whether ‘aliens’ are great agents of change. Probably not. The point is that
core capitalist institutions tend not to ‘produce’ strong emancipated personalities. They rather
offer the pre-conditions for inaction, indifference and general confusion. Being and feeling
‘whole’ is not encouraged in a world dominated by private property, capitalist competition
and profits because it would mean to go slower ( link to 4.3.6 acceleration), to encourage
people to develop a sense of ‘enough’ once basic human needs are met ( link to 4.3.1.
overproduction and 4.3.5 overconsumption), to be softer with ourselves and hence also with
our natural environments ( link to 4.3.3 appropriation), to live more real and meaningful
think. These practices undermine the purpose of universities as critical and independent voices of
society. This cannot be in the interest of society. This is not to complain (I love academia) but to explain
irrational systemic tendencies that are not conducive to transformational change.
100 Again, my intention is not to deny positive societal outcomes. I cannot emphasise often enough that
my purpose is not to provide a one-sided perspective. Concrete developments are always variegated.
However, there are general tendencies that help us understand why certain things are more likely to
happen than not.
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relations with people instead of machines ( link to 4.3.2 technological dynamism), and to
learn to let go of desires to own and possess ( link to 4.3.4 commodification). Striving for
fulfilled and meaningful lives under capitalism means to swim against the current. “It is not
easy being green”, Kermit the frog famously said. This is why many people who care also tend
to develop escape strategies, such as dropping out from mainstream society to live in
sustainability bubbles, become cynical, depressed, or pragmatic. These strategies are
understandable, but are they strong catalysts for radical social change? ( barrier to change)
4.3.8 Financialisation
Financialisation is often portrayed as a defining feature of contemporary capitalism,
associated with the rise of neoliberalism. The remarkable growth and instability of
international finance require mentioning at the end of this chapter, even if provisionally. Even
though financialisation is a global phenomenon, it stands out that it is especially prevalent in
mature capitalist economies, above all the US and the UK. Is this a coincidence, or does the
inherently expansive and fluid character of capital become ever more accentuated over time?
It is tempting to think that societies in which the social form M-C-M’ has prevailed for a
relatively long time give rise to financialisation as a new social dominant form. If so, what are
the societal – and environmental – consequences of purely monetary forms and relations?
This brief section aims to provide some initial reflections on how financialisation relates to the
circuit of capital and societal reproduction.
To begin with, what is financialisation? Generally speaking, it implies a shift of the economy in
the direction of finance and growth of monetary relations, simply represented as M-M’ forms.
More specifically and following Marxian monetary theory, financialisation can be defined as
the intensive and extensive accumulation of interest-bearing capital, i.e. money capital that is
traded as a commodity in anticipation of a return (interest) (Bayliss et al., 2017). In other
words, finance mushrooms in the 21st century, it becomes deep-rooted and expands into new
territories. Interest-bearing capital is a broad category, subsuming quite different things such
as interest from a bank account or revenues from derivatives trading. However, this definition
is specific enough to highlight that not all monetary advances M-M’ count as financialisation,
e.g. profits from retained earnings, but only such that transform future income streams into
tradeable assets. On this basis, how can we get a glimpse of how financialisation is connected
to M-C-M’? I see three broad interrelations.
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First, financialisation arises out of social reproduction. Without commodities and the
commodity-form, the proliferation of finance would not have been possible. The whole
architecture of value and capital described in the previous chapter and this one is a pre-
condition for the development of more complex economic relations in purely monetary terms.
As such, seemingly innocent cost-benefit-analyses to make nature’s value visible are
increasingly shown to have disastrous consequences. Commodification has
“greatly facilitated financialisation by creating more opportunities for the
securitisation of revenue streams and capture of monetary rewards by
finance” (Bayliss et al., 2017, p. 5).
Without the creation of carbon markets, for instance, speculation upon these revenue streams
would not be possible. What starts as well-meant intentions, becomes a harsh reality that
fosters the accelerated destruction of the environment. This is not a solution, but part of the
problem.
Moreover, without the increasing engagement of the main actors in the circuit of capital in
finance, financialisation would not have been possible (Lapavitsas, 2011): non-financial
businesses increasingly operating on financial markets on their own account, to finance
investments or comply with shareholder’s profit interests; partly as a consequence, private
banks seeking financial profits, instead of earning from traditional borrowing and lending; and
individuals and households willingly and unwillingly engaging in finance too, via mortgages,
credit cards, or private pension schemes, etc. Although historically and institutionally
variegated, these tendencies have emerged in a political context of financial liberalisation and
labour-market deregulation, which highlights the active role of States in the structural shift
towards financialisation (Lapavitsas, 2013).
Second, financialisation depends on social reproduction. Financial profits are profits upon
alienation ( link to 2.4 profit) that arise from the appropriation of revenue streams. These
profits require a material basis, which links them to actual physical production. Clearly, most
financial transactions do not involve any physical exchanges; and many are very dissociated
from real production (such as derivatives). However, finance can only have an autonomous
life on its own to a certain extent. Ultimately, financial operations are based on promises to
pay (or sell), i.e. claims on future wealth (Durand, 2017). These claims are rooted in something
physical, either houses or harvests or originally pigs or flowers or whatever else speculation is
based upon. Even seemingly ‘unphysical’ operations, such as speculating on stock market
indices, need a physical basis. Indices are underpinned by actual activities of listed
144
corporations – which are the most environmentally destructive industries. What do DAX or
Dow Jones listed corporations do? They engage in fossil extraction and use (aviation, car
industries); mass production of IT, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, industrial food production; and
– finance (banks, insurances, credit card companies). To me, this reveals a direct link between
financialisation and the large-scale destruction of life-support-services of our planet.
Third, and most importantly, financialisation shapes and restructures social reproduction. The
large-scale presence and power of finance shape what people do and think. Practices to make-
money-out-of-money become normalised and legitimised and encroach into people’s
everyday lives. If this is not an alienating trend, then I do not know what is ( link to 4.3.7
alienation). Crucially, financialisation tendencies imply a restructuring of the provision of basic
needs satisfaction, away from an ethos of public provision of housing, water, education or
health, towards private provision. This goes along with an increased individual responsibility,
to care for your own pension or pay for decent health care yourself, and associated hardship
and penalising that may arise from an inability to do so (Bayliss et al., 2017). Consumption
patterns are shown to transform too, for instance, desires for mortgage-facilitated owner-
occupation of housing (Robertson, 2017)( link to 4.3.5 overconsumption). The emergence of
financialisation leaves remarkable traces across societal reproduction. Tendencies that foster
the private and individual are diametrically opposed to creating a stronger collective spirit and
social institutions to act on global environmental challenges ( barrier to change).
Essentially, these three entanglements – financialisation arising out of, depending on and
restructuring M-C-M’ – reflect the very starting point of our investigation in the previous
chapter, i.e. the relationship between use value and exchange value. Exchange value emerged
as the dominant social form in capitalist societies; it has arisen out of, depends on and
restructures use values, as elaborated from different vantage points in this chapter. Exchange
value as a social form has developed into money M – a thing with an own existence and mirror
image of commodities as use values C. In the same way, we could ask the question whether
financialisation is a possible next stage in the development of capitalism, in which social M-M’
forms confront the entire social reproduction of societies M-C-M’. This is not a claim, but a
question that could be further explored. Is financialisation a new (or recurring?) expression of
how capital confronts life in the 21st century?
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4.4 Systemic outcomes
The outcomes of a system emerge from underlying system structure (Meadows, 2009).
Section 4.2 presents M-C-M’ as the simplest systemic structure of the system as a whole.
Section 4.3 highlights how this structure gives rise to a more complex, tangled web of
dominant tendencies. On this basis, it is possible to explain key macroeconomic outcomes:
growth and crises.
4.4.1 Growth
Growth is the normal outcome from the movements of capital through the system. Capitalist
economies expand as part of their normal reproduction. How is this expansion explained?
What accumulates, when capital accumulates? I explained above how the M-C-M’ movement
explains how surplus is created in capitalist (re)production. Surplus means disposable
resources that exceed what is required for ‘simple’ reproduction, i.e. to maintain the same
level of production and consumption or, what ecological economists would call a ‘steady-state
economy’ or ‘circular economy’.
Surplus means that more is produced than is required for the maintenance of life. In
biophysical terms, surplus takes the form of surplus products, i.e. additional amounts of ‘stuff’.
In monetary terms, surplus takes the form of surplus value that can be realised as profits, if
commodities are sold. This means the ongoing transformation of nature into commodities is
accompanied by additional money creation. But the directionality runs in the opposite
direction: the necessity and desire to create monetary incomes requires the transformation
of nature on an expanded scale. The key determining aspect in the circuit is the production of
surplus value (Fine, 2012, p. 111). The main driver of growth is profitability. Marx, Smith,
Ricardo, Keynes and other great economists agree on this point (Shaikh, 2016).
“How can the capitalist system, whose institutions, regulations, and
political structures have changed so significantly over the course of its
evolution, nonetheless exhibit recurrent economic patterns? The answer
lies in the fact that these particular patterns are rooted in the profit motive
which remains the central regulator of the system throughout its evolution.
Capitalisms’ heath mutates constantly but its core remains the same”
(Shaikh, 2016, p. 726).
“The spark is ignited in production – more is produced than is required for
the maintenance of life; the natural elasticity of human needs allows
146
demand to rise to the level of supply and, once in motion, to exceed it; the
increase in the means of subsistence also enables the population to growth,
sending up the level of both production and the amount of goods needed
to maintain life. A surplus is created only to create conditions that require
a greater surplus. The former makes the division of labor possible just as
the latter makes it necessary, and, caught in this vise, every success of the
division of labor leads to its extension” (Ollman, 1971, p. 159).
What can surpluses be used for? There are two options: it can be consumed or reinvested,
either by adding it to an existing circuit or using it for a new one (Fine, 2012). Surplus can also
be hoarded, which is a mere delay of either consumption or investment. The more surplus is
available, the higher the potential for accumulation. Growth is therefore primarily driven by
the rate of profit.
“The higher the profit rate, the greater is the incentive for firms to
accelerate the expansion of output and capacity” (Shaikh, 2016, p. 106).
The profit rate is crucial for accumulation because profit expectations stimulate investments.
Whether investments were successful is measured by profit (Shaikh, 2016). As the rate of
profit roots in surplus value, which roots in surplus labour, it is the exploitation of labour and
via it the exploitation of energy and resources that gives rise to the ‘added value’ of the system
as a whole.
In other words, growth in capitalist economies is ultimately driven by the exploitation of labour
and the appropriation of nature. This sounds quite pessimistic, especially because growth and
productivity advances have also gone hand in hand with improved living standards for millions
of people. My point is not to deny the positive outcomes of capitalist dynamics but to
emphasise the need to understand root causes of environmental crises. From a Marxist
perspective, which I find convincing, a root cause of ecological overshoot is the systemic need
to create surplus value. How could it be otherwise? Growth, by the virtue of its nature,
describes an increase. If something grows or accumulates, an amount increases. The two
ultimate factors of production are labour and nature. The accumulation of both gives rise to
growth and environmental impacts. By working more, as a world society, ever more nature is
transformed into commodities.
The transformation of nature can happen more efficiently, but for the reasons stated above
productivity gains, as a general tendency of the system as a whole, do not translate into
working less and using less resources, but into working more and using more. The perverse
sociality of capitalism traps people in a rat-race of more work and more resource use to
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stabilise the reproduction of the system, even in countries that have accumulated substantial
amounts of wealth. This rat-race increasingly destroys living conditions on Earth.
Ultimately, I argue that Marxian Political Economy offers one of the best growth theories we
have. Growth is the outcome of intertwined physical and monetary flows through the system.
The trilogy of Capital consists of little else. Growth is not unidirectional but emerges out of
complex and contradictory processes associated with the accumulation of capital (Fine 2012).
It arises out of the division of labour (in and between companies, industries and nations),
technological progress, productivity increases, sufficient effective demand, strategies to gain
access to and appropriate resources, the role of States in providing legal framework conditions
for the reproduction of the system, such as enabling the enforcement of private property
rights and negotiating trade legislation, the role of R&D in fostering innovations, and the
provision of credit and finance, all of which are fuelled by profit and competition. Taken by
themselves, these elements seem rather innocent, even the more dubious ones such as the
profit-motive and competition, but taken together they form the dynamics of overshoot.
Clearly, this is not good news. At least the Marxist approach offers a realistic and
comprehensive understanding of the status quo – in contrast to mainstream growth theories,
which explain growth at the level of technological progress, without problematizing deeper-
seated social relations. ‘Old’ exogenous growth theories that arose in the 1940s (Harrod-
Domar and Solow-Swan type models) aimed to measure the contributions of labour, capital
and exogenous (i.e. residual, unexplained, untheorized!) technological progress to growth
(Fine and Dimakou, 2016). ‘New’ endogenous growth theories of the 1980s (Romer-Lucas-
type models) aim to provide better explanations of productivity growth, however, they
resemble exogenous growth theory in problematic respects (Fine, 2000; Fine and Dimakou,
2016). Both are built upon micro foundations but aim to address systemic macro dynamics;
both rely on methodological individualism in which representative agents optimise utility,
thereby neglecting the fundamental role of social processes and institutions; both rely on
static equilibrium frameworks.
In my understanding, the consequence is that a comprehensive and systemic ‘bigger picture’
explanation of growth is missing from mainstream growth theories, and crucially, one that fails
to highlight the specific social configurations in which growth occurs – which is what needs to
change from an ecological economics perspective. In addition, technological innovation and
productivity growth are typically portrayed in a positive light by boosting competitiveness,
employment creation and sufficient tax incomes to finance social welfare systems. The
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uncritical stance towards growth, even in the heterodox schools of thought, has been a core
issue of discontent with ecological economists (Holt et al., 2009; Kronenberg, 2010; Martinez-
Alier and Muradian, 2015a).
Mainstream growth theory is subject to fundamental theoretical inconsistencies too. Growth
signifies increases in absolute quantities. How can absolute quantities be sensibly theorised
from marginal utility foundations? The short answer is: they cannot. Marginal utility theory
explains prices on the basis of marginal utility, rather than total utility. It is a purely relative
price theory (Brown and Spencer, 2012). For some economic categories this makes sense.
Prices only have meaning in relation to other prices (Elson, 1979). However, some economic
categories, such as growth or profits, express changes in absolute quantities. Understanding
growth implies to understand changes in total income and output, i.e. non-marginal changes.
Marginal utility theory fails to provide sensible explanations of such changes. It suffers from
an ‘aggregation problem’ because it lacks real quantities that can make sense of
macroeconomic aggregates and allow quantitative comparisons over time. Ultimately, this
means the neoclassical approach based on marginal utility theory cannot consistently explain
system-wide quantitative changes, i.e. economic growth.
The profound failings of marginal utility theory are well documented in the history of economic
thought. The Cambridge Capital controversies, for instance, established the impossibility to
sensibly measure capital and on this basis erect consistent growth theory, starting from
marginal foundations (Harcourt, 1969). However, instead of seriously rethinking the
foundations of mainstream economics as a consequence of devastating critiques, ‘toy models’
are deployed that model the economy as if it consisted of only one sector (Brown and Spencer,
2012; Fine, 2000). This approach circumvents and hides fundamental problems instead of
seriously aiming to solve them.
I think Marxian value theory provides a sensible alternative. By acknowledging the distinct but
interrelated nature of use value and exchange value categories, the Marxian approach keeps
real biophysical categories at the heart of understanding economic dynamics. On this basis, it
is possible to consistently theorise growth as the exploitation of labour and appropriation of
nature. However, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, Marxian value theory and its
ramifications for understanding real-world dynamics of the system as a whole remain
surprisingly little understood.
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4.4.2 Crises
Capital needs to move, otherwise it ceases to exist, as explained in section 4.2.2. Crises are
typically understood as periodical interruptions in the flow of capital accumulation. Depending
on where disturbances happen in the M-C-M’ movement, different crises occur (Harvey,
2010a). In the sphere of production (M-C), lack of sufficient credit provision, for instance, can
lead to profit squeeze crises. In the sphere of exchange (C’-M’), lack of effective demand
results in crises of underconsumption. Any individual crisis has specific triggers, which arise
from the concrete characteristics of capital accumulation at a certain point in time and place,
and need to be studied as such. At the same time, crises are not accidental, exceptional and
subject to always varying causes. Rather, capitalist production is structurally inclined to crisis
formation.
This is because of the tendency to overproduction. From a Marxist perspective, the origins of
the crisis-riddled nature of the capitalist system are to be found in overproduction, i.e. a
mismatch between production and effective demand, i.e. more commodities are produced
that can be sold at a price that enables the realisation of surplus value embodied in those
commodities (Clarke, 2012). Why is more produced than gets consumed? Because production
is not mainly driven by consumption, but by the appropriation of surplus value. And from a
systemic point of view, the reason why companies strive for profit is capitalist competition.
Overproduction is hence rooted in competitive struggles that force companies to expand
markets and cut costs. The main way this is done is by advancing technology. Producing as
much as possible cheaply drives competitors out of the market, supply runs ahead of demand,
and the result is systemic imbalances, which can be further exacerbated by the expansion of
credit (Clarke, 2012). Eventually, bubbles burst and devaluations take place. Devaluations
eliminate overproduction and pave the way for new rounds of capital accumulation.
Devaluations involve severe social hardship and struggle over who has to bear their costs.
Capitalist crises, therefore, bear severe social conflict potential, especially if they persist for
longer periods, such as high rates of unemployment or falling real wages. Stabilising forces
become essential. The State is the central re-stabilisation institution. States manage messes.
They do not create growth or crisis – financial bubbles or climate change – but try to alleviate
their socially disruptive outcomes (Meadows, 2009). The way this is done is by trying to re-
establish the conditions for the reproduction of capital and offering support to those who
suffer most from immediate consequences of the malfunctioning of the system. However, this
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strategy no longer works in the face of multiple global environmental crises, because capital
reproduces by degrading the environment.
The number one message from ecological economists is that growth leads to environmental
destruction. The Marxist perspective explains why. Section 4.3 explains how the systemic
pressures to overproduce, innovate, appropriate, commodify, overconsume, accelerate,
alienate, concentrate and financialise give rise to increasing energy and resource use. The total
amount of energy and materials used counts as a proxy for environmental impact (Schandl et
al., 2017). Eco-Marxists have a strong legacy of demonstrating how these dynamics unfold in
practice (Clark and Foster, 2009; Foster et al., 2010; Foster and Burkett, 2016; Malm, 2016;
Moore, 2015).
Eco-Marxists emphasise the need to distinguish between two types of environmental crises:
traditional economic crises, in which environmental constraints impinge on further capital
accumulation, for instance if cheap fossil fuels cease to exist. These crises have the potential
to lead to rising costs of production and a subsequent fall in profitability. They can be
temporarily ‘solved’ by capitalist restructuring, that is, capital manages to shift around
ecological problems to pave the way for new rounds of accumulation. Such crises remain
within the capitalist mode of production and often intensify the social metabolism by creating
new ecological problems, e.g. by shifting from traditional fossil extraction to fracking. But
shifting problems does not resolve fundamental contradictions underpinning capitalist
production. Rather, more fundamental crises of human development emerge (Burkett, 2009).
They indicate that the metabolic rift between capital and nature becomes progressively wider
and deeper over time (Moore, 2000). The issue at stake is not just economic cries but life itself
as Earth Systems are increasingly disrupted. Such epochal crisis would and could only be
resolved by a “fundamentally new historical configuration of wealth, power, and nature”
(Moore, 2015, p. 125).
Some authors believe that regulatory mechanisms exist that prevent such ultimate crisis to
happen (e.g. O’Connor, 1988); which ultimately lead to a view that capitalism could be fixed;
others stress the problem that capital continues thriving and reproducing on the basis of a
degraded environment (e.g. Foster and Burkett, 2016). This means there is no real feedback
mechanism, as often supposed, from rising ecological cost to economic crisis but the perverse
logic of the system leads to new industries and markets that make money with the destruction
of nature (such as waste management and carbon trading). This privatisation of formerly
commons only accelerates further destruction (Foster et al., 2010). The conclusion here is that
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nothing less than a revolution is necessary for effectively tackling global ecological crises. For
summaries and more insights into the eco-Marxist crisis literature I refer the interested reader
to, for instance, Economakis and Papalexiou (2016), Foster and Burkett (2016), Moore (2011)
or http://climateandcapitalism.com.
Accelerating and intensifying global environmental crises put the State as a central stabilising
institution in an increasingly schizophrenic position. Social stability under capitalism requires
to support the reproduction of a system, whose destructive forces become ever more visible.
‘Normal’ crises of capitalist development and reproduction tend to intensify in the presence
of financialisation. Additionally, they increasingly overlap with epochal crises, which cannot be
resolved through renewed capital accumulation (Moore, 2011). This gives rise to the notion
that we live in an era of multiple crises, in which ecological, economic, financial and social
crises intersect. The contradictions between supporting life and supporting capital widen.
Relying on traditional strategies to enable the reproduction of the system become increasingly
untenable.
However, until now, States often continue to defend, support and promote capitalism as best
of all possible worlds by highlighting the positive effects of the trickle-down-system and
underexposing increasingly negative ones. To be fair, the State is not a monolithic organisation
but consists of different institutions with opposing and contradicting internal forces. Different
ministries and agencies have different mandates and missions, however, the distribution of
power within States clearly tends towards supporting the status quo, even in the more
progressive Western welfare states. Ask yourself: how powerful is the environment ministry
in comparison to, say, the Treasury? Whose interests do these institutions represent?
“If a government proclaims its interest in protecting the environment but
allocates little money or effort toward that goal, environmental protection
is not, in fact, the government’s purpose” (Meadows, 2009, p. 14).
This is not to suggest that States do not have a major role to play in fighting social ecological
crises. They certainly have. However, we need to face scary, absurd and lethal realities, instead
of hiding behind technological solutions which are not in place. Marxian Political Economy
offers a realistic comprehensible approach that explains the emergence of planetary crises.
How are crises of the system as a whole explained in mainstream theory? Not well. Why?
Starting from marginal utility foundations, neoclassical economics envisions the economy as a
system that maximises pleasure and minimises pain, with supply/production/marginal costs
on one side and demand/consumption/marginal utility on the other. This idea gives rise to a
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conception of the economy as a cost-benefit system. The market is portrayed as the central
coordinating mechanism that efficiently balances opposing forces and interests towards
socially optimal outcomes. Mainstream theory thereby neglects inherent conflict potentials,
crises and power imbalances. Crises are essentially exogenous shocks that disturb an
otherwise self-equilibrating system. The word ‘externalities’ as something stemming from
outside captures the idea well. Marx contested this worldview already 150 years ago by
showing how capitalist crises are recurrent endogenous features of a system structurally
geared towards uneven development and inequalities.
4.5 Conclusions
The contribution of this chapter to ecological economics is four-fold. First, I identified and
detailed in chapters 1 and 2 that ecological economics lacks a theory of the system as a whole
that explains social ecological dynamics and crises. This chapter addresses this gap, building
on the value theoretical foundations of chapter 3. It introduces the general circuit of capital
M-C-M’ as a simple, intuitive and powerful framework that explains how global environmental
problems and crises emerge and why they persist. The circuit of capital is the Marxian
theoretical backbone of the system as a whole that explains long-run dynamics, irrespective
of accumulation regimes and countries. It gives rise to tendencies that fuel environmental
overuse: overproduction, technological dynamism, appropriation, commodification,
overconsumption, acceleration, alienation, and financialisation. These tendencies, in turn,
result in macroeconomic outcomes: growth and crises formation.
What does the circuit of capital explain? In a nutshell, it explains how the production of
commodities spurs surplus value creation, in Western economies predominantly by the
increasing use of energy and resources driven by technological advance spurred by capitalist
competition; how sufficient effective demand is required and created to meet the level of
production; how crises emerge if this matching does not function; how international relations
– peacefully via trade and non-peacefully via violent appropriation – enable access to the
increased demand for energy/resources and also labour; how credit provision balances
different time frictions throughout the circuit; how financialisation fuels short-termism and
systemic instabilities; how a tight network of transport and communications networks allows
for the physical flows of people, information, energy and resources; how the State provides
the legal architecture for the reproduction of the system and ensures more or less
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redistribution of its surpluses. Taken together, these relations explain the expansion and
acceleration of capitalism around the globe.
How does this understanding help ecological economists? How does attention to value
analysis make a difference in the way that this problem is seen? In essence, the Marxian
understanding of ‘capital’ explains systemic reasons for the ‘growing economic subsystem’
that lies at the centre of ecological economists’ concerns (see Fig 1. page 3). It shows how and
why capital is the core problem – rather than growth – because it is what gives rise to an
expansive capitalist system, which fuels energy and resource overuse as proxies for
environmental destruction, as detailed by various tendencies in this chapter. Capital, in turn,
can only be understood on the basis of value theory (chapter 3), with an understanding of the
crucial role of labour exploitation at its heart, which is not overemphasised in Marxian Political
Economy but underemphasised in ecological economics.
Second, and following from the first contribution, this chapter specifies the systemic challenge
ecological economists aspire to address. When ecological economists speak about the need
for social ecological transformation and systemic change, what does this mean? From a
Marxist perspective, the systemic challenge is to confront M-C-M’ as dominant social structure
of the system as a whole. M-C-M’ is the simplest characterisation of the capitalist system. It
highlights that capitalism is primarily a mode of production for profit, not need. The drive and
structural necessity to extract surplus value – based on the exploitation of people and the
natural environment – highlights the inherently expansive character of the system.
Environmental problems emerge as undesirable by-products of system-inherent structural
dynamics. No one deliberately creates environmental problems but they emerge anyway. A
comprehensive understanding of capital remains however widely missing in ecological
economics, as described in section 4.2.2. Part of this neglect can be explained, I think, by the
still strong prevalence of neoclassical economics within ecological economics. I identify
neoclassical economics as a barrier to change in this chapter, because it hides from essential
issues and deep explanations of ecological destruction. Many ecological economists share this
view. However, this chapter shows that the traces to neoclassical economics sit deeper in
ecological economics than often assumed, which influences what gets studied and addressed
in ecological economics, and what not.
In terms of policies, this means Marxian value analysis brings more clarity what types of
interventions are urgently needed: those that have a potential to transcend the dominant M-
C-M’ structure. Demonstrating that the logic of capital is diametrically opposed to steady-state
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or circular economy or living well within limits ambitions advocated in ecological economics
has practical implications for research, outreach and action. It does not mean that these
ambitions are impossible to reach; however, it implies what is required for coming closer to
achieving them is a full confrontation with capitalism, with a recognition of the need for social
struggles at its core. Acting in accordance with the ‘good of the whole’ means to transcend
capital, rather than feed it. Research can be harmful, when it feeds, rather than transcends,
and we should be aware of it.
Third, the circuit of capital can serve as a tool for integrating knowledge in ecological
economics. The dominant tendencies of capitalist reproduction that I describe in section 4.3
are not new to ecological economists. However, they have been dealt with rather separately.
Ecological economics has a lot of essential pillars in place to understand the political economy
of nature, but it has not brought them together to form a substantive, comprehensive and
consistent theory of the economy as a whole. The circuit of capital provides this framework
and helps to bring ‘order to chaos’ in terms of identifying different drivers of environmental
destruction at different levels of social ecological reality. As a realistic representation of the
system that explains social ecological shifts, it has the capacity to bring a lot of empirical and
theoretical work in ecological economics systematically together. This framework also points
to some limitations in ecological economics. The strong emphasis on economic growth and
the biophysical underpinnings of growth comes at the expense of prominently addressing
underlying economic and social drivers of ecological destruction. The capitalist core – the
trinity of capital, profit and competitiveness – remains surprisingly implicit in ecological
economics, which I identify as a serious omission, because it prevents the upfront
confrontation of capitalist institutions that prevent, instead of encourage, sustainability
transitions.
Fourth, by drawing parallels to systems thinking, I show that Marx’s understanding of
capitalism is consistent with the scope, approach and ambitions of ecological economics. The
Marxian realist and systemic approach enables an understanding of the interrelations
between monetary and biophysical dynamics, rather than viewing them separately (this was
one major point of critique in the steady-state economic approach in chapter 2). On this basis,
the explanatory power of the Marxian approach can hardly be underestimated. The circuit of
capital encompasses the whole life cycle – spanning production, consumption, and waste
streams – and hence traces the reproduction of the system as the flow of use values and
exchange values through the system. This explains growth, profit and accumulation dynamics
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and their entanglement with destructive environmental feedbacks. This understanding is
tightly intertwined with an understanding of power and vested interests and the role of key
capitalist institutions, such as markets, credit provision, finance or the State which illuminates
implementation barriers and limits of policy-making.
Ultimately, this chapter aims to establish the credibility of the Marxian approach by
demonstrating its explanatory power. By starting from M-C-M’ as the dominant social
structure driving capitalist reproduction, various implications for society can be shown. This is
not rocket science. It also does not require a set of highly abstract assumptions, as in
neoclassical economics, to ‘prove’ the efficiency of markets. On the contrary, by adopting a
realist Marxian perspective of capitalist markets, it can be shown how harmful they are. Facing
reality in this way is a precondition for a more honest debate about what interventions are
needed to deliver sustainability transitions. Transparency is power, as Arild Vatn, one of my
teachers, remarks and the comprehensive and realistic Marxian approach is good at
uncovering what is important and what often remains hidden from neoclassical analysis.
How, then, can ecological economists take this analysis on board? The framework of 8-fold
tendencies underpinned by the capitalist core and the value categories established in the
previous chapter can be applied to specific sustainability problems, at local, regional or global
levels. The task is to follow flows of value throughout the whole system. This is how biophysical
analysis, where ecological economists are strong, can be combined with Marxian value theory.
The Marxian approach provides the framework for understanding how value streams that
appear in biophysical, monetary and other social forms travel together through the system.
Use value and exchange value flows can be traced, for example, to understand waste or
emission flows throughout production and consumption systems (e.g. Horton, 1997). I do not
provide any specific empirical analysis here, because it would require another PhD to trace
the specific cultural, monetary, historical and other context-specific circumstances that a good
political economy analysis of a specific problem requires. What I contribute are core
theoretical building blocks to understand why such problems arise, evolve and persist. As such,
I provide a theoretical bridge to many applied eco-Marxist political economy analyses that
operate on these foundations, without usually making them explicit (e.g. Mattioli et al.,
forthcoming; Bayliss et al., 2015). More such analyses are needed in ecological economics
because this is what it takes to put into practice what has long been claimed necessary for
ecological economics: to develop the field further as radical political economy of nature.
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Ecological economics can play a powerful role in the societal uptake of progressive policies
and actions towards sustainability. However, it has neglected the central role of capital, profits
and competitiveness and a comprehensive understanding of the interrelated movements of
biophysical and monetary flows through the system. This chapter is an invitation for ecological
economists to re-consider research in light of an understanding of the capitalist core; to think
through bundles of proposals to confront the interconnected nature of social ecological
problems; and to let go of inherited pre-conceptions against the Marxian approach.
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5 Conclusions
5.1 Synthesis of results
Ecological economists accentuate ‘the system’ and ‘social ecological transformation’; Marxists
‘capitalism’ and ‘revolution’; both mean essentially the same. Both traditions share a
commitment to systemic thinking, realism, and ambitious changes, yet they have lived rather
separate lives. I argued in chapter 1 that the core of Marxian Political Economy is what is
missing in ecological economics: understanding and explaining the dynamics of the system as
a whole in a realistic and coherent way. I introduced this core in chapters 3 and 4, thereby
showing how an understanding of value and capital allows comprehending the capitalist
system and on this basis social ecological dynamics and barriers to social change.
In this section, I synthesise three key results of this thesis. First, I find that traces of neoclassical
economic theory and reasoning sit deeper in ecological economics than often assumed
(section 5.1.1). Second, I present the Marxian understanding of value and capital as the
missing core of ecological economics: a realistic understanding of the capitalist system, spelled
out from the basics in simple and abstract terms (section 5.1.2). Third, I highlight the
importance and political content of economic methodology. I argue that both the substantive
failings of neoclassical economics and the explanatory power of the Marxian approach can be
traced back to methodological differences (section 5.1.3). The first finding establishes a
critique of ecological economics from a heterodox and particularly Marxian perspective; the
latter two provide the contours of a Marxian alternative, with vast scope for future
applications and concrete developments.
“The future can’t be predicted, but it can be envisioned and brought
lovingly into being. Systems can’t be controlled, but they can be
designed and redesigned” (Meadows, 2002, p. 1).
“Keep fighting” (Chick, 2018).
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5.1.1 Neoclassical economic thought is more prevalent in ecological economics than
often assumed
Contrary to widespread views that ecological economics is the heterodox school of thought of
the environment, I conclude that the roots of neoclassical economics sit deeper than often
assumed. This insight arises throughout chapters 2-4. I expose how ecological economics
implicitly remains tied to neoclassical theory and reasoning in all three resulting chapters, and
detail in each instance why this is problematic.
In chapter 2, I argue that steady-state economics implicitly relies on a neoclassical
understanding of the economic process.101 By accepting allocative efficiency of markets, the
core of neoclassical economics is incorporated into the steady-state framework. This leaves
steady-state economics in an ambiguous position: Daly vigorously criticises neoclassical
economics on various grounds, but also unconsciously – or strategically – adopts several of its
features. My main point of critique is that steady-state economics fails to provide a realistic
101 I have been accused of grossly misinterpreting and misrepresenting steady-state economics and its
relation to neoclassical economics in a response that was published as a result of my critique. “The
characterisation of the SSE in Pirgmaier’s paper is neither deep nor correct” (Farley and Washington,
2018, p. 447). The authors mostly agree with my critique of neoclassical economics but then distance
steady-state economics from neoclassical foundations. However, I find that Farley and Washington
portray and defend Daly’s approach exactly along the same lines that I criticised. They insist that Daly’s
understanding of allocative efficiency is biophysical, rather than neoclassical, but then argue that
carefully constrained markets can be Pareto efficient (p. 445). “We do believe that once we have
achieved ecological sustainability and just distribution, markets can help us achieve efficient allocation”
(p. 446); they highlight that scale and distribution must be “imposed from outside the market” (p. 445);
they emphasise economic growth as the source of crisis, but without explaining how it arises; and argue
that “markets… already exist, are widely accepted, and should be used until something better emerges”
(p. 446), thereby providing an undifferentiated view of markets. Farley and Washington also adopt Daly’s
pragmatism about the role of theory, which I identify as dangerous. Whilst acknowledging that theory
is important, the authors think that “all economic systems, capitalist, socialist or other, have disrupted
global ecosystems” (p. 447) and that “there is shockingly little evidence that the theories from any
economic schools truly explain our evolving system” (p. 447). “Our biggest challenge right now is not to
exactly define how the system works, but rather to convince people that major changes are required in
the immediate future” (p. 448). As “the problem is much deeper than capitalism” (p. 447) we “should
perhaps focus on human behaviour and evolutionary psychology, rather than more nuanced economic
theories” (p. 447). After all, “all scientists must accept that few assumptions underpinning any science
are perfectly realistic” (p. 445). Whilst I certainly agree with the urgency to address global ecological
crises, I see our role as academics to provide sharp analysis of deep systemic problems as the basis for
radical policies. This demands better economics – which exists; we do not have to reinvent the wheel
but learn from heterodox traditions, rather than giving up on economics, nuance, history and
complexity. All theories are abstractions from reality; however, there are very different ways to theorise
and formulate assumptions. Neoclassical economics makes assumptions irrespective of its relation to
reality, which ultimately can be shown to lead to policies that support the status quo, instead of
challenging it. This cannot be in our interest. We cannot allow ourselves to compromise on realistic,
ambitious, and systemic analysis.
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economic theory that explains ecological impacts and social crises, with the practical
consequence that it limits and partly misguides the proposed solution space. It lists normative
goals of sustainable scale and just distribution, and policies and institutions to achieve those
goals, but it does not explain how growth dynamics emerge and why steady-state proposals
face extreme implementation barriers. As a consequence, steady-state proposals reflect a
widely uncritical reliance on core capitalist institutions such as nation states to deliver
‘rational’ sustainability policies. They also adopt an undifferentiated view of markets as part
of the solution, in problematic areas such as tradeable birth certificates to cap population
growth.102
In chapter 3 I show how ecological economists mimic the neoclassical conception of the
economic system as a whole. Value theory is hardly debated in ecological economics, but what
ecological economists do – in practice and as a collective, as illustrated by five different camps
within ecological economics – is to study the ‘real real’ economy. Ecological economists
thereby implicitly adopt a neoclassical economic conception of a ‘real’ economy, rather than
understanding and confronting capitalism as monetary market economy, which would imply
to emphasise the social and monetary drivers underpinning matter-energy use. Marx’s core
critique of Classical Political Economy was that it constituted a wrong conception of the
economic system as a whole. Does the same critique hold for ecological economics today? By
characterising the economic process as a transformation of matter-energy into goods and
services, even some of the most progressive thinkers in ecological economics fall back into a
C-M-C conception of the economic process:
“The economy is a complex process that converts raw materials (and
energy) into useful goods and final services” (Kallis, 2017, p. 2).
This sounds intuitive, but for understanding the general working of the system as a whole it is
misleading. Capitalist production is driven by the exchange of money quantities, not (physical)
commodities, and the reproduction of money quantities on an extended scale. Commodities
and underpinning matter-energy stocks and flows enable this process, rather than motivate
it. Ecological economists might argue this is obvious, but I argue it is highly problematic that
basic economic foundations of capitalism are not made crystal clear and explicit in ecological
102 I would not have dared to suggest transferable birth licences as an indicative example of Daly’s
approach, as this proposal mainly dates back to his early steady-state writings in the 1970s and ‘80s.
However, I was shocked to see it as part of the possible options proposed in Farley’s and Washington’s
(2018) recent attempt to defend steady-state economics.
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economics (best at the beginning of ecological economics textbooks). Realistic and
transparent economic foundations are essential to support the development of
transformative proposals and strategies to tackle devastating ecological destruction more
effectively.
Next, in chapter 4 (especially section 4.2), I highlight how ecological economists widely neglect
deeper seated social drivers of environmental destruction such as profits, capitalist
competition and an understanding of capital as a historically specific social form of economic
organisation – in much the same way as these drivers are neglected in neoclassical economics.
Ecological economists attack economic growth – prominently and vigorously – as key problem
underpinning ecological destructions of all kinds. The real fuel of economic growth is
considered to be coal, oil, gas and natural resources, as well as technological advance. By
framing the problem predominantly in biophysical terms, ecological economists remain fairly
close to a neoclassical mechanistic understanding of capital and the economic growth process.
This establishes an understanding of what is happening, but not why. As Ilyenkov remarks: a
“superficially materialist-mechanistic explanation [is] only a ‘bit’ of an explanation”, leaving in
the dark the bulk of it (Ilyenkov, 1977, p. 11). What destroys life on Earth is not natural, but
social. Energy, resources and technology become meaning as social categories. I conclude that
ecological economists overemphasise growth – both economic and biophysical – at the
expense of underpinning social drivers of ecological destruction, most generally the systemic
extraction of surplus value.
The general conclusion from chapters 2, 3 and 4 is that – despite a general scepticism and
repudiation of neoclassical economics within ecological economics – it exerts a strong
influence in crucial respects. This holds for the progressive camps within ecological economics
too, for instance, in statements such as
“the study of the market (the chrematistics) should come after the study of
ecology and social institutions … the market economy could not exist
without social institutions, and without the unpaid services of ecosystems”
(Martinez-Alier and Muradian, 2015b, p. 2).
Whilst it is clear that humans cannot exist without functioning ecosystems, Martinez-Alier’s
and Muradian’s framing is problematic because it guides research away from a realistic study
and full confrontation of capitalism – as a major driver behind global ecological challenges.
Important questions and issues are left unanswered because they often remain unasked in
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ecological economics. For instance, financialisation is hardly studied at all in ecological
economics.103
I find that some of the most progressive thinkers in ecological economics, who aim to
radicalise and redirect ecological economics along heterodox lines, often do not go far enough
in directing research to key issues at stake. Spash’s seminal contribution New foundations for
ecological economics is one example. Spash critiques orthodox economics for failing to
address reality and suggests seeing
“the future of ecological economics firmly amongst heterodox economic
schools of thought and in ideological opposition to those supporting the
existing institutional structures perpetuating a false reality of the world’s
social, environmental and economic systems and their operation” (Spash,
2012, p. 36).
However, in what follows, Spash does not mention profits, competition, surplus,
financialisation, or money – at all. ‘The economy’ is mentioned only once, in the typical
ecological economics representation of the economic process as “the economy is embedded
in the Natural environmental and subject to the Laws of Thermodynamics” (Spash, 2012, p.
43). Economics, on the other hand, is mentioned 231 times in this article, mainly to criticise
the mainstream. My point is that almost all ecological economists critique neoclassical
economics from a sustainability perspective, the problem is that we – as ecological economists
– often unconsciously keep thinking in mainstream economics terms, which influences what
gets studied and what not. Letting go of neoclassical economic foundations is more easily said
than done. Whilst many ecological economists accept the need to promote a development of
ecological economics that puts the social and political economy to the fore (not least by Clive
Spash’s seminal works, e.g. Spash, 2017), I think it is not superfluous to reiterate that our field
needs to be grounded in an understanding of capitalist dynamics of the system as a whole. It
needs to become a more critical and political social science.
103 A Scopus title-abstract-keyword search for financialisation in Ecological Economics yields 0 results
(9 August 2018).
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5.1.2 The value of value theory. Understanding the Capitalocene
In this PhD, I argue that classical Marxian Political Economy provides theory and methodology
‘fit for purpose’ for the further development of ecological economics. It has the capacity to
ground ecological economics in a realistic understanding of capitalist dynamics. The core
message that I tried to convey in chapter 3 is that – contrary to widespread views within
ecological economics – Marxian value theory is neither monistic, favouring labour, neglecting
the environment nor outdated. Rather, it is part and parcel of understanding the essence of
the capitalist system. I argued that understanding commodity exchange and the
entanglements of use value, exchange value and value help to understand what matters in
capitalism and how it shapes the world around us. Concluding, I raise the question: What are
the implications of Marxian value theory for ecological economists?
To begin with, value reveals the essence of the capitalist system. The behaviour and dynamics
of every system follow a function or purpose that is often difficult to detect (Meadows, 2009).
The function of the capitalist system is to produce value. The reproduction of capitalist
societies spirals around the extraction of surplus value. Prices are not determined by supply
and demand, but by abstract socially necessary labour time. By driving prices down, the
market exercises pressures on people and the use of energy and resources in manifold ways,
some of which I highlight in chapter 4. Marx’s value theory thereby unpacks the specific and
dominant forms of exploitation of labour and the appropriation of nature under capitalism. It
shows how capital contradicts the fundamental limitedness of resources because of its drive
toward infinite self-valorisation (Saito, 2017). The system depends on matter-energy but is
also blind to its environment (Luhmann, 1987). This is a core systemic contradiction, which
becomes ever more apparent in the face of global environmental crises.
This understanding helps ecological economists to concretise the systemic challenge we are
facing. What do we mean when we speak of systemic change and the need to restructure the
economy? What are the main problems? Money? Modernity? The market? Globalisation?
Neoclassical economics? We could say that the main problem with capitalist value production
is that capitalist societies are too successful. The seemingly collaborative highly productive
and efficient global division of labour locks societies into increasingly destructive modes of
living, as the result of systemic forces that drive abstract socially necessary labour time down.
The systemic challenge, from a Marxist perspective, is therefore to transcend the dominant
value regime. The systemic structure M-C-M’ is a positive re-enforcing feedback loop that
overshoots, if nothing is done to break it. From a sustainability perspective, it is a problem-
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generating structure (Meadows, 2009, p. 112). A systemic trap can be escaped by recognizing
it, or by altering its structure, for instance by reformulating goals, altering feedback loops, or
adding new feedback loops.
How this can be done is difficult to conceive. However, it seems clear that it cannot be done
on a simple and abstract level as the one adopted in this thesis. This thesis provides the
foundations for future developments – foundations which are missing and developments
which can happen much more in ecological economics.104 On an abstract level, we are only
able to say that capitalism tends to destroy the environment. However, “Marx was never
satisfied with such an abstract thesis” (Saito, 2017, p. 260). Where and how the core
contradiction between capital and nature (life) manifests, requires concrete analysis. Value
theory serves as starting point and guiding thread for more in-depth studies of capitalism and
concrete manifestations of ecological problems and spaces for transformative changes.
The capitalist system has proven highly adaptive and more capable of surviving than often
thought in the past. Against this background, Marxian thought is often portrayed as not
acknowledging the positive benefits and progress of capitalism and accused of painting a too
grim and pessimistic picture of the world. Surely, there are happier stories to be told. About
optimal markets leading to socially desirable outcomes, for instance. A flat and deterministic
understanding of Marxist Political Economy often ends in biased positions of favouring ‘poor’
workers against ‘evil and greedy’ capitalists, the salvation of which can only be found in
communism, as the systems next and inevitable destination. Such caricatures of Marxian
thought are not helpful for a constructive agenda in ecological economics.
The strength of Marx’s analysis lies in the investigation of general dominant reproduction
tendencies of the system as a whole. The explanatory power of this comprehensive and careful
unfolding of the capitalist system can hardly be underestimated. The description of the system
in the form of M-C-M’ is an incredibly simple and powerful notion that explains dominant
forces in society. It provides a realistic assessment of capitalism as a surplus value-driven
system. If our aim is to understand global environmental change, we are not well served by
relying on theories that tell a more comforting story, nor stories that favour workers or
capitalists or other societal groups, nor narratives that are used in the mainstream policy
104 A clearly spelled-out understanding of capital in the form of M-C-M’ underpinned by Marxian value
theory is absent in ecological economics, as I show in chapters 3 and 4. This understanding can enter
textbooks and teaching materials and can be used to reconsider and reshape research and actions.
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discourse. We are all part of the same system. This is what needs to be understood and this is
what Marx was good at explaining. There is a clear need to advance Marxian thinking within
ecological economics, ‘from misunderstanding to meaningful dialogue’, as Douai aptly puts it
(Douai, 2016). This PhD intends to be one contribution to this end.
5.1.3 The power of economic methodology
Ideas matter, no matter whether they are empirically right or wrong. Economic ideas matter
especially because they are closely tied to access to resources and power. Economic
methodology influences how economic ideas and theories come into being. From this
perspective, methodology becomes a practical tool, with highly political content, because it
either illuminates what we otherwise do not see or obscures and leaves in the dark, what is
important.
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests
is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas”
(Keynes, 1936, p. 234; emphasis added).
Power is often insidious when hidden. Who would think that an innocent-looking subject such
as economic methodology is a good way to hide power? I argue it is and that both the failings
of neoclassical economics and the explanatory power of the Marxian approach can be traced
back to methodological differences. The message for ecological economists is that the
pragmatic use, neglect or failure to take economic methodology seriously can promote the
reproduction of power relations that prevent, instead of encourage, sustainability transitions.
The practical implications of different methodological underpinnings can be fatal. In
chapters 3 and 4 I highlight how mainstream methodological foundations rooted in British
empiricism result in nothing less than a wrong conception of the economic system as a whole.
Treating the economy as if it were a C-M-C system, it can be argued, is, inter alia, the result of
methodological individualist foundations. Ilyenkov (1960) states that Smith and Ricardo had
the ambition “to understand the capitalist system of interactions as a complex whole” (p. 169)
but that they were lacking the methodological tools to do so. Their “analysis killed and
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destroyed exactly that which we intended to understand” (p. 169). Core economic phenomena
such as value, prices, profits or growth are emergent phenomena, which arise out of the
interaction of complex dynamics. A methodological individualist architecture that singles out
individual categories is incapable of making sense of these realities.
In chapter 4, I show how the methodological corset of neoclassical economics is associated
with a mechanistic understanding of capital, a flat and incoherent understanding of profits
and an idealised assuming-away of capitalist competition. The neoclassical approach thereby
fails to explain much of what matters for understanding social ecological dynamics. A key
critique of Marx was that mainstream economists are pre-occupied with appearances rather
than attempting to uncover the real essences of the world. This limits the explanatory power
of theories because they are not able to grasp and explain underlying drivers and mechanisms
of surface appearances. This matters for understanding root causes of social ecological
problems.
Chapter 2 shows how Daly’s steady-state approach remains infused with ‘old’ neoclassical
economic thinking. Despite his claim that “it is past time to change the basic framework of our
thinking” (Daly, 1996), I find Daly’s approach remains tied to externality and equilibrium
thinking. It also perpetuates analytical separations, such as the split between the monetary
and the biophysical economy, or the political sphere ‘outside the market’ and the market
itself, or the idea that scale, distribution and allocation are separate entities that can be
implemented by separate institutions. On this basis, I find steady-state economics does not go
deep enough – in terms of explaining root causes of ecological destruction and barriers to
change for Daly’s suggested ‘policy candles’ – and it does not go far enough – in terms
addressing power, politics and vested interests, for example. Ultimately, I find that
internalising neoclassical reasoning impedes the ability to understand and address social
ecological crises realistically.
I argued against mainstream thinking for ecological economics throughout this thesis and tried
to show how a neglect and failure to reason in dynamic, systemic and realistic terms easily
leads to dropping important elements that explain real-world dynamics. The claim that
neoclassical economics needs to give way to ‘new economic thinking’ is far from new and
generally accepted in ecological economics. It is not difficult to criticise the mainstream for
being reductionist; it is also not difficult to agree on the need for more realism and systems-
thinking. However, it is not straightforward how this can be done. How is it possible to grasp
complex dynamic realities? This is a methodological question.
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The way ecological economists typically address complexity is by adopting inter- and
transdisciplinary research methodologies, coupled with pleas for pluralism. This is one way
towards the integration of knowledge. It can become problematic when interdisciplinarity
becomes an eclectic bricolage of mixing incoherent ideas together. Chapter 2 illustrates
steady-state economics as one problematic example. One message from a Marxian
perspective is that there are different ways how knowledge can be integrated. The Marxian
approach is holistic and systemic and insofar interdisciplinary in itself. It studies the object of
investigation from different vantage points, works with concepts rooted in reality, and does
not shy away from real-world complexities, interconnections and contradictions. In chapters
3 and 4 I introduce elements of Marx’s methodology, specifically the method of systematic
dialectics, grounded in dialectical materialist philosophy. I show how this method was crucial
for Marx to develop a realistic theory of value and conception of the capitalist system as a
whole. I also show how it resembles a systems thinking approach aspired to in ecological
economics.
I conclude that the explanatory power of Marx’s understanding of value and capital can be
traced back to its unique methodological foundations. From this perspective, sound economic
methodology is not a waste of time, but a practical tool for understanding complex realities
and insurance against ideology. By thinking through, step by step, how different categories
are interlinked to form a whole, it is possible to conclusively explain rather than haphazardly
infer how the capitalist system functions. The combination of Marxian philosophy (materialist
dialectics), method (systematic dialectics) and theory (Marx’s analysis of capitalism) has the
potential to improve ecological economics along the lines of its core subject matter: the study
of social ecological interrelations with a view to sustainability transitions.
5.2 Moving forward. Elements of a critical research agenda for ecological
economics
This section turns the synthesising conclusion of the previous section into research priorities
looking forward. What are the implications of these insights for ecological economics and how
to deal with interconnected social ecological problems?
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5.2.1 De-mystify and confront the power of economics
Speaking as an economist has authority and power. But as Veblen emphasised long ago,
neoclassical education may contaminate instinct (Reinert et al., 2016). As neoclassical
economics remains alive and well and extremely influential within ecological economics,
grounds remain to contest it. It is not just another school of thought in a pluralist toolkit, but
a hegemonic discipline that protects vested interests and core capitalist institutions, rather
than critically exposing and dismantling them in the broader societal interest. What has always
been problematic becomes dangerous in the face of accelerating global ecological
catastrophes, because without active interventions, large-scale planning and serious
rethinking of established ways of living, social conflicts easily escalate.
One way to address power is by making is visible. This calls for researchers to look for what is
not spoken and written about, who is left out and why. From this perspective, critique
becomes an essential ingredient of transition and expression of active resistance. It helps
create transparency by informing people about unacceptable circumstances and can be
combined with building constructive alternatives at all times. This includes debunking
economic myths and challenging the dominant narrative where it is false or morally wrong.
Mainstream economics remains a social disaster and core barrier to systemic changes (as
identified in chapter 4), but one that can be de-mystified and confronted.
Meadows (1999) identifies the mindset or paradigm out of which the system – its goals, power
structures, rules, and culture – arises as a more important lever for change than the actual
goals and structures of the system (Meadows, 1999). Similarly, Oreskes and Conway (Oreskes
and Conway, 2014) expose belief-systems around market-fundamentalism as a core reason
for potential societal collapse. M-C-M’ is a structure, not an idea, however, what keeps it alive
are powerful economic ideas and narratives, which can be dismantled. By adopting a highly
critical stance towards mainstream economics and institutions and by providing fierce
critiques of their real-life implications, ecological economists can play an important role as
loud and critical societal voice. The challenge remains to ‘capture the castle’, as Victoria Chick
calls it, and reclaim economics not only as a social science but also as a life science.
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5.2.2 Transcend capital
This thesis has just set the contours – in abstract and simple terms – of an understanding of
the capitalist system and some of its social ecological ramifications. The general theoretical
framework of the system as a whole can be filled with empirical flesh of particular cases. It can
be used, for instance, to systematically explore combinations of post-growth and degrowth
proposals. What could we learn if we understood work-time reduction policies or
interventions to reduce labour productivity, for instance, against the background of
diminishing surplus value and profit creation, in a particular institutional setting? Much
research could be done to understand the role and different functions of money, financial
systems and forms of de-monetisation for achieving more sustainable and just societies; or
how to redesign systems of production that are not inclined towards expansion; or critically
examining core institutions, such as States, in supporting or challenging basic system
structures, as has been done in some of the critical social sciences for a long time.
One way to transcend capital might be to keep focussing on what really matters: satisfying
human needs in a context of global justice. We know quite well what basic human needs are
and how they can be fulfilled (meaningful participation in society, access to health care,
healthy food, decent housing, personal dignity etc.) (Doyle and Gough, 1991; Gough, 2017,
2015). It is essential to steer research and building alternatives in directions that focus on
delivering such ultimate goals directly, rather than indirectly via intermediate means.
Employment is not an ultimate goal, consumption and the possession of money neither. These
are means to achieving something else. Focusing on intermediaries often creates side-effects
that can be detrimental to the satisfaction of needs.
What remains crucial is to understand structures and institutions in the context of a larger
whole. If we understand capitalism as a complex web of entangled interactions, it becomes
clear that attempted interventions on one side will face resistance from other sides. This
means alternative systems and interventions cannot be about abolishing money, or labour
markets, etc. but about restructuring them in a way that is no longer supportive of the
dominant social relation. What we can do is to move away from piecemeal approaches and
focus efforts on alternatives that combine different elements to break systemic
entanglements at the same time. The challenge is to think through bundles of alternatives and
the role of institutions in it. Changing many structures at the same time is obviously difficult,
but if it were possible to implement alternative structures, it also means a lot could change at
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the same time. Structures can be planned, redesigned, broken and transformed. Whilst it is
difficult to conceive how to change systemic structures, it is not an excuse not to act.
5.2.3 Learn to think dialectically
Throughout this thesis, I started to introduce dialectical logic as a way of reasoning that fits
the subject matter of ecological economics, i.e. the study of social ecological transformations,
and I suggested that the standard Western approach to scientific reasoning is severely limited
towards this end. Pioneers in social ecological thought have stressed the importance of
dialectical reasoning for integrating and advancing knowledge with a view to radical change
(Bookchin, 1995; Capra, 1997, 1975; Capra and Luisi, 2014; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994b;
Ravetz, 2011). Yet, the dialectical method105 and its philosophical underpinnings in dialectical
materialism remain relatively little known.
Dialectics is a different way of seeing and thinking. Its subject is to capture change and
interaction in thought. It can be understood as an organic way of understanding processes of
becoming, emergence, co-evolution and complexity. Identifying contradictions is seen as
crucial for understanding the driving forces of change.
“In order to confront the complexities of our sciences and our world we
have to internalise in our intuition a philosophy of totality, connecting
within and across levels, dynamics, contradiction, and self-reflectivity –
which is dialectics” (Lewontin and Levins, 2007, p. 198).
It is not easy to let go of old-established ways of thinking, but it can be learnt. I think dialectic
logic could play a helpful role in advancing research on theories of change in ecological
economics. As Cornforth put it: “Dialectical materialism is an instrument in the hands of the
people for use in changing the world” (Cornforth, 1987, p. 15). I see much potential for
developing and applying the dialectical method in ways that help to ask better questions,
provide different perspectives, discover potentialities, and open up new spaces for
constructive changes. More radical thinking is a way towards more radical praxis and
dialectical logic a tool towards this end.
105 The method of systematic dialectics is extremely little known. A Scopus search on 5 June 2018 for
systematic dialectics in Abstract title, Abstract, Keywords yields 9 results. These contributions are barely
cited. To me, they are treasures of understanding.
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More specifically, I think developmental thinking has potentials for designing alternatives. For
instance, if we learn how to understand how different forms of money or markets have
developed over time, and how global tightly-interconnected production systems have evolved
from formerly more local ones, we might have better chances to design institutions that do
not result in unsustainability outcomes. Clearly, envisioning structural change does not only
happen on laptop screens and drawing boards but is also a practical field of experimentation.
However, as academics we are primarily occupied with the world of ideas and to think through
what might be better alternatives than others. Therefore, learning how to think more radically,
systematically and in process- and evolutionary terms seems to be an exciting avenue in my
view.
5.3 The future of ecological economics. Towards an emancipatory
paradigm?
Modern civilisation is at crossroads. Dominant forces in society are well underway to destroy
the living conditions for human and non-human beings on this planet. The consequences of
4 degrees global warming are to turn planet Earth into Venus, i.e. an uninhabitable planet,
with the weakest and most vulnerable beings hit first (Spratt and Dunlop, 2018). The world
seems already in a transitional period of an emerging new order, but the outcome is still
unclear. “A descent to barbarism … is just as possible as the attainment of a rational society”
(Bookchin, 1995, p. xiv). The current dominant political climate driven by rising populism,
nationalism, deepening neoliberalism and ‘post-truth’ cynicism does not invite to much
euphoria about the future state of the world. However, other worlds are possible and scientific
contributions can be made that support moving in a direction for human betterment.
“So how do you change paradigms? … In a nutshell, you keep pointing at
the anomalies and failures in the old paradigm, you keep speaking louder
and with assurance from the new one, you insert people with the new
paradigm in places of public visibility and power. You don’t waste time with
reactionaries; rather you work with active change agents and with the vast
middle ground of people who are open-minded” (Meadows, 1999, p. 18).
In this spirit, I see Marx’s methodological, theoretical and political critique of capitalism as one
key ingredient for improving ecological economics. In this thesis, I have firmly argued for the
need to break with existing prejudices against the Marxian approach and take it seriously as
realistic economic theory and guidance for more radical praxis.
171
References
Ackerman, F., 2002. Still dead after all these years: interpreting the failure of general
equilibrium theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 9, 119–139.
Adaman, F., Özkaynak, B., 2002. The Economics-Environment Relationship: Neoclassical,
Institutional, and Marxist Approaches. Studies in Political Economy 69, 109–135.
Alchian, A., 1953. The Meaning of Utility Measurement. American Economic Review 43, 26–
50.
Alcott, B., 2012. Population matters in ecological economics. Ecological Economics 80, 109–
120.
Alcott, B., 2005. Jevons’ paradox. Ecological Economics 54, 9–21.
Aldred, J., 2013. Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty.
Ecological Economics 96, 132–140.
Aldred, J., 2006. Incommensurability and Monetary Valuation. Land Economics 82, 141–161.
Alvaredo, F., Chancel, L., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G., 2017. Global inequality dynamics:
New findings from WID.world. American Economic Review 107, 404–409.
Anderson, B., M’Gonigle, M., 2012. Does ecological economics have a future? Contradiction
and reinvention in the age of climate change. Ecological Economics 84, 37–48.
Antunes, P., Kallis, G., Videira, N., Santos, R., 2009. Participation and evaluation for sustainable
river basin governance. Ecological Economics 68, 931–939.
Arnsperger, C., 2008. Never Quite Enough: Can existential thinking help us reflect on economic
development? UBE Universidad de Belgrano. Buenos Aires.
Arthur, C., 2008. Systematic Dialectic, in: Ollman, B., Smith, T. (Eds.), Dialectics for the New
Century. Palgrave MacMillan, Houndsmill and New York, pp. 211–221.
Ayres, R., Kneese, A.U., 1969. Production, Consumption, and Externalities. American Economic
Review 59, 282–297.
Ayres, R.U., 1997. Technological Progress: A Proposed Measure, INSEAD Working paper
97/101/EPS. Fontainebleau.
Ayres, R.U., Ayres, L.W., Pokrovsky, V.N., 2005. On the efficiency of US electricity usage since
1900. Energy 30, 1092–1145.
Ayres, R.U., Ayres, L.W., Warr, B., 2003. Exergy, power and work in the US economy, 1900–
1998. Energy 28, 219–273.
Ayres, R.U., Turton, H., Casten, T., 2007. Energy efficiency, sustainability and economic growth.
Energy 32, 634–648.
Ayres, R.U., Voudouris, V., 2014. The economic growth enigma: Capital, labour and useful
energy? Energy Policy 64, 16–28.
Ayres, R.U., Warr, B., 2009. The Economic Growth Engine. How energy and work drive material
prosperity. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Ayres, R.U., Warr, B., 2005. Accounting for growth: the role of physical work. Structural Change
and Economic Dynamics 16, 181–209.
172
Banaji, J., 1979. From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel’s Dialectic in Marx’s Capital, in: Elson,
D. (Ed.), Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism. CSE Books, London, pp. 14–
45.
Bannock, G., Baxter, R.E., Rees, R., 1984. The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 3rd ed. Penguin
Books, Harmondsworth.
Bauman, Z., Donskis, L., 2016. Liquid Evil. Polity Press, Cambridge and Malden.
Bayliss, K., Fine, B., Robertson, M., 2017. Introduction to special issue on the material cultures
of financialisation. New Political Economy 22, 355–370.
Bayliss, K., Fine, B., Robertson, M., 2015. From Financialisation to Consumption: The Systems
of Provision Approach Applied to Housing and Water, FESSUD Working paper No 2.
Leeds.
Becker, C., Faber, M., Hertel, K., Manstetten, R., 2005. Malthus vs. Wordsworth: Perspectives
on humankind, nature and economy. A contribution to the history and the foundations
of ecological economics. Ecological Economics 53, 299–310.
Bellofiore, R., 2011. Crisis theory and the Great Recession: a personal journey from Marx to
Minsky. Research in Political Economy 27, 81–120.
Benjaminsen, T.A., Bryceson, I., 2012. Conservation, green/blue grabbing and accumulation
by dispossession in Tanzania. Journal of Peasant Studies 39, 335–355.
Bertalanffy, L., 1968. General System Theory. Foundations, Development, Applications. Georg
Braziller, New York.
Blauwhof, F.B., 2012. Overcoming accumulation: Is a capitalist steady-state economy
possible? Ecological Economics 84, 254–261.
Boffo, M., Brown, A., Spencer, D.A., 2017. From happiness to social provisioning: addressing
well-being in times of crisis. New Political Economy 22, 450–462.
Böhm-Bawerk, E., 1894. The ultimate standard of value. The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 5, 1–60.
Bookchin, M., 2015. The Next Revolution. Verso, London and New York.
Bookchin, M., 1995. The Philosophy of Social Ecology. Essays on Dialectical Naturalism. Black
Rose Books, Montreal, New York and London.
Bookchin, M., 1982. The Ecology of Freedom. The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy.
Cheshire Books, Pao Alto.
Boulding, Kenneth, E., 1956. General Systems Theory - the Skeleton of Science. Management
Science 2, 197–208.
Boumans, R., Costanza, R., Farley, J., Wilson, M.A., Portela, R., Rotmans, J., Villa, F., Grasso, M.,
2002. Modeling the dynamics of the integrated earth system and the value of global
ecosystem services using the GUMBO model. Ecological Economics 41, 529–560.
Brand, U., 2016. How to get out of the multiple crisis? Contours of a critical theory of social-
ecological transformation. Environmental Values 25, 503–525.
Brand, U., Wissen, M., 2012. Global Environmental Politics and the Imperial Mode of Living:
Articulations of State-Capital Relations in the Multiple Crisis. Globalizations 9, 547–560.
Brennan, T., 1997. Economy for the earth: The labour theory of value without the
subject/object distinction. Ecological Economics 20, 175–185.
Brockway, P.E., Barrett, J.R., Foxon, T.J., Steinberger, J.K., 2014. Divergence of trends in US and
173
UK Aggregate Exergy Efficiencies 1960-2010. Environmental Science & Technology 48,
9874–9881.
Brockway, P.E., Steinberger, J.K., Barrett, J.R., Foxon, T.J., 2015. Understanding China’s past
and future energy demand: An exergy efficiency and decomposition analysis. Applied
Energy 155, 892–903.
Bromley, D.W., 1990. The idelology of efficiency: Searching for a theory of policy analysis.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19, 86–107.
Brown, A., 2008. A materialist development of some recent contributions to the labour theory
of value. Cambridge Journal of Economics 32, 125–146.
Brown, A., 2007. Reorienting critical realism: A system-wide perspective on the capitalist
economy. Journal of Economic Methodology 14, 499–519.
Brown, A., 2002. Critical realism, value and capital. PhD thesis. Middlesex University London.
Brown, A., Spencer, D.A., 2014. Understanding the Global Financial Crisis: Sociology, Political
Economy and Heterodox Economics. Sociology 48, 938–953.
Brown, A., Spencer, D.A., 2012. The nature of economics and the failings of the mainstream:
Lessons from Lionel Robbins’s essay. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36, 781–798.
Buch-Hansen, H., 2018. The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical
Political Economy. Ecological Economics 146, 157–163.
Bull, J., Suttle, K.B., Gordon, A., Singh, N., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 2013. Biodiversity offsets in
theory and practice. Oryx 47, 369–380.
Burkett, P., 2009. Marxism and Ecological Economics. Toward a Red and Green Political
Economy. Haymarket Books, Chicago.
Burkett, P., 2004. Marx’s reproduction schemes and the environment. Ecological Economics
49, 457–467.
Burkett, P., 2003. The Value Problem in Ecological Economics. Organization & Environment
16, 137–167.
Burkett, P., 1996. Value, Capital and Nature: Some Ecological Implications of Marx’s Critique
of Political Economy. Science and Society 60, 332–359.
Burkett, P., Foster, J.B., 2008. The Podolinsky myth: An obituary introduction to “human labour
and unity of force”, by Sergei Podolinsky. Historical Materialism 16, 115–161.
Burkett, P., Foster, J.B., 2006. Metabolism, energy, and entropy in Marx’ s critique of political
economy: Beyond the Podolinsky myth. Theory and Society 35, 109–156.
Capra, F., 1997. The Web of Life. A New Synthesis of Mind and Matter. Flamingo, London.
Capra, F., 1975. The Tao of Physics. An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics
and Eastern Mysticism. Shambhala Publications, Boulder.
Capra, F., Luisi, P.L., 2014. The Systems View of Life. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
CASSE, 2016. Centre for the Advancement of the Steady-State Economy [WWW Document].
URL www.steadystate.org
Chick, V., 2018. The future of heterodox economics. AHE 2018 conference opening address,
Leicester.
Chick, V., Dow, S., 2005. The meaning of open systems. Journal of Economic Methodology 12,
363–381.
174
Christensen, P., 1989. Historical Roots for Ecological Economics: Biophysical vs. Allocative
Approaches. Ecological Economics 1, 17–36.
Christensen, P., 1987. Classical Roots for a Modern Materials-Energy Analysis. Ecological
Modelling 38, 75–89.
Clark, B., Foster, J.B., 2009. Ecological imperialism and the global metabolic rift: Unequal
exchange and the guano/nitrates trade. International Journal of Comparative Sociology
50, 311–334.
Clarke, S., 2012. Crisis theory, in: Fine, B., Saad-Filho, A., Boffo, M. (Eds.), The Elgar Companion
to Marxist Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton, pp. 90–95.
Clarke, S., 1991. Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology. From Adam Smith to Max Weber,
2nd ed. Basingtoke, London.
Cleveland, C.J., 1999. Biophysical economics: from physiocracy to ecological economics and
industrial ecology, in: Gowdy, J.M., Mayumi, K. (Eds.), Bioeconomics and Sustainability:
Essays in Honor of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 125–154.
Cleveland, C.J., 1987. Biophysical economics: Historical perspective and current research
trends. Ecological Modelling 38, 47–73.
Cleveland, C.J., Costanza, R., Hall, C.A., Kaufmann, R., 1984. Energy and the U. S. economy: a
biophysical perspective. Science 225, 890–897.
Colander, D., Holt, R., Rosser, J.B., 2004. The Changing face of economics: conversations with
cutting edge economists. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Common, M., Stagl, S., 2005. Ecological Economics. An Introduction. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Connor, B.J.O., 1988. Capitalism , Nature , Socialism: A Theoretical Introduction 1, 11–38.
Cornforth, M., 1987. Dialectical Materialism. An Introduction. Volume I: Materialism and the
Dialectical Method, 5th ed. Lawrence & Wishart, London.
Costanza, R., 1989. What is ecological economics? Ecological Economics 1, 1–7.
Costanza, R., 1980. Embodied energy and economic valuation. Science 210, 1219–1224.
Costanza, R., Cumberland, J.H., Daly, H.E., Goodland, R., Norgaard, R.B., Kubiszewski, I., Franco,
C., 2015. An Introduction to Ecological Economics, 2nd ed. CRC Press, London and New
York.
Costanza, R., D’Arge, R., de Groot, R., Farber, S., Grasso, M., Hannon, B., Limburg, K., Naeem,
S., O’Neill, R. V, Paruelo, J., Raskin, R.G., Sutton, P., van den Belt, M., 1997. The value of
the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital. Nature 387, 253–260.
Costanza, R., Farber, S., 2002. Introduction to the special issue on the dynamics and value of
ecosystem services: integrating economic and ecological perspectives. Ecological
Economics 41, 367–373.
Cruz, I., Stahel, A., Max-Neef, M., 2009. Towards a systemic development approach: Building
on the Human-Scale Development paradigm. Ecological Economics 68, 2021–2030.
D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F., Kallis, G., 2014. Degrowth. A New Vocabulary. Routledge, New York
and London.
Dafermos, Y., Galanis, G., Nikolaidi, M., 2014. An ecological stock-flow-fund modelling
framework, IMK FMM Conference paper. Berlin.
Daly, H.E., 2010a. From a Failed-Growth Economy to a Steady-State Economy. Solutions 1, 37–
175
43.
Daly, H.E., 2010b. Comment: The operative word here is “somehow”. Real-World Economics
Review 54, 103.
Daly, H.E., 2008. A Steady-State Economy. A failed growth economy and a steady-state
economy are not the same thing; they are the very different alternatives we face.,
Sustainable Development Commission Thinkpiece. London.
Daly, H.E., 1997a. Reply to Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22, 271–273.
Daly, H.E., 1997b. Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22, 261–266.
Daly, H.E., 1996. Beyond Growth. Beacon Press, Boston.
Daly, H.E., 1994. Reply to Prakash and Gupta. Ecological Economics 10, 90–91.
Daly, H.E., 1992. Allocation, distribution, and scale: towards an economics that is efficient, just,
and sustainable. Ecological Economics 6, 185–193.
Daly, H.E., 1991a. Steady-State Economics. Island Press, Washington.
Daly, H.E., 1991b. Towards an Environmental Macroeconomics. Land Economics 67, 255–259.
Daly, H.E., 1974a. The Economics of the Steady State. American Economic Review 64, 15–21.
Daly, H.E., 1974b. Steady-State Economics versus Growthmania: A Critique of the Orthodox
Conceptions of Growth, Wants, Scarcity, and Efficiency. Policy Sciences 5, 149–167.
Daly, H.E., Cobb, J.B., 1989. For the Common Good. Redirecting the Economy toward
Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. Beacon Press, Boston.
Daly, H.E., Farley, J., 2011. Ecological Economics. Principles and Applications, 2nd ed. Island
Press, Washington, Covelo and London.
Dietz, R., O’Neill, D., 2013. Enough is Enough. Building a Sustainble Economy in a World of
Finite Resources. Routledge, Abingdon.
Douai, A., 2016. Ecological marxism and ecological economics: From misunderstanding to
meaningful dialogue. Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics: Nature and Society
57–66.
Douai, A., 2009. Value theory in ecological economics: The contribution of a political economy
of wealth. Environmental Values 18, 257–284.
Doyle, G., Gough, I., 1991. A Theory of Human Need. Guildford Press, New York.
Durand, C., 2017. Fictitious Capital. How Finance is Appropriating our Future. Verso, London.
Easterlin, R.A., McVey, L.A., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O., Zweig, J., 2010. The happiness-income
paradox revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107, 22463–22468.
Economakis, G., Papalexiou, G., 2016. Environmental Degradation and Crisis: A Marxist
Approach. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 27, 34-51.
Ekins, P., Simon, S., Deutsch, L., Folke, C., De Groot, R., 2003. A framework for the practical
application of the concepts of critical natural capital and strong sustainability. Ecological
Economics 44, 165–185.
Elson, D., 1979. What is Marx’s Theory of Value a Theory of?, in: Elson, D. (Ed.), Value: The
Representation of Labour in Capitalism. CSE Books, London, pp. 115–180.
Emel, J., 2017. Valuing the Earth and Each Other. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 28, 62–67.
Fairhead, J., Leach, M., Scoones, I., 2012. Green Grabbing: A new appropriation of nature?
176
Journal of Peasant Studies 39, 237–261.
Farber, S., Costanza, R., Wilson, M., 2002. Economic and ecological concepts for valuing
ecosystem services. Ecological Economics 41, 375–392.
Farley, J., 2015. Steady State Economics, in: D’Alisa, G., Demaria, F.K., Kallis, G. (Eds.),
Degrowth. A Vocabulary for a New Era. Routledge, New York and London.
Farley, J., Washington, H., 2018. Circular Firing Squads: A Response to “The Neoclassical Trojan
Horse of Steady-State Economics” by Pirgmaier. Ecological Economics 147, 442–449.
Fine, B., 2016. Microeconomics: A Critical Companion. Pluto Press, London.
Fine, B., 2012. Economic reproduction and the circuits of capital, in: Fine, B., Saad-Filho, A.,
Boffo, M. (Eds.), The Elgar Companion to Marxist Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
and Northampton, pp. 111–118.
Fine, B., 2007. Rethinking Critical Realism: Labour Markets or Capitalism. Capital & Class 31,
125–130.
Fine, B., 2004. Addressing the critical and the real in critical realism, in: Lewis, P. (Ed.),
Transforming Economics. Perspectives on the Critical Realist Project. Routledge, London
and New York, pp. 202–226.
Fine, B., 2002. The World of Consumption. The material and cultural revisited, 2nd ed.
Routledge, London and New York.
Fine, B., 2000. Endogenous growth theory: a critical assessment. Cambridge Journal of
Economics 24, 245–265.
Fine, B., Dimakou, O., 2016. Macroeconomics. A Critical Companion. Pluto Press, London.
Fine, B., Lapavitsas, C., Saad-Filho, A., 2004. Transforming the transformation problem: Why
the “new interpretation” is a wrong turning. Review of Radical Political Economics 36, 3–
19.
Fine, B., Saad-Filho, A., 2018. Marx 200: The Abiding Relevance of the Labour Theory of Value.
Review of Political Economy 30, 1–16.
Fine, B., Saad-Filho, A., 2016. Marx’s Capital, 6th ed. Pluto Press, London.
Fischer-Kowalski, M., 1998. Society’s Metabolism. The Intellectual History of Materials Flow
Analysis, Part I, 1860-1970. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2, 61–78.
Fischer-Kowalski, M., Hüttler, W., 1999. Society’s Metabolism. The Intellectual History of
Materials Flow Analysis, Part II, 1970-1998. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2, 107–136.
Fischer-Kowalski, M., Krausmann, F., Pallua, I., 2014. A sociometabolic reading of the
anthropocene: Modes of subsistence, population size and human impact on Earth.
Anthropocene Review 1, 8–33.
Fleetwood, S., 2011. Laws and tendencies in Marxist political economy. Capital & Class 36,
235–262.
Fleetwood, S., 2001. Causal Laws, Functional Relations and Tendencies. Review of Political
Economy 13, 201–220.
Foley, D., 1982. The value of money, the value of labor power and the Marxian transformation
problem. Review of Radical Political Economics 14, 37–47.
Fontana, G., Sawyer, M., 2013. Post-Keynesian and Kaleckian thoughts on ecological
macroeconomics. European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies 10, 256–267.
177
Foster, J.B., Burkett, P., 2016. Marx and the Earth. An Anti-Critique. Brill, Leiden.
Foster, J.B., Burkett, P., 2008. Classical Marxism and the second law of thermodynamics.
Organization & Environment 21, 3–37.
Foster, J.B., Burkett, P., 2004. Ecological Economics and Classical Marxism. The “Podolinsky
Business” Reconsidered. Organization & Environment 17, 32–60.
Foster, J.B., Clark, B., York, R., 2010. The Ecological Rift. Capitalism’s War on the Earth. Monthly
Review Press, New York.
Foster, J.B., Holleman, H., 2014. The theory of unequal ecological exchange: a Marx-Odum
dialectic. Journal of Peasant Studies 41, 199–233.
Foxon, T.J., 2018. Energy and economic growth. Why we need a new pathway to prosperity.
Routledge, London.
Foxon, T.J., 2011. A coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustainable low
carbon economy. Ecological Economics 70, 2258–2267.
Foxon, T.J., Köhler, J., Michie, J., Oughton, C., 2013. Towards a new complexity economics for
sustainability. Cambridge Journal of Economics 37, 187–208.
Fuchs, D., Di Giulio, A., Glaab, K., Lorek, S., Maniates, M., Princen, T., Røpke, I., 2016. Power:
the missing element in sustainable consumption and absolute reductions research and
action. Journal of Cleaner Production 132, 298–307.
Fullbrook, E., 2014. New Paradigm Economics versus Old Paradigm Economics. Real-World
Economics Review 66, 131–143.
Fullbrook, E., 2013. New paradigm economics. Real-World Economics Review 65, 139–131.
Funtowicz, S.O., Ravetz, J.R., 1994a. The worth of a songbird: ecological economics as a post-
normal science. Ecological Economics 10, 197–207.
Funtowicz, S.O., Ravetz, J.R., 1994b. Emergent complex systems. Futures 26, 568–582.
Funtowicz, S.O., Ravetz, J.R., 1994c. Uncertainty, Complexity and Post-Normal Science.
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 13, 1881–1885.
Funtowicz, S.O., Ravetz, J.R., 1993. Science for the post-normal age. Futures 25, 739–755.
Gallai, N., Salles, J.M., Settele, J., Vaissière, B.E., 2009. Economic valuation of the vulnerability
of world agriculture confronted with pollinator decline. Ecological Economics 68, 810–
821.
Georgescu-Roegen, N., 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Gerber, J.-D., Gerber, J.-F., 2017. Decommodification as a foundation for ecological
economics. Ecological Economics 131, 551–556.
Getzner, M., Spash, C.L., Stagl, S., 2004. Alternatives for Environmental Valuation. Routledge,
London and New York.
Gómez-Baggethun, E., de Groot, R., Lomas, P.L., Montes, C., 2010. The history of ecosystem
services in economic theory and practice: From early notions to markets and payment
schemes. Ecological Economics 69, 1209–1218.
Gough, I., 2017. Recomposing consumption: defining necessities for sustainable and equitable
well-being. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A 375, 1–18.
Gough, I., 2015. Climate change and sustainable welfare: The centrality of human needs.
178
Cambridge Journal of Economics 39, 1191–1214.
Gould, K.A., Pellow, D.N., Schnaiberg, A., 2008. The treadmill of production. Injustice and
unsustainability in the global economy. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder.
Gowdy, J., 1994. Coevolutionary Economics. The Economy, Society and the Environment.
Kluwer, Dordrecht.
Gowdy, J., Erickson, J.D., 2005. The approach of ecological economics. Cambridge Journal of
Economics 29, 207–222.
Gowdy, J.M., 1991. Bioeconomics and post Keynesian economics: a search for common
ground. Ecological Economics 3, 77–87.
Groot, R.S., Wilson, M.A., Boumans, R.M., 2002. A typology for the classification, description
and valuation of ecosystem functions, goods and services. Ecological Economics 41, 393–
408.
Hahnel, R., 2012. The Growth Imperative: Beyond Assuming Conclusions. Review of Radical
Political Economics 45, 24–41.
Hammond, G.P., Stapleton, A.J., 2001. Exergy analysis of the United Kingdom energy system.
Journal of Power and Energy 215, 141–162.
Harcourt, G.C., 1969. Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. Journal of
Economic Literature 7, 369–405.
Hardt, L., O’Neill, D.W., 2017. Ecological Macroeconomic Models: Assessing Current
Developments. Ecological Economics 134, 198–211.
Harre, R., Madden, E.H., 1975. Causal Powers. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Harvey, D., 2015. Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Profile Books, London.
Harvey, D., 2010a. Reading Marx’s Capital Volume I [WWW Document]. URL
http://davidharvey.org/reading-capital (accessed 11.12.17).
Harvey, D., 2010b. A Companion to Marx’s Capital. Verso, London and New York.
Harvey, D., 2006. Limits to Capital. Verso, London and New York.
Harvey, D., 2004. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Heilbroner, R.L., 1980. Marxism – For and Against. W. W. Norton & Company, New York and
London.
Hepburn, C., Bowen, A., 2012. Prosperity with growth: Economic growth, climate change and
environmental limits, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment Working paper No. 93. London.
Heun, M.K., Santos, J., Brockway, P.E., Pruim, R., Domingos, T., Sakai, M., 2017. From Theory
to Econometrics to Energy Policy: Cautionary Tales for Policymaking Using Aggregate
Production Functions. Energies 10, 1–44.
Holling, C.S., 1985. The resilience of terrestrial ecosystems: local surprise and global change,
in: Roederer, J.G., Malone, T.F. (Eds.), Global Change. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 228–269.
Holt, R.P., Pressman, S., Spash, C.L., 2009. Post Keynesian and Ecological Economics.
Confronting environmental issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Hornborg, A., 2014. Ecological economics, Marxism, and technological progress: Some
explorations of the conceptual foundations of theories of ecologically unequal exchange.
179
Ecological Economics 105, 11–18.
Hornborg, A., 1998. Commentary: Towards an ecological theory of unequal exchange:
Articulating world system theory and ecological economics. Ecological Economics 25,
127–136.
Horton, S., 1997. Value, waste and the built environment: A Marxian analysis. Capitalism,
Nature, Socialism 8, 127–139.
Hovardas, T., 2016. Two paradoxes with one stone: A critical reading of ecological
modernization. Ecological Economics 130, 1–7.
Howard, M., 1983. Profits in Economic Theory. Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke.
Howarth, R.B., 2011. Intergenerational Justice, in: Dryzek, J.S., Norgaard, R.B., Schlosberg, D.
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 338–352.
Howarth, R.B., Farber, S., 2002. Accounting for the value of ecosystem services. Ecological
Economics 41, 421–429.
Huber, M.T., 2017. Value, Nature, and Labor: A Defense of Marx. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism
28, 39–52.
Hüther, G., 2013. Kommunale Intelligenz: Potentialentfaltung in Städten und Gemeinden.
Körber Stiftung, Hamburg.
Ilyenkov, E., 1977. Dialectical Logic. Progress Publishers, Moscow.
Ilyenkov, E., 1960. Dialectics of the Abstract & the Concrete in Marx’s Capital. Progress
Publishers, Moscow.
Ince, O.U., 2014. Primitive accumulation, new enclosures, and global land grabs: A theoretical
intervention. Rural Sociology 79, 104–131.
Jackson, T., 2009. Prosperity Without Growth. Economics for a Finite Planet. Earthscan,
London.
Jayashankar, P., Ashta, A., Rasmussen, M., 2015. Slow money in an age of fiduciary capitalism.
Ecological Economics 116, 322–329.
Jo, T.-H., 2011. Social Provisioning Process and Socio-Economic Modelling. American Journal
of Economics and Sociology 70, 1094–1116.
Jorgenson, A.K., 2016. Environment, development, and ecologically unequal exchange.
Sustainability 8, 227.
Judson, D.H., 1989. The Convergence of Neo-Ricardian and Embodied Energy Theories of
Value and Price. Ecological Economics 1, 261–281.
Kallis, G., 2017. Radical dematerialization and degrowth. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society A 375, 1–13.
Kallis, G., Gómez-Baggethun, E., Zografos, C., 2013. To value or not to value? That is not the
question. Ecological Economics 94, 97–105.
Kallis, G., Kerschner, C., Martinez-Alier, J., 2012. The economics of degrowth. Ecological
Economics 84, 172–180.
Kallis, G., Norgaard, R.B., 2010. Coevolutionary ecological economics. Ecological Economics
69, 690–699.
Kallis, G., Swyngedouw, E., 2017. Do Bees Produce Value? A Conversation Between an
180
Ecological Economist and a Marxist Geographer. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 28, 1–15.
Kapp, K.W., 1978. The Social Costs of Cutthroat Competition, Planned Obsolecence and Sales
Promotion, in: Kapp, K.W. (Ed.), The Social Costs of Business Enterprise. Spokesman,
Nottingham, pp. 224–247.
Kapp, K.W., 1971. The Social Costs of Private Enterprise. Schocken Books, New York.
Kapp, K.W., 1961. Toward a Science of Man in Society. A Positive Approach to the Integration
of Social Knowledge. Martinus Nijhof, The Hague.
Keen, S., 2001. Debunking Economics. The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences. Pluto Press,
Annandale.
Kenney-Lazar, M., Kay, K., 2017. Value in Capitalist Natures. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 28,
33–38.
Kenway, P., 1980. Marx, Keynes and the possibility of crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics
4, 23–36.
Kenyon, W., 2007. Evaluating flood risk management options in Scotland: A participant-led
multi-criteria approach. Ecological Economics 64, 70–81.
Keynes, J.M., 1936. The general theory of employment, interest and money. Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, Oxford.
Kirman, A., 1989. The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The Emperor has No
Clothes. The Economic Journal 99, 126–139.
Kliman, A., McGlone, T., 1988. The transformation non-problem and the non-transformation
problem. Capital & Class 12, 56–84.
Klitgaard, K.A., Krall, L., 2012. Ecological economics, degrowth, and institutional change.
Ecological Economics 84, 247–253.
Knuth, S., 2017. Green Devaluation: Disruption, Divestment, and Decommodification for a
Green Economy Green. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 28, 98–117.
Kosoy, N., Corbera, E., 2010. Payments for ecosystem services as commodity fetishism.
Ecological Economics 69, 1228–1236.
Krall, L., Klitgaard, K.A., 2011. Ecological economics and institutional change. Annals of the
New York Academy of Sciences 1219, 185–196.
Kronenberg, T., 2010. Finding common ground between ecological economics and post-
Keynesian economics. Ecological Economics 69, 1488–1494.
Krupp, S., 1963. Analytic Economics and the Logic of External Effects. American Economic
Review 53, 220–226.
Kümmel, R., 2011. The Second Law of Economics. Energy, entropy, and the origins of wealth.
Springer, London.
Kümmel, R., 1982. The Impact of Energy on Industrial Growth. Energy 7, 189–203.
Kümmel, R., Strassl, W., Gossner, A., Eichhorn, W., 1985. Technical Progress and Energy
Dependent Production Functions. Journal of Economics 45, 285–311.
Lapavitsas, C., 2017. Marxist Monetary Theory. Haymarket Books, Chicago.
Lapavitsas, C., 2013. The financialization of capitalism: Profiting without producing. City 17,
792–805.
Lapavitsas, C., 2011. Theorizing financialization. Work, Employment and Society 25, 611–626.
181
Lash, S., Dragos, B., 2016. An Interview with Philip Mirowski. Theory, Culture and Society 33,
123–140.
Lawn, P., 2010. Facilitating the transition to a steady-state economy: Some macroeconomic
fundamentals. Ecological Economics 69, 931–936.
Lawn, P., 2007. Frontier Issues in Ecological Economics. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Lawn, P., 2004. A comment on the independence of allocation, distribution and scale.
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 4, 298–303.
Lee, F., 2009. A History of Heterodox Economics. Challenging the Mainstream in the Twentieth
Century. Routledge, London.
Lélé, S., Norgaard, R.B., 2005. Practicing Interdisciplinarity. BioScience 55, 967.
Leopold, A., 1949. A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There. Oxford University
Press, New York.
Lewontin, R., Levins, R., 2007. Biology under the Influence. Dialectical Essays on Ecology,
Agriculture, and Health. Monthly Review Press, New York.
Lietaer, B., Arnsperger, C., Goerner, S., Brunnhuber, S., 2012. Money and Sustainability: The
Missing Link, Report of the Club of Rome - EU Chapter. Brussels.
Limburg, K.E., O’Neill, R. V, Costanza, R., Farber, S., 2002. Complex systems and valuation.
Ecological Economics 41, 409–420.
Liodakis, G., 1994. The People-Nature Relation and the Historical Significance of the Labour
Theory of Value. Capital & Class 73, 113–140.
Lipietz, A., 1982. The So-Called “Transformation Problem" Revisited. Journal of Economic
Theory 26, 59–88.
Liu, Z., Koerwer, J., Nemoto, J., Imura, H., 2008. Physical energy cost serves as the “invisible
hand” governing economic valuation: Direct evidence from biogeochemical data and the
U.S. metal market. Ecological Economics 67, 104–108.
Lo, A.Y., 2013. Agreeing to pay under value disagreement: Reconceptualizing preference
transformation in terms of pluralism with evidence from small-group deliberations on
climate change. Ecological Economics 87, 84–94.
Lorde, A., 2007. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches. Crossing Press, Berkeley.
Luhmann, N., 1994. Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.
Luhmann, N., 1987. Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie. Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt.
Lux, K., 2003. The failure of the profit motive. Ecological Economics 44, 1–9.
Mäler, K.-G., 1990. Economic theory and environmental degradation: a survey of some
problems. Revista de Analisis Economico 5, 7–17.
Malghan, D., 2010. On the relationship between scale, allocation, and distribution. Ecological
Economics 69, 2261–2270.
Malm, A., 2016. Fossil Capital. The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming.
Verso, London and New York.
Mankiw, N.G., 2013. Macroeconomics, 8th ed. Palgrave MacMillan, Houndsmill.
Mankiw, N.G., 2004. Principles of Microeconomics, 3rd ed. Thomson South-Western, Mason.
182
Martinez-Alier, J., 2003. The Environmentalism of the Poor. A Study of Ecological Conflicts and
Valuation. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Martinez-Alier, J., 1987. Ecological Economics. Energy, Environment and Society. Blackwell,
Oxford and Cambridge, MA.
Martinez-Alier, J., Barca, S., Sciarelli, R., Engel di Mauro, S., Di Pierri and A Sud, M., Leonardi,
E., 2018. In Memory of James O’Connor (1930-2017).
Martinez-Alier, J., Munda, G., O’Neill, J., 1998. Weak comparability of values as a foundation
for ecological economics. Ecological Economics 26, 277–286.
Martinez-Alier, J., Muradian, R., 2015a. Handbook of Ecological Economics. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham and Northampton.
Martinez-Alier, J., Muradian, R., 2015b. Taking Stock: the keystones of ecological economics,
in: Martinez-Alier, J., Muradian, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Ecological Economics. Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 1–25.
Martinez-Alier, J., Naredo, E., 1982. A Marxist precursor of energy economics: Podolinsky. The
Journal of Peasant Studies 9, 207–224.
Martinez-Alier, J., Røpke, I., 2008. Recent Developments in Ecological Economics. Edward
Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton.
Marx, K., 1993. Capital Volume II. Penguin Classics, London.
Marx, K., 1991. Capital Volume III. Penguin Classics, London.
Marx, K., 1990. Capital Volume I. Penguin Classics, London.
Marx, K., 1863. Theories of Surplus Value. Progress Publishers, Moscow.
Mattioli, G., Roberts, C., Brown, A., Steinberger, J.K., forthcoming. Elements of a Political
Economy of Car Dependence.
Max-Neef, M., 1995. Economic growth and quality of life: a threshold hypothesis. Ecological
Economics 15, 115–118.
Max-Neef, M.A., 2005. Foundations of transdisciplinarity. Ecological Economics 53, 5–16.
Meadows, D.H., 2009. Thinking in Systems. A Primer. Earthscan, London.
Meadows, D.H., 2002. Dancing with Systems. The Systems Thinker 13, 2–6.
Meadows, D.H., 1999. Leverage Points. Places to Intervene in a System, The Sustainability
Institute. Hartland VT.
Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., 1972. The Limits to Growth. New American
Library, New York.
Melathopoulos, A.P., Stoner, A.M., 2015. Critique and transformation: On the hypothetical
nature of ecosystem service value and its neo-Marxist, liberal and pragmatist criticisms.
Ecological Economics 117, 173–181.
Mill, J.S., 2006. Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social
Philosophy. Ebiron Classics, London.
Milonakis, D., Fine, B., 2009. From Political Economy to Economics: Method, the social and the
historical in the evolution of economic theory. Routledge, Abingdon, New York.
Mirowski, P., 1989. More Heat than Light. Economics as social physics: Physics as nature’s
economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
183
Missemer, A., 2018. Natural Capital as an Economic Concept, History and Contemporary
Issues. Ecological Economics 143, 90–96.
Moore, J.W., 2015. Capitalism in the Web of Life. Verso, London and New York.
Moore, J.W., 2014. Toward a Singular Metabolism. Epistemic Rifts and Environment-Making
in the Capitalist World-Ecology. New Georgraphies 06, 11–19.
Moore, J.W., 2011. Transcending the metabolic rift: A theory of crises in the capitalist world-
ecology. Journal of Peasant Studies 38, 1–46.
Moore, J.W., 2000. Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical
Perspective. Organization & Environment 13, 123-157.
Moseley, F., 2000. The “New Solution” to the Transformation Problem: A Symphathetic
Critique. Review of Radical Political Economics 32, 282–316.
Mujezinovic, D., 2013. Socialism, capitalism and Dalyian steady-state economy. Investigating
the potential for a Marxian contribution to Herman Daly’s conception of ecological
economics. Master’s thesis. The University of Manchester.
Muradian, R., Martinez-Alier, J., 2001. Trade and the environment: From a “Southern”
perspective. Ecological Economics 36, 281–297.
Murphy, D.J., Hall, C.A.S., 2011. Energy return on investment, peak oil, and the end of
economic growth. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1219, 52–72.
Murphy, D.J., Hall, C.A.S., Dale, M., Cleveland, C.J., 2011. Order from Chaos: A Preliminary
Protocol for Determining the EROI of Fuels. Sustainability 3, 1888–1907.
Murray, P., 2017. The Mismeasure of Wealth. Essays on Marx and Social Form. Haymarket
Books, Chicago.
Murray, P., 1993. The necessity of money: how Hegel helped Marx surpass Ricardo’s theory of
value, in: Moseley, F. (Ed.), Marx’s Method in “Capital”: A Re-Examination. Humanities
Press, New Jersey, pp. 37–62.
Murray, P., Schuler, J., 2017. The Commodity Spectrum. Continental Thought & Theory 1, 112–
152.
Nadeau, R.L., 2015. The unfinished journey of ecological economics. Ecological Economics
109, 101–108.
Nelson, A., 2001. The poverty of money: Marxian insights for ecological economists. Ecological
Economics 36, 499–511.
Nelson, J.A., 2008. Economists, value judgments, and climate change: A view from feminist
economics. Ecological Economics 65, 441–447.
Nicholson, W., Snyder, C., 2014. Intermediate Microeconomics and its applications, 12th ed.
Cengage Learning, Boston.
Niemeyer, S., Spash, C.L., 2001. Environmental valuation analysis, public deliberation, and
their pragmatic syntheses: A critical appraisal. Environment and Planning C: Government
and Policy 19, 567–585.
Norgaard, R., 1994. Development Betrayed. The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary
Revisioning of the Future. Routledge, Abingdon.
O’Neill, D., 2015. What Should Be Held Steady in a Steady-State Economy? Interpreting Daly’s
Definition at the National Level. Journal of Industrial Ecology 19, 552–563.
O’Neill, J., 1998. The Market. Ethics, Knowledge and Politics. Routledge, London and New York.
184
O’Neill, J., 1992. Intrinsic value. The Monist 75, 119–137.
O’Neill, J., Spash, C.L., 2000. Appendix: Policy research brief conceptions of value in
environmental decision-making. Environmental Values 9, 521–536.
Obrinsky, M., 1983. Profit Theory and Capitalism. Martin Robertson, Oxford.
Odum, H.T., Odum, E.C., 2006. The prosperous way down. Energy 31, 21–32.
Okun, A.M., 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff. Brookings Institution, Washington.
Ollman, B., 1993. Dialectical Investigations. Routledge, New York and London.
Ollman, B., 1971. Alienation. Marx’s conception of man in capitalist society. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Ollman, B., Smith, T., 2008. Dialectics for the New Century. Palgrave MacMillan, Houndsmill
and New York.
Oreskes, N., Conway, E.M., 2014. The Collapse of Western Civilization. Dædalus, the Journal
of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 142, 40–58.
Özkaynak, B., Adaman, F., Devine, P., 2012. The identity of ecological economics: retrospects
and prospects. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36, 1123–1142.
Paavola, J., Adger, W.N., 2005. Institutional ecological economics. Ecological Economics 53,
353–368.
Parkin, M., 2014. Economics, 11th ed. Pearson, Harlow.
Patterson, M., 1998. Commensuration and theories of values in ecological economics.
Ecological Economics 25, 105–125.
Pauliuk, S., Arvesen, A., Stadler, K., Hertwich, E.G., 2017. Industrial ecology in integrated
assessment models. Nature Climate Change 7, 13–20.
Perloff, J.M., 2015. Microeconomics, 7th ed. Pearson, Boston.
Perman, R., Ma, Y., McGilvray, J., Common, M., 2003. Natural Resource and Environmental
Economics. Pearson, Harlow.
Persons, C.E., 1913. Marginal Utility and Marginal Disutility as Ultimate Standards of Value.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 27, 547–578.
Pindyck, R.S., Rubinfeld, D.L., 2015. Microeconomics, 8th ed. London.
Pirgmaier, E., Urhammer, E., 2015. Value pluralism and incommensurability in ecological
economics, Thor Heyerdahl Summer School in Environmental Governance Vol. 3. Aas.
Plumecocq, G., 2014. The second generation of ecological economics: How far has the apple
fallen from the tree? Ecological Economics 107, 457–468.
Pokrovsky, V.N., 2003. Energy in the theory of production. Energy 28, 769–788.
Polanyi, K., 1944. The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.
Beacon Press, Boston.
Prakash, A., Gupta, A.K., 1994. Are efficiency, equity, and scale independent. Ecological
Economics 10, 89–91.
Proops, J.L.R., 1989. Ecological economics: Rationale and problem areas. Ecological Economics
1, 59–76.
Puller, A., Smith, T., 2017. A critical and realist approach to ecological economics, in: Spash,
C.L. (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics: Nature and Society. Abingdon
185
and New York, pp. 17–26.
Rao, N.D., Baer, P., 2012. “Decent Living” emissions: A conceptual framework. Sustainability
4, 656–681.
Rao, N.D., Min, J., 2018. Decent Living Standards: Material Prerequisites for Human Wellbeing.
Social Indicators Research 138, 225–244.
Rauschmayer, F., Omann, I., Frühmann, J., 2011. Sustainable Development: Capabilities,
Needs, and Well-being. Routledge, New York and London.
Ravetz, J.R., 2011. Postnormal Science and the maturing of the structural contradictions of
modern European science. Futures 43, 142–148.
Reinert, E., Ghosh, J., Kattel, R., 2016. Handbook of alternative theories of economic
development. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Northampton.
Reuten, G., 2017. An Outline of Systematic Dialectics for the investigation and exposition of
the capitalist system, in: The Unity of the Capitalist Economy and State. A Systematic-
Dialectical Exposition of the Capitalist System [Unpublished].
Reuten, G., 2000. The Interconnection of Systematic Dialectics and Historical Materialism.
Historical Materialism 7, 137–165.
Rezai, A., Stagl, S., 2016. Ecological macroeconomics: Introduction and review. Ecological
Economics 121, 181–185.
Richters, O., Siemoneit, A., 2017. Consistency and stability analysis of models of a monetary
growth imperative. Ecological Economics 136, 114–125.
Rizvi, S.A.T., 1994. The microfoundations project in general equilibrium theory. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 18, 357–377.
Robbins, L., 1932. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. Macmillan,
London.
Robertson, M., 2017. (De)constructing the financialised culture of owner-occupation in the
UK, with the aid of the 10Cs. New Political Economy 22, 398–409.
Røpke, I., 2016. Complementary system perspectives in ecological macroeconomics - The
example of transition investments during the crisis. Ecological Economics 121, 237–245.
Røpke, I., 2015. Sustainable consumption: transitions, systems and practices, in: Martinez-
Alier, J., Muradian, R. (Eds.), Handbook of Ecological Economics. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham and Northampton, pp. 332–359.
Røpke, I., 2005. Trends in the development of ecological economics from the late 1980s to the
early 2000s. Ecological Economics 55, 262–290.
Røpke, I., 2004. The early history of modern ecological economics. Ecological Economics 50,
293–314.
Røpke, I., 1999. Prices are not worth much. Ecological Economics 29, 45–46.
Saad-Filho, A., 2002. The Value of Marx. Political Economy for contemporary capitalism.
Routledge, Abingdon, New York.
Saari, D.G., 1995. Mathematical complexity of simple economics. Notices of the American
Mathematical Society 42, 222–230.
Saint-Exupéry, A., 1943. The Little Prince. Egmont, London.
Saito, K., 2017. Capital, Nature, and The Unfinished Critique of Political Economy. Karl Marx’s
186
Ecosocialism. Monthly Review Press, New York.
Schandl, H., Fischer-Kowalski, M., West, J., Giljum, S., Dittrich, M., Eisenmenger, N., Geschke,
A., Lieber, M., Wieland, H., Schaffartzik, A., Krausmann, F., Gierlinger, S., Hosking, K.,
Lenzen, M., Tanikawa, H., Miatto, A., Fishman, T., 2017. Global Material Flows and
Resource Productivity: Forty Years of Evidence. Journal of Industrial Ecology 22, 827–
838.
Schmidt-Bleek, F., 2001. MIPS and ecological rucksacks in designing the future, in: Proceedings
of the Second International Symposium on Environmentally Conscious Design and
Inverse Manufacturing. IEEE, Tokyo, pp. 1–8.
Schumpeter, J.A., 1954. History of economic analysis. Allen & Unwin, London.
Screpanti, E., Zamagi, S., 2005. An outline of the history of economic thought, 2nd ed. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Seidl, I., Tisdell, C., 1999. Carrying capacity reconsidered: from Malthus’ population theory to
cultural carrying capacity. Ecological Economics 31, 395–408.
Serrenho, A.C., Warr, B., Sousa, T., Ayres, R.U., Domingos, T., 2012. Natural resource
accounting: exergy-to-useful work analysis in Portugal from 1856 to 2009, Conference
paper. Portland.
Shaikh, A., 2016. Capitalism. Competition, Conflict, Crises. Oxford University Press, New York.
Shaikh, A., 1978. An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories, in: URPE (Ed.), US Capitalism
in Crisis. URPE, New York, pp. 219–241.
Shaikh, A., 1977. Marx’s Theory of Value and the “Transformation Problem,” in: Schwartz, J.
(Ed.), The Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism. Goodyear, Santa Monica, CA, pp. 106–139.
Shmelev, S.E., 2012. Ecological Economics. Sustainability in Practice. Springer, Dordrecht,
Heidelberg, London and New York.
Simms, A., Smith, J. (Eds.), 2008. Do Good Lives Have To Cost The Earth? Constable & Robinson
Ltd, London.
Smith, A., 1999. The Wealth of Nations Books I-III. Penguin Classics, London.
Smith, R., 2010. Beyond growth or beyond capitalism? Real-World Economics Review 53, 28–
42.
Smith, T., 1998. Value Theory and Dialectics. Science & Society 3, 460–470.
Smith, T., 1990. The Logic of Marx’ Capital. New York Press, New York.
Söderbaum, P., 2008. Understanding sustainability economics: towards pluralism in
economics. Earthscan, London.
Söderbaum, P., 2000. Ecological Economics. A Political Economics Approach to Environment
and Development. Earthscan, London.
Söderbaum, P., 1999. Values, ideology and politics in ecological economics. Ecological
Economics 28, 161–170.
Söllner, F., 1997. A reexamination of the role of thermodynamics for environmental
economics. Ecological Economics 22, 175–201.
Solow, R.M., 1997. Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow-Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22, 267–
268.
Sorrell, S., Dimitropoulos, J., Sommerville, M., 2009. Empirical estimates of the direct rebound
187
effect: A review. Energy Policy 37, 1356–1371.
Spash, C.L., 2017. Routledge Handbook of Ecological Economics. Routledge, Abingdon and
New York.
Spash, C.L., 2015a. The Future Post-Growth Society. Development and Change 46, 366–380.
Spash, C.L., 2015b. Bulldozing biodiversity: The economics of offsets and trading-in Nature.
Biological Conservation 192, 541–551.
Spash, C.L., 2014. Economics, Reality and the Myths of Growth, Presentation at Thor
Heyerdahl Summer School in Environmental Governance. Ås.
Spash, C.L., 2013. The shallow or the deep ecological economics movement? Ecological
Economics 93, 351–362.
Spash, C.L., 2012. New foundations for ecological economics. Ecological Economics 77, 36–47.
Spash, C.L., 2011a. Social Ecological Economics: Understanding the Past to See the Future.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 70, 340–375.
Spash, C.L., 2011b. Terrible economics, ecosystems and banking. Environmental Values 20,
141–145.
Spash, C.L., 2008a. How much is that ecosystem in the window? The one with the bio-diverse
trail. Environmental Values 17, 259–284.
Spash, C.L., 2008b. Deliberative Monetary Valuation and the Evidence for a New Value Theory.
Land Economics 84, 469–488.
Spash, C.L., Ryan, A., 2012. Economic schools of thought on the environment: Investigating
unity and division. Cambridge Journal of Economics 36, 1091–1121.
Spash, C.L., Vatn, A., 2006. Transferring environmental value estimates: Issues and
alternatives. Ecological Economics 60, 379–388.
Spencer, D.A., 2013. Integrating economics with the other human (and related) sciences: some
initial considerations, FESSUD Working paper No 1. Leeds.
Spencer, D.A., 2004. From Pain Cost to Opportunity Cost: The Eclipse of the Quality of Work
as a Factor in Economic Theory. History of Political Economy 36, 387–400.
Spratt, D., Dunlop, I., 2018. What lies beneath? The underestimation of existential climate risk,
Breakthrough. National Centre For Climate Restoration. Melbourne.
Sraffa, P., 1926. The Law of returns under competitive conditions. Economic Journal 40, 538–
550.
Standing, G., 2016. The Corruption of Capitalism. Why Rentiers Thrive and Work does not pay.
Biteback Publishing, London.
Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockström, J., Cornell, S.E., Fetzer, I., Bennett, E.M., Biggs, R.,
Carpenter, S.R., De Vries, W., De Wit, C.A., Folke, C., Gerten, D., Heinke, J., Mace, G.M.,
Persson, L.M., Ramanathan, V., Reyers, B., Sörlin, S., 2015. Planetary boundaries: Guiding
human development on a changing planet. Science 347, 736–747.
Stern, D.I., 2011. The role of energy in economic growth. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 1219, 26–51.
Stern, D.I., 1993. Energy and economic growth in the USA. A multivariate approach. Energy
Economics 22, 137–150.
Stern, D.I., Kander, A., 2012. The Role of Energy in the Industrial Revolution and Modern
188
Economic Growth. The Energy Journal 33, 125–152.
Stewen, M., 1998a. The interdependence of allocation, distribution, scale and stability - A
comment on Herman E. Daly’s vision of an economics that is efficient, just and
sustainable. Ecological Economics 27, 119–130.
Stewen, M., 1998b. Response to Herman Daly. Ecological Economics.
Stigler, G., 1958. Ricardo and the 93% Labor Theory of Value. American Economic Review 48,
357–367.
Stigler, G., 1950. The Development of Utility Theory. Journal of Political Economy 58, 307–327.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1997. Georgescu-Roegen versus Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22, 269–
270.
Sullivan, S., 2013. Banking Nature? The Spectacular Financialisation of Environmental
Conservation. Antipode 45, 198–217.
Sutton, P.C., Costanza, R., 2002. Global estimates of market and non-market values derived
from nighttime satellite imagery, land cover, and ecosystem service valuation. Ecological
Economics 41, 509–527.
Taşdemir Yaşın, Z., 2017. The adventure of capital with nature: from the metabolic rift to the 
value theory of nature. The Journal of Peasant Studies 44, 377–401.
Temper, L., Bene, D. del, Alier, J.M., 2015. Mapping the frontiers and frontlines of global
environmental justice: the EJAtlas. Journal of Political Ecology 22, 255–278.
Trainer, T., 2011. The Radical Implications of Zero Growth Economy. Real-World Economics
Review 57, 71–82.
Turner, R.K., Paavola, J., Cooper, P., Farber, S., Jessamy, V., Georgiou, S., 2003. Valuing nature:
Lessons learned and future research directions. Ecological Economics 46, 493–510.
Vatn, A., 2015a. Environmental Governance: Institutions, Policies and Actions. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham and Northampton.
Vatn, A., 2015b. Markets in environmental governance. From theory to practice. Ecological
Economics 117, 225–233.
Vatn, A., 2005a. Rationality, institutions and environmental policy. Ecological Economics 55,
203–217.
Vatn, A., 2005b. Institutions and the Environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and
Northampton.
Vatn, A., Bromley, D.W., 1994. Choices without Prices without Apologies. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 26, 129–148.
Veblen, T., 1904. The Theory of Business Enterprise. Martino Fine Books, Eastford.
Veblen, T., 1898. Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science? The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 12, 373–397.
Victor, P., 2010. Questioning economic growth. Nature 468, 370–371.
Victor, P.A., 1991. Indicators of sustainable development: some lessons from capital theory.
Ecological Economics 4, 191–213.
Victor, P.A., Rosenbluth, G., 2007. Managing without growth. Ecological Economics 61, 492–
504.
Vlachou, A., 2002. Nature and Value Theory. Science & Society 66, 169–201.
189
Wackernagel, M., Onisto, L., Bello, P., Callejas Linares, A., López Falfán, S., Méndez Garcıá, J., 
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